Narrative:

The following event occurred while on vectors for a visual approach to runway 30 at hts. I, the captain, was flying the visual approach with the airport visible off my side of the aircraft. Approach control had us level at 3000 ft, on a 030 degree heading, a modified left base to final. After the previous initial instructions by approach, the first officer informed me he was going to switch to radio #2 to call 'in range' to our company operations. I took the #1 radio while he was off frequency. 1 min later, he checked back on stating 'I'm back and have the #1 radio.' I acknowledged and soon after, further instructions from approach were received. We were told to turn right heading 060 degrees. The first officer replied and the turn was commenced. Shortly thereafter, approach stated again, 'turn right 060 degrees' and also to contact the tower. The first officer replied and then switched to tower frequency. It was at this moment that I looked at his radio panel and noticed that his last 2 replies to approach had been made to the #2 radio, not #1. I informed him of his radio set-up and he switched to #1. When the first officer checked in with the tower, we were told to look for traffic on a 3-4 mi final for runway 30. I told the first officer I had the traffic and the field in sight. Tower replied, 'turn a 5 mi final and follow the traffic.' I set up on a 5 mi final behind the traffic to be followed and soon after received a landing clearance for runway 30. A normal approach and landing were made, the aircraft arrived at the gate and prepared for our next departure. While at the gate, I was advised by our ground personnel that I needed to go into the terminal and speak to one of the controllers. I did, and he was very nice and cordial, but wanted to know what we thought about our approach. Come to find out, I had never actually received 'cleared for the visual approach' by the approach controller. Due to the selection of the wrong radio, we initiated a visual approach without proper clearance. The tower controller had cleared us to land and separation with the aircraft ahead was never broken. I left my conversation with the controller positively and he said it was not an issue, they just wanted to work out the confusion for both parties involved. Looking back on this incident, I see a number of errors I made. As the aircraft PIC, it is my responsibility to manage all information relating to the aircraft operation. My first mistake was not verifying my first officer's radio position. I was hand flying this visual. Had I used the autoplt, I might have been able to look over at his audio panel and verify the correct position. Secondly, I became so focused on looking for VFR traffic and flying a visual approach that I failed to recognize the absence of a visual approach clearance. My experience tells me I should have heard that statement prior to commencing the approach and surely before the landing clearance. To correct these errors in the future, I will do several things. I will use my aircraft system to aid me and reduce my workload, ie, autoplt. I will also seek to concentrate on making sure I hear the appropriate clearance is issued before assuming it has. There are several other factors of a human nature I feel had an impact here. This incident occurred on the 5TH day of flying in a row. This was also our second to last leg before being off. For myself, this was the 10TH day out of 11 I had worked. I had been scheduled close to the limits of flight time. (5 days on, 1 day off, 5 days on -- incident on very last day.) there is no doubt that my first officer and myself were fatigued. Although we had only been on duty approximately 9 hours, the day was drawing to an end. Also, this particular first officer was new to me. These 5 days we had flown together were our only flight experience with each other. I'm sure I trusted him too much. While he is a senior first officer, I should have watched him closer to observe his performance before trusting him so much. Finally, and sad to say, this first officer does not have the best reputation. He is known for his attitude and negative demeanor towards younger capts. It is my job to foster the safest working environment I can. I need to be a true leader with this first officer to ensure his contribution to our crew concept is accurate and helpful. In closing, I made several errors. Above all, I feel that I was complacent. I let too many items, ranging from ATC to my fatigue to interpersonal issues with my first officer, get in the way of correctly flying an approach. Learning is the only way the aviation industry ever improves or grows. Pilots are part of a long equation, and I know I learned volumes from this situation. I now know several mistakes to watch for so that I can remain a valid part of the aviation equation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB120 CREW MADE A VISUAL APCH TO HTS WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING EVENT OCCURRED WHILE ON VECTORS FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30 AT HTS. I, THE CAPT, WAS FLYING THE VISUAL APCH WITH THE ARPT VISIBLE OFF MY SIDE OF THE ACFT. APCH CTL HAD US LEVEL AT 3000 FT, ON A 030 DEG HDG, A MODIFIED L BASE TO FINAL. AFTER THE PREVIOUS INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS BY APCH, THE FO INFORMED ME HE WAS GOING TO SWITCH TO RADIO #2 TO CALL 'IN RANGE' TO OUR COMPANY OPS. I TOOK THE #1 RADIO WHILE HE WAS OFF FREQ. 1 MIN LATER, HE CHKED BACK ON STATING 'I'M BACK AND HAVE THE #1 RADIO.' I ACKNOWLEDGED AND SOON AFTER, FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM APCH WERE RECEIVED. WE WERE TOLD TO TURN R HDG 060 DEGS. THE FO REPLIED AND THE TURN WAS COMMENCED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, APCH STATED AGAIN, 'TURN R 060 DEGS' AND ALSO TO CONTACT THE TWR. THE FO REPLIED AND THEN SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. IT WAS AT THIS MOMENT THAT I LOOKED AT HIS RADIO PANEL AND NOTICED THAT HIS LAST 2 REPLIES TO APCH HAD BEEN MADE TO THE #2 RADIO, NOT #1. I INFORMED HIM OF HIS RADIO SET-UP AND HE SWITCHED TO #1. WHEN THE FO CHKED IN WITH THE TWR, WE WERE TOLD TO LOOK FOR TFC ON A 3-4 MI FINAL FOR RWY 30. I TOLD THE FO I HAD THE TFC AND THE FIELD IN SIGHT. TWR REPLIED, 'TURN A 5 MI FINAL AND FOLLOW THE TFC.' I SET UP ON A 5 MI FINAL BEHIND THE TFC TO BE FOLLOWED AND SOON AFTER RECEIVED A LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 30. A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WERE MADE, THE ACFT ARRIVED AT THE GATE AND PREPARED FOR OUR NEXT DEP. WHILE AT THE GATE, I WAS ADVISED BY OUR GND PERSONNEL THAT I NEEDED TO GO INTO THE TERMINAL AND SPEAK TO ONE OF THE CTLRS. I DID, AND HE WAS VERY NICE AND CORDIAL, BUT WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE THOUGHT ABOUT OUR APCH. COME TO FIND OUT, I HAD NEVER ACTUALLY RECEIVED 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH' BY THE APCH CTLR. DUE TO THE SELECTION OF THE WRONG RADIO, WE INITIATED A VISUAL APCH WITHOUT PROPER CLRNC. THE TWR CTLR HAD CLRED US TO LAND AND SEPARATION WITH THE ACFT AHEAD WAS NEVER BROKEN. I LEFT MY CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLR POSITIVELY AND HE SAID IT WAS NOT AN ISSUE, THEY JUST WANTED TO WORK OUT THE CONFUSION FOR BOTH PARTIES INVOLVED. LOOKING BACK ON THIS INCIDENT, I SEE A NUMBER OF ERRORS I MADE. AS THE ACFT PIC, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE ALL INFO RELATING TO THE ACFT OP. MY FIRST MISTAKE WAS NOT VERIFYING MY FO'S RADIO POS. I WAS HAND FLYING THIS VISUAL. HAD I USED THE AUTOPLT, I MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LOOK OVER AT HIS AUDIO PANEL AND VERIFY THE CORRECT POS. SECONDLY, I BECAME SO FOCUSED ON LOOKING FOR VFR TFC AND FLYING A VISUAL APCH THAT I FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE ABSENCE OF A VISUAL APCH CLRNC. MY EXPERIENCE TELLS ME I SHOULD HAVE HEARD THAT STATEMENT PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE APCH AND SURELY BEFORE THE LNDG CLRNC. TO CORRECT THESE ERRORS IN THE FUTURE, I WILL DO SEVERAL THINGS. I WILL USE MY ACFT SYS TO AID ME AND REDUCE MY WORKLOAD, IE, AUTOPLT. I WILL ALSO SEEK TO CONCENTRATE ON MAKING SURE I HEAR THE APPROPRIATE CLRNC IS ISSUED BEFORE ASSUMING IT HAS. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS OF A HUMAN NATURE I FEEL HAD AN IMPACT HERE. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON THE 5TH DAY OF FLYING IN A ROW. THIS WAS ALSO OUR SECOND TO LAST LEG BEFORE BEING OFF. FOR MYSELF, THIS WAS THE 10TH DAY OUT OF 11 I HAD WORKED. I HAD BEEN SCHEDULED CLOSE TO THE LIMITS OF FLT TIME. (5 DAYS ON, 1 DAY OFF, 5 DAYS ON -- INCIDENT ON VERY LAST DAY.) THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MY FO AND MYSELF WERE FATIGUED. ALTHOUGH WE HAD ONLY BEEN ON DUTY APPROX 9 HRS, THE DAY WAS DRAWING TO AN END. ALSO, THIS PARTICULAR FO WAS NEW TO ME. THESE 5 DAYS WE HAD FLOWN TOGETHER WERE OUR ONLY FLT EXPERIENCE WITH EACH OTHER. I'M SURE I TRUSTED HIM TOO MUCH. WHILE HE IS A SENIOR FO, I SHOULD HAVE WATCHED HIM CLOSER TO OBSERVE HIS PERFORMANCE BEFORE TRUSTING HIM SO MUCH. FINALLY, AND SAD TO SAY, THIS FO DOES NOT HAVE THE BEST REPUTATION. HE IS KNOWN FOR HIS ATTITUDE AND NEGATIVE DEMEANOR TOWARDS YOUNGER CAPTS. IT IS MY JOB TO FOSTER THE SAFEST WORKING ENVIRONMENT I CAN. I NEED TO BE A TRUE LEADER WITH THIS FO TO ENSURE HIS CONTRIBUTION TO OUR CREW CONCEPT IS ACCURATE AND HELPFUL. IN CLOSING, I MADE SEVERAL ERRORS. ABOVE ALL, I FEEL THAT I WAS COMPLACENT. I LET TOO MANY ITEMS, RANGING FROM ATC TO MY FATIGUE TO INTERPERSONAL ISSUES WITH MY FO, GET IN THE WAY OF CORRECTLY FLYING AN APCH. LEARNING IS THE ONLY WAY THE AVIATION INDUSTRY EVER IMPROVES OR GROWS. PLTS ARE PART OF A LONG EQUATION, AND I KNOW I LEARNED VOLUMES FROM THIS SIT. I NOW KNOW SEVERAL MISTAKES TO WATCH FOR SO THAT I CAN REMAIN A VALID PART OF THE AVIATION EQUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.