Narrative:

Upon arrival in ZZZ, we were advised that the first officer and myself were to do a test flight on aircraft XXX. The write-up on the aircraft stated that from 17000 ft to approximately 15000 ft with the autopilot on, the stabilizer out of trim light illuminated. The autopilot was disconnected and the yoke was found to be frozen. Forward and aft pressure was applied on 'both' yokes with no results. In trim condition was achieved with electric trim. Ailerons were normal. At approximately 4000 ft the yoke returned to normal. Two of our mechanics were present and I asked them what the sign off was to fix the problem. They stated that they had checked the entire system and had found nothing other than a fault with the 'a' autopilot which they had reset. They felt that ice was not an issue. No components had been changed. I contacted dispatch to find out what their plans were for this aircraft and us and was advised that they wanted us to do a full test flight to check out the complete aircraft autopilot systems. My thought was that this was a bad idea because of the following reasons: 1. If the aircraft passed it would be put back into service with the same faulty component still in the aircraft waiting to cause another problem. 2. If the aircraft problem repeated itself on the test flight, it would be the one with the jammed elevator which, per the write up, was not able to be overcontrolled by both pilots applying pressure to the yoke, per our QRH procedure to regain elevator control for this type of problem. Since the mechanics had felt certain that the problem was somewhere in the a autopilot system. Advised dispatch that I would not do a complete test flight but would ferry the aircraft to YYY, with the autopilot off. After discussions with both maintenance and dispatch about why I would not do a test flight, but would do a ferry flight, I was told that a ferry flight was 'not' an option. It would have to be a full test flight or nothing. I advised dispatch that I would not fly the flight. A few minutes later, the dispatch manager called and restated that the flight would have to be a full test flight or nothing. I read the write up to him and my thoughts about not flying the airplane with the autopilot engaged until components had been changed. I told him that I would not do it. He then told me that if I would not fly the aircraft, he would call the chief pilot on call and find someone who would. I said something to the effect that 'that would be fine.' a few more minutes passed and the chief pilot on call called. He was on a conference call with the manager. I read the write-up to the chief and he agreed that a test flight was probably not in order since the culprit component was still somewhere in the airplane. The manager then did a complete 180 turn with his thoughts, stated that he did not understand the complete write-up earlier, and offered an apology. All of a sudden, a ferry flight became a possibility and we ferried the aircraft to YYY on a ferry permit with the autopilot not to be used. I considered this a 'flight safety concern' because of the insistent pressure to fly this aircraft with a flight control problem of this significance with the thought that duplicating the problem on a test flight was an acceptable outcome. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was maintenance ferried to a maintenance station where it was out of service for four days. The reporter said during this time the NTSB removed the flight data recorder. The reporter stated the maintenance findings were 'a' autopilot servo was always engaged and was corrected by a relay replacement. The reporter said maintenance also found the elevator input control rod out of adjustment and believes this was the corrective action. The reporter said the airplane was test flown and returned to service. The reporter stated the insistence and determination of the manager of dispatch to test fly the airplane when not having full understanding of the actual problem was disturbing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ELEVATORS LOCKED UP FROM 15000 FT TO 17000 FT WHERE ELEVATOR CONTROL WAS RECOVERED. CAUSED BY ELEVATOR INPUT CONTROL ROD OUT OF ADJUSTMENT.

