Narrative:

I departed ZZZ at approximately 25 mins before the incident occurred on nov/xa/01. I had a pilot on board who wanted to buy into my aircraft as a partner. We went through an extensive preflight prior to departure in order to familiarize him with this new-to-him airplane. We specifically looked at the fuel measurements (it showed 20 gallons on each gauge) and decided that 40 gallons would be sufficient for the planned 30-45 min flight. I had just landed the aircraft and a fuel computer indicated approximately 30 gallons of fuel on board. On takeoff, all was fine, and we proceeded to a practice area about 10 mi northwest of ZZZ airspace. We went over numbers (manifold pressure, RPM) to use for climb out and in level flight. We discussed descent and shock cooling. We then did some preliminary air work to give the prospective buyer a feel of the airplane. After 4 180 degree to 360 degree turns at 10-28 degrees, we went into level flight and discussed V speeds as we throttled back slowly to 22 degrees manifold pressure. During one of the last turns, the right low fuel light came on. We discussed and decided that we would continue with the right tank so that we would definitely have a left tank with fuller fuel at the time of landing. From previous experience of filling the tank after a low fuel light had come on, I had found about 8 gallons were left in the tank. I told the passenger we would fly a few mins more and then switch tanks. During level flight and approximately 3 mins later, the engine died. My first reaction was to switch tanks and restart the engine. I proceeded to do this after establishing best glide speed and simultaneously pointing the plane toward the nearest airport. There was no hint of restart as I tried to readjust the throttle. I tried the primer switch and got no response, so I tried the low boost switch and eventually the high boost switch. When the power went out, we were at approximately 3300 ft altitude over the ground. I knew that the closest airport was not attainable after about 1 min of flight, so I spent my time trying to restart the engine, holding best glide speed and course toward this too distant airport. I checked circuit breakers, throttle mixture, propeller, and ignition -- all to no avail. At 1200 ft AGL, I decided that restart was not my main concern and I needed to pick a landing site. We found a road with few cars and set up to land on this small, dead end country road. At about 800 ft AGL, my passenger loudly and firmly said 'power lines, both sides! Power lines, both sides!' I immediately broke off the road approach and sidestepped over to a plowed field adjacent to the road. I had deployed my landing gear for the road landing and left the gear down. I noticed I was going cross furloughs but decided not to turn 90 degrees at the last min. I tried to maintain 70 KTS and gradually touched at stall speed. I told the passenger to pop the door and I turned off the master, ignition and fuel. As the plane touched down, dirt flew into the open door of the cabin and we quickly arrested to a stop about 150 ft later. The field was very soft peat and the wheels sunk into the ground, and one collapsed. The final stop was abrupt when the nose settled almost with an impact to the ground. We were both fine and unhurt. A farmer in a pickup drove over to the site and offered assistance. We gathered things out of the plane, called wives (not home), picked up debris (tire and wheel cover) and went to the home of the farmer who worked the land to report that we were fine and the plane was in the field. We drove to the perspective buyer's house and his wife took us to retrieve our cars at the airport. I called my flight instructor, mechanic and the local sheriff upon returning home. Upon reflection of what transpired, I have realized that in emergency sits, I was well trained and remained calm and alert throughout the ordeal. Although I have an emergency procedure list at my finger-tips, I did not use it due to the low altitude and precious little time. I might have pulled it out and given it to the passenger as he could have quickly reviewed it to check anything I may have missed. Although I still believe we had sufficient fuel to do what we had planned, it would have been prudent to add fuel prior to this flight. It was suggested to me that perhaps with low fuel, the fuel line 'unported and sucked air into the lines.' this apparently has been reported in bonanzas, but is not found in the M20K poh. I might have chosen the interstate highway to land my plane, possibly targeting the median area. However, due to the large volume of traffic, I felt a country road or field was the better choice. I had just returned from a trip to san diego and had flown 45 mins of a 2 hour trip in hard IMC. I may have been tired and could have reacted faster, but the outcome would have been the same. Maybe I should have looked sooner or longer for a better landing site instead of trying so hard for a restart. I did not use flaps nor retract the landing gear on landing. The sudden switch to the plowed field instead of using the road distraction my attention. The use of flaps would have lowered the stall speed and a belly landing would have minimized some of the extensive damage to the landing gear. In many ways, having the perspective buyer on board was a fortunate thing. Checklists and fine attention to details of flying the airplane were highlighted verbally as I was teaching and explaining the operation of this particular airplane. 2 trained pilots were paying attention to gauges, history and performance expectations were being discussed and events and reactive procedures were observed by both simultaneously.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: M20P PLT RAN A TANK OUT OF GAS AND WAS UNABLE TO RESTART THE ENG AFTER SWITCHING TANKS TO A TANK WITH FUEL.

