Narrative:

I was the first officer (PNF) on a flight into ord during which we landed without receiving landing clearance on the assigned runway 22R. In hindsight, it is obvious that we were task saturated due to a number of significant human factors. Within 10 NM of the field and during peak traffic flow, ATC changed our runway assignment 3 times. Every time our runway was changed, we had to reaccomplish a number of tasks to ensure procedural compliance with the far's and company rules. This included: reconfiguring aircraft system including selection of the new approach in the FMC, resetting the inbound courses and decision altitude bugs, tuning and identing all navigation radios. An approach briefing was then conducted to include the missed approach and runway exit plan. When the third and final change to runway 22R was made, the workload increased even more as we had to insure the lahso clearance (hold short of runway 27R) we were issued could be safely accepted due to an occasional tailwind component caused by the variable and gusty winds, possible runway contamination, and other related operational considerations. Our workload was sustained by the high rate of descent required by ATC to put the aircraft on final, in the proper sequence as assigned for the visual approach, all while maintaining proper separation on the preceding slower aircraft. Although stabilized approach criteria was met, the initial descent rate required and the resulting difficulty in slowing our aircraft added yet again to the challenging approach. In pilot terms, it was a 'slam-dunk' approach. The last real opportunity we had to catch our mistake occurred at 1000 ft AGL, when company SOP requires the PNF to make a '1000 ft, instruments crosschecked' call. The PF is required to reply with runway assignment and landing clearance (the purpose of the reply is to insure that both pilots heard the landing clearance issued). In this case, I made the 1000 ft call, and the captain (PF) replied, 'runway 22R, cleared to land.' we discovered that we were monitoring the improper VHF frequency after landing, while holding short of runway 27R. The academic solution to this scenario would have been to request extended vectors to allow for extra time to set up for the approach. Any experienced pilot will tell you that the reality of flying into ord during peak hours and requesting extended vectors is not realistic unless you are willing to accept a significant delay while being vectored to the back of the pack. Human factors were the primary cause of this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER 3 RWY CHANGES WHILE APCH TO ORD, TASK SATURATED B757 FLC LAND WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO (PNF) ON A FLT INTO ORD DURING WHICH WE LANDED WITHOUT RECEIVING LNDG CLRNC ON THE ASSIGNED RWY 22R. IN HINDSIGHT, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE TASK SATURATED DUE TO A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT HUMAN FACTORS. WITHIN 10 NM OF THE FIELD AND DURING PEAK TFC FLOW, ATC CHANGED OUR RWY ASSIGNMENT 3 TIMES. EVERY TIME OUR RWY WAS CHANGED, WE HAD TO REACCOMPLISH A NUMBER OF TASKS TO ENSURE PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAR'S AND COMPANY RULES. THIS INCLUDED: RECONFIGURING ACFT SYS INCLUDING SELECTION OF THE NEW APCH IN THE FMC, RESETTING THE INBOUND COURSES AND DECISION ALT BUGS, TUNING AND IDENTING ALL NAV RADIOS. AN APCH BRIEFING WAS THEN CONDUCTED TO INCLUDE THE MISSED APCH AND RWY EXIT PLAN. WHEN THE THIRD AND FINAL CHANGE TO RWY 22R WAS MADE, THE WORKLOAD INCREASED EVEN MORE AS WE HAD TO INSURE THE LAHSO CLRNC (HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R) WE WERE ISSUED COULD BE SAFELY ACCEPTED DUE TO AN OCCASIONAL TAILWIND COMPONENT CAUSED BY THE VARIABLE AND GUSTY WINDS, POSSIBLE RWY CONTAMINATION, AND OTHER RELATED OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. OUR WORKLOAD WAS SUSTAINED BY THE HIGH RATE OF DSCNT REQUIRED BY ATC TO PUT THE ACFT ON FINAL, IN THE PROPER SEQUENCE AS ASSIGNED FOR THE VISUAL APCH, ALL WHILE MAINTAINING PROPER SEPARATION ON THE PRECEDING SLOWER ACFT. ALTHOUGH STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA WAS MET, THE INITIAL DSCNT RATE REQUIRED AND THE RESULTING DIFFICULTY IN SLOWING OUR ACFT ADDED YET AGAIN TO THE CHALLENGING APCH. IN PLT TERMS, IT WAS A 'SLAM-DUNK' APCH. THE LAST REAL OPPORTUNITY WE HAD TO CATCH OUR MISTAKE OCCURRED AT 1000 FT AGL, WHEN COMPANY SOP REQUIRES THE PNF TO MAKE A '1000 FT, INSTS XCHKED' CALL. THE PF IS REQUIRED TO REPLY WITH RWY ASSIGNMENT AND LNDG CLRNC (THE PURPOSE OF THE REPLY IS TO INSURE THAT BOTH PLTS HEARD THE LNDG CLRNC ISSUED). IN THIS CASE, I MADE THE 1000 FT CALL, AND THE CAPT (PF) REPLIED, 'RWY 22R, CLRED TO LAND.' WE DISCOVERED THAT WE WERE MONITORING THE IMPROPER VHF FREQ AFTER LNDG, WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 27R. THE ACADEMIC SOLUTION TO THIS SCENARIO WOULD HAVE BEEN TO REQUEST EXTENDED VECTORS TO ALLOW FOR EXTRA TIME TO SET UP FOR THE APCH. ANY EXPERIENCED PLT WILL TELL YOU THAT THE REALITY OF FLYING INTO ORD DURING PEAK HRS AND REQUESTING EXTENDED VECTORS IS NOT REALISTIC UNLESS YOU ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SIGNIFICANT DELAY WHILE BEING VECTORED TO THE BACK OF THE PACK. HUMAN FACTORS WERE THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.