Narrative:

I was acting as PNF from the right seat on a beechjet 400A. The flight was operating from richmond international, class C airspace. After engines started and passenger on board, we called ground for taxi with ATIS information. ATIS information reported VMC with runway 20/2 closed, runway 16 and runway 25 in use and various taxiway closures. Ground issued a taxi clearance. We taxied north on taxiway U from the southwest corner of the field, running parallel with runway 20/2. The captain stopped the aircraft at the hold short line on taxiway a. Just after this hold short, both approach ends of runway 20 and runway 16 meet. Tower issued a takeoff clearance without specifying a runway. The captain called for the line-up check and proceeded to line up. My eyes and head were inside completing the line-up checks when the captain asked me to verify we were cleared for takeoff. Tower again cleared us for takeoff and issued a turn to heading 240 degrees after takeoff. Finishing up with the checklist, I positioned the captain's heading, but to 240 degrees. Looking up as the captain was bringing up the power levers, I did not notice our heading was on 200 degrees. We had taxied onto the closed runway 20/2. I began to make standard calls when we both noticed a vehicle at the end of runway 20 with headlights on. The captain asked me to query tower about the lights, which I did. Tower responded to the query, informing us we had taxied onto a closed runway and instructed us to abort the takeoff. I called for an abort to the captain, deployed the speed brakes and acknowledged to tower we were aborting. We taxied off runway 20 about 1/2 way down the runway at taxiway east. We switched to ground, which instructed us to taxi back to the hold short line. Once back at the hold short line, tower issued a second takeoff clearance with specific instructions to cross runway 20 for takeoff on runway 16. While crossing runway 20, we noticed no 'X' indicating runway 20 was closed. Once across runway 20, no signage was located to inform us of our location. Contributing factors included: takeoff clearance issued with a specific runway or runway crossing instructions, poor signage and markings at the approach end of runway 20 and runway 16, failure of the tower to notice us taxiing onto a closed runway, no markings on a runway to indicate it was closed, failure to notice to xref headings with runways. Supplemental information from acn 528418: we were instructed to follow a citation quite a ways ahead of us. As we held on taxiway U at taxiway a, which is a common hold point for both runway 20 and runway 16, and while going through remaining preflight checks, I casually noticed a citation depart on what I thought was runway 20. First officer informed tower that we were ready for takeoff. As I rolled onto the departure end of runway 20, I noticed what appeared to possibly be an object at the end of runway 20, approximately 6600 ft away. Rather than throttling up and continuing the takeoff, I held in position on runway 20 and told my first officer to confirm with tower that we are cleared for takeoff. After hearing tower's second clearance for takeoff, I assumed that what I saw was not on the runway and started the takeoff roll. After approximately 1000 ft, it became more apparent to me that possibly a vehicle was on the end of the runway. Knowing that I only needed approximately another 2000 ft of runway for takeoff, and that I would be well clear of the object, I still elected to abort the takeoff and err on the side of safety. I commanded my first officer to tell tower that there appears to be a vehicle on the runway and we are aborting the takeoff. Tower responded after the fact and in an un-urgent voice, 'abort takeoff.' that was the first time that I was aware that runway 20 had been closed and I do not know if the runway was now closed because of the vehicle that we had alerted them