Narrative: I DEPARTED ZZZ AT APPROX 25 MINS BEFORE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED ON NOV/XA/01. I HAD A PLT ON BOARD WHO WANTED TO BUY INTO MY ACFT AS A PARTNER. WE WENT THROUGH AN EXTENSIVE PREFLT PRIOR TO DEP IN ORDER TO FAMILIARIZE HIM WITH THIS NEW-TO-HIM AIRPLANE. WE SPECIFICALLY LOOKED AT THE FUEL MEASUREMENTS (IT SHOWED 20 GALLONS ON EACH GAUGE) AND DECIDED THAT 40 GALLONS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PLANNED 30-45 MIN FLT. I HAD JUST LANDED THE ACFT AND A FUEL COMPUTER INDICATED APPROX 30 GALLONS OF FUEL ON BOARD. ON TKOF, ALL WAS FINE, AND WE PROCEEDED TO A PRACTICE AREA ABOUT 10 MI NW OF ZZZ AIRSPACE. WE WENT OVER NUMBERS (MANIFOLD PRESSURE, RPM) TO USE FOR CLBOUT AND IN LEVEL FLT. WE DISCUSSED DSCNT AND SHOCK COOLING. WE THEN DID SOME PRELIMINARY AIR WORK TO GIVE THE PROSPECTIVE BUYER A FEEL OF THE AIRPLANE. AFTER 4 180 DEG TO 360 DEG TURNS AT 10-28 DEGS, WE WENT INTO LEVEL FLT AND DISCUSSED V SPDS AS WE THROTTLED BACK SLOWLY TO 22 DEGS MANIFOLD PRESSURE. DURING ONE OF THE LAST TURNS, THE R LOW FUEL LIGHT CAME ON. WE DISCUSSED AND DECIDED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE WITH THE R TANK SO THAT WE WOULD DEFINITELY HAVE A L TANK WITH FULLER FUEL AT THE TIME OF LNDG. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF FILLING THE TANK AFTER A LOW FUEL LIGHT HAD COME ON, I HAD FOUND ABOUT 8 GALLONS WERE LEFT IN THE TANK. I TOLD THE PAX WE WOULD FLY A FEW MINS MORE AND THEN SWITCH TANKS. DURING LEVEL FLT AND APPROX 3 MINS LATER, THE ENG DIED. MY FIRST REACTION WAS TO SWITCH TANKS AND RESTART THE ENG. I PROCEEDED TO DO THIS AFTER ESTABLISHING BEST GLIDE SPD AND SIMULTANEOUSLY POINTING THE PLANE TOWARD THE NEAREST ARPT. THERE WAS NO HINT OF RESTART AS I TRIED TO READJUST THE THROTTLE. I TRIED THE PRIMER SWITCH AND GOT NO RESPONSE, SO I TRIED THE LOW BOOST SWITCH AND EVENTUALLY THE HIGH BOOST SWITCH. WHEN THE PWR WENT OUT, WE WERE AT APPROX 3300 FT ALT OVER THE GND. I KNEW THAT THE CLOSEST ARPT WAS NOT ATTAINABLE AFTER ABOUT 1 MIN OF FLT, SO I SPENT MY TIME TRYING TO RESTART THE ENG, HOLDING BEST GLIDE SPD AND COURSE TOWARD THIS TOO DISTANT ARPT. I CHKED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, THROTTLE MIXTURE, PROP, AND IGNITION -- ALL TO NO AVAIL. AT 1200 FT AGL, I DECIDED THAT RESTART WAS NOT MY MAIN CONCERN AND I NEEDED TO PICK A LNDG SITE. WE FOUND A ROAD WITH FEW CARS AND SET UP TO LAND ON THIS SMALL, DEAD END COUNTRY ROAD. AT ABOUT 800 FT AGL, MY PAX LOUDLY AND FIRMLY SAID 'PWR LINES, BOTH SIDES! PWR LINES, BOTH SIDES!' I IMMEDIATELY BROKE OFF THE ROAD APCH AND SIDESTEPPED OVER TO A PLOWED FIELD ADJACENT TO THE ROAD. I HAD DEPLOYED MY LNDG GEAR FOR THE ROAD LNDG AND LEFT THE GEAR DOWN. I NOTICED I WAS GOING CROSS FURLOUGHS BUT DECIDED NOT TO TURN 90 DEGS AT THE LAST MIN. I TRIED TO MAINTAIN 70 KTS AND GRADUALLY TOUCHED AT STALL SPD. I TOLD THE PAX TO POP THE DOOR AND I TURNED OFF THE MASTER, IGNITION AND FUEL. AS THE PLANE