Narrative: UPON ARRIVAL IN ZZZ, WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE FO AND MYSELF WERE TO DO A TEST FLIGHT ON AIRCRAFT XXX. THE WRITE-UP ON THE AIRCRAFT STATED THAT FROM 17000 FT TO APPROXIMATELY 15000 FT WITH THE AUTOPILOT ON, THE STAB OUT OF TRIM LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE AUTOPILOT WAS DISCONNECTED AND THE YOKE WAS FOUND TO BE FROZEN. FORWARD AND AFT PRESSURE WAS APPLIED ON 'BOTH' YOKES WITH NO RESULTS. IN TRIM CONDITION WAS ACHIEVED WITH ELECTRIC TRIM. AILERONS WERE NORMAL. AT APPROX 4000 FT THE YOKE RETURNED TO NORMAL. TWO OF OUR MECHANICS WERE PRESENT AND I ASKED THEM WHAT THE SIGN OFF WAS TO FIX THE PROBLEM. THEY STATED THAT THEY HAD CHECKED THE ENTIRE SYSTEM AND HAD FOUND NOTHING OTHER THAN A FAULT WITH THE 'A' AUTOPILOT WHICH THEY HAD RESET. THEY FELT THAT ICE WAS NOT AN ISSUE. NO COMPONENTS HAD BEEN CHANGED. I CONTACTED DISPATCH TO FIND OUT WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE FOR THIS AIRCRAFT AND US AND WAS ADVISED THAT THEY WANTED US TO DO A FULL TEST FLIGHT TO CHECK OUT THE COMPLETE ACFT AUTOPILOT SYSTEMS. MY THOUGHT WAS THAT THIS WAS A BAD IDEA BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1. IF THE ACFT PASSED IT WOULD BE PUT BACK INTO SERVICE WITH THE SAME FAULTY COMPONENT STILL IN THE ACFT WAITING TO CAUSE ANOTHER PROBLEM. 2. IF THE ACFT PROBLEM REPEATED ITSELF ON THE TEST FLIGHT, IT WOULD BE THE ONE WITH THE JAMMED ELEVATOR WHICH, PER THE WRITE UP, WAS NOT ABLE TO BE OVERCONTROLLED BY BOTH PILOTS APPLYING PRESSURE TO THE YOKE, PER OUR QRH PROCEDURE TO REGAIN ELEVATOR CONTROL FOR THIS TYPE OF PROBLEM. SINCE THE MECHANICS HAD FELT CERTAIN THAT THE PROBLEM WAS SOMEWHERE IN THE A AUTOPILOT SYSTEM. ADVISED DISPATCH THAT I WOULD NOT DO A COMPLETE TEST FLIGHT BUT WOULD FERRY THE AIRCRAFT TO YYY, WITH THE AUTOPILOT OFF. AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH MAINTENANCE AND DISPATCH ABOUT WHY I WOULD NOT DO A TEST FLIGHT, BUT WOULD DO A FERRY FLIGHT, I WAS TOLD THAT A FERRY FLIGHT WAS 'NOT' AN OPTION. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A FULL TEST FLIGHT OR NOTHING. I ADVISED DISPATCH THAT I WOULD NOT FLY THE FLIGHT. A FEW MINUTES LATER, THE DISPATCH MGR CALLED AND RESTATED THAT THE FLIGHT WOULD HAVE TO BE A FULL TEST FLIGHT OR NOTHING. I READ THE WRITE UP TO HIM AND MY THOUGHTS ABOUT NOT FLYING THE AIRPLANE WITH THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGED UNTIL COMPONENTS HAD BEEN CHANGED. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD NOT DO IT. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT IF I WOULD NOT FLY THE AIRCRAFT, HE WOULD CALL THE CHIEF PILOT ON CALL AND FIND SOMEONE WHO WOULD. I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT 'THAT WOULD BE FINE.' A FEW MORE MINUTES PASSED AND THE CHIEF PILOT ON CALL CALLED. HE WAS ON A CONFERENCE CALL WITH THE MGR. I READ THE WRITE-UP TO THE CHIEF AND HE AGREED THAT A TEST FLIGHT WAS PROBABLY NOT IN ORDER SINCE THE CULPRIT COMPONENT WAS STILL SOMEWHERE IN THE AIRPLANE. THE MGR THEN DID A COMPLETE 180 TURN WITH HIS THOUGHTS, STATED THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE COMPLETE WRITE-UP EARLIER, AND OFFERED AN APOLOGY. ALL OF A SUDDEN, A FERRY FLIGHT BECAME A POSSIBILITY AND WE FERRIED THE AIRCRAFT TO YYY ON A FERRY PERMIT WITH THE AUTOPILOT NOT TO BE USED. I CONSIDERED THIS A 'FLIGHT SAFETY CONCERN' BECAUSE OF THE INSISTENT PRESSURE TO FLY THIS AIRCRAFT WITH A FLIGHT CONTROL PROBLEM OF THIS SIGNIFICANCE WITH THE THOUGHT THAT DUPLICATING THE PROBLEM ON A TEST FLIGHT WAS AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: THE REPORTER STATED THE AIRCRAFT WAS MAINTENANCE FERRIED TO A MAINTENANCE STATION WHERE IT WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR FOUR DAYS. THE REPORTER SAID DURING THIS TIME THE NTSB REMOVED THE FLIGHT DATA RECORDER. THE REPORTER STATED THE MAINTENANCE FINDINGS WERE 'A' AUTOPILOT SERVO WAS ALWAYS ENGAGED AND WAS CORRECTED BY A RELAY REPLACEMENT. THE REPORTER SAID MAINTENANCE ALSO FOUND THE ELEVATOR INPUT CONTROL ROD OUT OF ADJUSTMENT AND BELIEVES THIS WAS THE CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE REPORTER SAID THE AIRPLANE WAS TEST FLOWN AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. THE REPORTER STATED THE INSISTENCE AND DETERMINATION OF THE MGR OF DISPATCH TO TEST FLY THE AIRPLANE WHEN NOT HAVING FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTUAL PROBLEM WAS DISTURBING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.