to, or that we were cleared by tower to takeoff on a runway that was closed. There was nothing mentioned in the airport NOTAMS and there were no barriers, signs, or markings on the departure end of runway 20 to indicate that it was closed. Also, there was nothing mentioned on ATIS when we checked a few mins later which indicated runway 20 was once again open. Tower would have had to have seen us on runway 20 when they initially cleared us for takeoff at least when we asked for reconfirmation. We departed ric for lch. Lake charles approach informed us thatrichmond tower asked that we call them. I called and spoke to mr X. He told me he was calling about the situation that occurred a few hours ago and that they were reviewing the tapes. I received a call from mr X. He then told me that he had reviewed all the tapes, conducted interviews, and that he has determined that no pilot violation, deviation, or error had occurred on my part. He then told me that his investigation was to now focus on controller error and possible controller procedural deviations. I think that by operating to a much greater adherence and enforcement of preexisting procedures, requirements, and regulations, that any of these could have prevented this problem. All runway closures should be included in airport NOTAMS and the effective times stated, regardless of duration, in addition to ATIS that is changing continuously and of limited duration. Better communication between tower and airport surface vehicles. More closely observing the entire runway surface and length for obstructions before issuing clearance to take off. All runway closure barriers, signs, and markings should be kept in place, and then only removed as the very last item prior to opening a runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GA PAX BEECH JET 400A PIC ABORTS HIS TKOF WHEN NOTING LIGHTS AT THE END OF HIS TKOF RWY 20 WHICH, POST FACT, WAS DETERMINED TO BE CLOSED FOR TKOF AT RIC, VA.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS PNF FROM THE R SEAT ON A BEECHJET 400A. THE FLT WAS OPERATING FROM RICHMOND INTL, CLASS C AIRSPACE. AFTER ENGS STARTED AND PAX ON BOARD, WE CALLED GND FOR TAXI WITH ATIS INFO. ATIS INFO RPTED VMC WITH RWY 20/2 CLOSED, RWY 16 AND RWY 25 IN USE AND VARIOUS TXWY CLOSURES. GND ISSUED A TAXI CLRNC. WE TAXIED N ON TXWY U FROM THE SW CORNER OF THE FIELD, RUNNING PARALLEL WITH RWY 20/2. THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE ON TXWY A. JUST AFTER THIS HOLD SHORT, BOTH APCH ENDS OF RWY 20 AND RWY 16 MEET. TWR ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC WITHOUT SPECIFYING A RWY. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE LINE-UP CHK AND PROCEEDED TO LINE UP. MY EYES AND HEAD WERE INSIDE COMPLETING THE LINE-UP CHKS WHEN THE CAPT ASKED ME TO VERIFY WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. TWR AGAIN CLRED US FOR TKOF AND ISSUED A TURN TO HDG 240 DEGS AFTER TKOF. FINISHING UP WITH THE CHKLIST, I POSITIONED THE CAPT'S HDG, BUT TO 240 DEGS. LOOKING UP AS THE CAPT WAS BRINGING UP THE PWR LEVERS, I DID NOT NOTICE OUR HDG WAS ON 200 DEGS. WE HAD TAXIED ONTO THE CLOSED RWY 20/2. I BEGAN TO MAKE STANDARD CALLS WHEN WE BOTH NOTICED A VEHICLE AT THE END OF RWY 20 WITH HEADLIGHTS ON. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO QUERY TWR ABOUT THE LIGHTS, WHICH I DID. TWR RESPONDED TO THE QUERY, INFORMING US WE HAD TAXIED ONTO A CLOSED RWY AND INSTRUCTED US TO ABORT THE TKOF. I CALLED FOR AN ABORT TO THE CAPT, DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES AND ACKNOWLEDGED TO TWR WE WERE ABORTING. WE TAXIED OFF RWY 20 ABOUT 1/2 WAY DOWN THE RWY AT TXWY E. WE SWITCHED TO GND, WHICH INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI BACK TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE. ONCE BACK AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE, TWR ISSUED A SECOND TKOF CLRNC WITH SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS RWY 20 FOR TKOF ON RWY 16. WHILE XING RWY 20, WE NOTICED NO 'X' INDICATING RWY 20 WAS CLOSED. ONCE ACROSS RWY 20, NO SIGNAGE WAS LOCATED TO INFORM US OF OUR LOCATION. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED: TKOF CLRNC ISSUED WITH A SPECIFIC RWY OR RWY XING INSTRUCTIONS, POOR SIGNAGE AND MARKINGS AT THE APCH END OF RWY 20 AND RWY 16, FAILURE OF THE TWR TO NOTICE US TAXIING ONTO A CLOSED RWY, NO MARKINGS ON A RWY TO INDICATE IT WAS CLOSED, FAILURE TO NOTICE TO XREF HDGS WITH RWYS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 528418: WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW A CITATION QUITE A WAYS AHEAD OF US. AS WE HELD ON TXWY U AT TXWY A, WHICH IS A COMMON HOLD POINT FOR BOTH RWY 20 AND RWY 16, AND WHILE GOING THROUGH REMAINING PREFLT CHKS, I CASUALLY NOTICED A CITATION DEPART ON WHAT I THOUGHT WAS RWY 20. FO INFORMED TWR THAT WE WERE READY FOR TKOF. AS I ROLLED ONTO THE DEP END OF RWY 20, I NOTICED WHAT APPEARED TO POSSIBLY BE AN OBJECT AT THE END OF RWY 20, APPROX 6600 FT AWAY. RATHER THAN THROTTLING UP AND CONTINUING THE TKOF, I HELD IN POS ON RWY 20 AND TOLD MY FO TO CONFIRM WITH TWR THAT WE ARE CLRED FOR TKOF. AFTER HEARING TWR'S SECOND CLRNC FOR TKOF, I ASSUMED THAT WHAT I SAW WAS NOT ON THE RWY AND STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. AFTER APPROX 1000 FT, IT BECAME MORE APPARENT TO ME THAT POSSIBLY A VEHICLE WAS ON THE END OF THE RWY. KNOWING THAT I ONLY NEEDED APPROX ANOTHER 2000 FT OF RWY FOR TKOF, AND THAT I WOULD BE WELL CLR OF THE OBJECT, I STILL ELECTED TO ABORT THE TKOF AND ERR ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY. I COMMANDED MY FO TO TELL TWR THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE A VEHICLE ON THE RWY AND WE ARE ABORTING THE TKOF. TWR RESPONDED AFTER THE FACT AND IN AN UN-URGENT VOICE, 'ABORT TKOF.' THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I WAS AWARE THAT RWY 20 HAD BEEN CLOSED AND I DO NOT KNOW IF THE RWY WAS NOW CLOSED BECAUSE OF THE VEHICLE THAT WE HAD ALERTED THEM TO, OR THAT WE WERE CLRED BY TWR TO TKOF ON A RWY THAT WAS CLOSED. THERE WAS NOTHING MENTIONED IN THE ARPT NOTAMS AND THERE WERE NO BARRIERS, SIGNS, OR MARKINGS ON THE DEP END OF RWY 20 TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS CLOSED. ALSO, THERE WAS NOTHING MENTIONED ON ATIS WHEN WE CHKED A FEW MINS LATER WHICH INDICATED RWY 20 WAS ONCE AGAIN OPEN. TWR WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE SEEN US ON RWY 20 WHEN THEY INITIALLY CLRED US FOR TKOF AT LEAST WHEN WE ASKED FOR RECONFIRMATION. WE DEPARTED RIC FOR LCH. LAKE CHARLES APCH INFORMED US THATRICHMOND TWR ASKED THAT WE CALL THEM. I CALLED AND SPOKE TO MR X. HE TOLD ME HE WAS CALLING ABOUT THE SIT THAT OCCURRED A FEW HRS AGO AND THAT THEY WERE REVIEWING THE TAPES. I RECEIVED A CALL FROM MR X. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD REVIEWED ALL THE TAPES, CONDUCTED INTERVIEWS, AND THAT HE HAS DETERMINED THAT NO PLT VIOLATION, DEV, OR ERROR HAD OCCURRED ON MY PART. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT HIS INVESTIGATION WAS TO NOW FOCUS ON CTLR ERROR AND POSSIBLE CTLR PROCEDURAL DEVS. I THINK THAT BY OPERATING TO A MUCH GREATER ADHERENCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF PREEXISTING PROCS, REQUIREMENTS, AND REGS, THAT ANY OF THESE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS PROB. ALL RWY CLOSURES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ARPT NOTAMS AND THE EFFECTIVE TIMES STATED, REGARDLESS OF DURATION, IN ADDITION TO ATIS THAT IS CHANGING CONTINUOUSLY AND OF LIMITED DURATION. BETTER COM BTWN TWR AND ARPT SURFACE VEHICLES. MORE CLOSELY OBSERVING THE ENTIRE RWY SURFACE AND LENGTH FOR OBSTRUCTIONS BEFORE ISSUING CLRNC TO TAKE OFF. ALL RWY CLOSURE BARRIERS, SIGNS, AND MARKINGS SHOULD BE KEPT IN PLACE, AND THEN ONLY REMOVED AS THE VERY LAST ITEM PRIOR TO OPENING A RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.