TOUCHED DOWN, DIRT FLEW INTO THE OPEN DOOR OF THE CABIN AND WE QUICKLY ARRESTED TO A STOP ABOUT 150 FT LATER. THE FIELD WAS VERY SOFT PEAT AND THE WHEELS SUNK INTO THE GND, AND ONE COLLAPSED. THE FINAL STOP WAS ABRUPT WHEN THE NOSE SETTLED ALMOST WITH AN IMPACT TO THE GND. WE WERE BOTH FINE AND UNHURT. A FARMER IN A PICKUP DROVE OVER TO THE SITE AND OFFERED ASSISTANCE. WE GATHERED THINGS OUT OF THE PLANE, CALLED WIVES (NOT HOME), PICKED UP DEBRIS (TIRE AND WHEEL COVER) AND WENT TO THE HOME OF THE FARMER WHO WORKED THE LAND TO RPT THAT WE WERE FINE AND THE PLANE WAS IN THE FIELD. WE DROVE TO THE PERSPECTIVE BUYER'S HOUSE AND HIS WIFE TOOK US TO RETRIEVE OUR CARS AT THE ARPT. I CALLED MY FLT INSTRUCTOR, MECH AND THE LCL SHERIFF UPON RETURNING HOME. UPON REFLECTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED, I HAVE REALIZED THAT IN EMER SITS, I WAS WELL TRAINED AND REMAINED CALM AND ALERT THROUGHOUT THE ORDEAL. ALTHOUGH I HAVE AN EMER PROC LIST AT MY FINGER-TIPS, I DID NOT USE IT DUE TO THE LOW ALT AND PRECIOUS LITTLE TIME. I MIGHT HAVE PULLED IT OUT AND GIVEN IT TO THE PAX AS HE COULD HAVE QUICKLY REVIEWED IT TO CHK ANYTHING I MAY HAVE MISSED. ALTHOUGH I STILL BELIEVE WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL TO DO WHAT WE HAD PLANNED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRUDENT TO ADD FUEL PRIOR TO THIS FLT. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO ME THAT PERHAPS WITH LOW FUEL, THE FUEL LINE 'UNPORTED AND SUCKED AIR INTO THE LINES.' THIS APPARENTLY HAS BEEN RPTED IN BONANZAS, BUT IS NOT FOUND IN THE M20K POH. I MIGHT HAVE CHOSEN THE INTERSTATE HWY TO LAND MY PLANE, POSSIBLY TARGETING THE MEDIAN AREA. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE LARGE VOLUME OF TFC, I FELT A COUNTRY ROAD OR FIELD WAS THE BETTER CHOICE. I HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO SAN DIEGO AND HAD FLOWN 45 MINS OF A 2 HR TRIP IN HARD IMC. I MAY HAVE BEEN TIRED AND COULD HAVE REACTED FASTER, BUT THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME. MAYBE I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED SOONER OR LONGER FOR A BETTER LNDG SITE INSTEAD OF TRYING SO HARD FOR A RESTART. I DID NOT USE FLAPS NOR RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR ON LNDG. THE SUDDEN SWITCH TO THE PLOWED FIELD INSTEAD OF USING THE ROAD DISTR MY ATTN. THE USE OF FLAPS WOULD HAVE LOWERED THE STALL SPD AND A BELLY LNDG WOULD HAVE MINIMIZED SOME OF THE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE LNDG GEAR. IN MANY WAYS, HAVING THE PERSPECTIVE BUYER ON BOARD WAS A FORTUNATE THING. CHKLISTS AND FINE ATTN TO DETAILS OF FLYING THE AIRPLANE WERE HIGHLIGHTED VERBALLY AS I WAS TEACHING AND EXPLAINING THE OP OF THIS PARTICULAR AIRPLANE. 2 TRAINED PLTS WERE PAYING ATTN TO GAUGES, HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS WERE BEING DISCUSSED AND EVENTS AND REACTIVE PROCS WERE OBSERVED BY BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.