Narrative:

We departed bvi at XA30Z, arriving in pit at XB10Z. The WX at bvi and pit was VFR and was forecast to remain that way with a visibility not less than 2 mi throughout the night. We departed pit at XD30Z and arrived in roc at XE36Z. I then called altoona FSS and filed the return IFR flight plan to bvi. There was no discussion of the WX as there was no reason to believe that any significant change would have occurred and no WX briefing was offered by FSS, even though I had not filed for an alternate and stated that 'I didn't think one was required.' we departed roc at XE46Z. Approximately XF30Z, 15 mi from bvi, I obtained pit ATIS, as bvi has no current ATIS information when the tower is closed and they have no ASOS. Pit ATIS was indicating marginal IFR conditions due to fog and an RVR runway 10L of 1200 variable. We contacted en route flight watch for an update on the WX in the pit area and were told to contact altoona FSS for that information. We then contacted aoo FSS and learned that most of the airports in the pit area were reporting low visibility in fog. On contact with pit approach, XF40Z, we received a clearance for the runway 10 localizer approach at bvi and we requested the current WX for the agc airport. Agc was reporting 1 1/2 mi visibility with fog. I then advised pit approach that if we could not get into bvi, we would go to agc. Upon executing the missed approach at bvi, I advised pit approach and requested clearance to agc. Pit advised me that agc WX had dropped below 1/2 mi visibility and asked me of my intentions. I requested and received a clearance for the ILS runway 8 approach into btp. On executing the missed approach procedure at btp, approximately XF55Z, pit approach advised me that all of the airports in the area were reporting very low visibility with fog and asked me of my intentions. Based on the information available to me at this time and the situation growing desperate due to fuel depletion, my reply was 'at this time, sir, I may have no choice but to come to pit.' we were immediately given vectors for the pit ILS runway 10L approach and advised that the current RVR was 1000 ft versus 1200 ft. Upon passing the FAF inbound, pit advised me that the RVR was 1000 ft. I acknowledged and continued the approach to CAT I minimums in hopes that, with all of the lighting available, I would be able to obtain some visual reference to the runway. On executing the missed approach, pit once again requested my intentions and I asked him to stand by. Very shortly thereafter, pit asked me of my fuel on board. Due to the inaccuracy of my fuel gauges, I advised him that I had approximately 45-50 mins of fuel remaining. Pit then advised me that eri was reporting 5 mi visibility and aoo was reporting 3 or 4 mi visibility. After checking the ete for both these airports, 36 mins to eri and 39 mins to aoo, I requested and received a clearance to eri. After being handed off to yng approach, I again requested the current WX at eri. Yng advised me that eri was still reporting 5 mi visibility and relying on those damn inaccurate fuel gauges, I advised them that I was declaring 'minimum fuel' and could not accept any delay en route. On arrival at eri, I requested that the fueler top off the inboard and outboard fuel tanks which hold 56 and 40 gallons each respectively for a total of 192 gallons. As it turned out on arrival at eri, I had 38 gallons of fuel remaining which equates to another 49 mins 34 seconds, of engine running time. Causes: 1) inaccurate WX forecasts. 2) flight crew failure to obtain a current WX briefing from FSS prior to departure from roc. 3) failure of the flight watch personnel to provide requested information. 4) failure of aoo FSS personnel to provide any additional information above what was requested by the flight crew. 5) inaccuracy of fuel gauges leading the flight crew to believe that the situation was more desperate than actual. Remedies: 1) this flight crew shall become more vigilant in obtaining current WX information prior to departure and throughout the flight operation. 2) an aircraft mechanic has completed repair and calibration of the aircraft fuel gauge in question. 3) flight watch should be a 24 hour service -- not just when they feel like it. 4) with current technology used in WX forecasting, ie, FOUS60 and other dynamic models, the accuracy of WX forecasts should be better than what we are seeing. The FOUS60, nested grid model is one of many tools that projects ambient and dewpoint temperatures, among other atmospheric parameters, over a given time period., with tools such as this, the likelihood of fog development becomes quite apparent and the forecasts should reflect it accordingly. However, the real problem here is that quite often, a forecast may be written by one meteorologist and simply updated with only a current time by his/her successor without a re-evaluation of atmospheric conditions unless there is a significant WX event occurring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA31 CREW GOT TRAPPED IN AN AREA THAT HAD ARPTS RPTING WX BELOW LNDG MINIMUMS.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED BVI AT XA30Z, ARRIVING IN PIT AT XB10Z. THE WX AT BVI AND PIT WAS VFR AND WAS FORECAST TO REMAIN THAT WAY WITH A VISIBILITY NOT LESS THAN 2 MI THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. WE DEPARTED PIT AT XD30Z AND ARRIVED IN ROC AT XE36Z. I THEN CALLED ALTOONA FSS AND FILED THE RETURN IFR FLT PLAN TO BVI. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE WX AS THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE WOULD HAVE OCCURRED AND NO WX BRIEFING WAS OFFERED BY FSS, EVEN THOUGH I HAD NOT FILED FOR AN ALTERNATE AND STATED THAT 'I DIDN'T THINK ONE WAS REQUIRED.' WE DEPARTED ROC AT XE46Z. APPROX XF30Z, 15 MI FROM BVI, I OBTAINED PIT ATIS, AS BVI HAS NO CURRENT ATIS INFO WHEN THE TWR IS CLOSED AND THEY HAVE NO ASOS. PIT ATIS WAS INDICATING MARGINAL IFR CONDITIONS DUE TO FOG AND AN RVR RWY 10L OF 1200 VARIABLE. WE CONTACTED ENRTE FLT WATCH FOR AN UPDATE ON THE WX IN THE PIT AREA AND WERE TOLD TO CONTACT ALTOONA FSS FOR THAT INFO. WE THEN CONTACTED AOO FSS AND LEARNED THAT MOST OF THE ARPTS IN THE PIT AREA WERE RPTING LOW VISIBILITY IN FOG. ON CONTACT WITH PIT APCH, XF40Z, WE RECEIVED A CLRNC FOR THE RWY 10 LOC APCH AT BVI AND WE REQUESTED THE CURRENT WX FOR THE AGC ARPT. AGC WAS RPTING 1 1/2 MI VISIBILITY WITH FOG. I THEN ADVISED PIT APCH THAT IF WE COULD NOT GET INTO BVI, WE WOULD GO TO AGC. UPON EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH AT BVI, I ADVISED PIT APCH AND REQUESTED CLRNC TO AGC. PIT ADVISED ME THAT AGC WX HAD DROPPED BELOW 1/2 MI VISIBILITY AND ASKED ME OF MY INTENTIONS. I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A CLRNC FOR THE ILS RWY 8 APCH INTO BTP. ON EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH PROC AT BTP, APPROX XF55Z, PIT APCH ADVISED ME THAT ALL OF THE ARPTS IN THE AREA WERE RPTING VERY LOW VISIBILITY WITH FOG AND ASKED ME OF MY INTENTIONS. BASED ON THE INFO AVAILABLE TO ME AT THIS TIME AND THE SIT GROWING DESPERATE DUE TO FUEL DEPLETION, MY REPLY WAS 'AT THIS TIME, SIR, I MAY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO COME TO PIT.' WE WERE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN VECTORS FOR THE PIT ILS RWY 10L APCH AND ADVISED THAT THE CURRENT RVR WAS 1000 FT VERSUS 1200 FT. UPON PASSING THE FAF INBOUND, PIT ADVISED ME THAT THE RVR WAS 1000 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONTINUED THE APCH TO CAT I MINIMUMS IN HOPES THAT, WITH ALL OF THE LIGHTING AVAILABLE, I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SOME VISUAL REF TO THE RWY. ON EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH, PIT ONCE AGAIN REQUESTED MY INTENTIONS AND I ASKED HIM TO STAND BY. VERY SHORTLY THEREAFTER, PIT ASKED ME OF MY FUEL ON BOARD. DUE TO THE INACCURACY OF MY FUEL GAUGES, I ADVISED HIM THAT I HAD APPROX 45-50 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING. PIT THEN ADVISED ME THAT ERI WAS RPTING 5 MI VISIBILITY AND AOO WAS RPTING 3 OR 4 MI VISIBILITY. AFTER CHKING THE ETE FOR BOTH THESE ARPTS, 36 MINS TO ERI AND 39 MINS TO AOO, I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO ERI. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO YNG APCH, I AGAIN REQUESTED THE CURRENT WX AT ERI. YNG ADVISED ME THAT ERI WAS STILL RPTING 5 MI VISIBILITY AND RELYING ON THOSE DAMN INACCURATE FUEL GAUGES, I ADVISED THEM THAT I WAS DECLARING 'MINIMUM FUEL' AND COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY DELAY ENRTE. ON ARR AT ERI, I REQUESTED THAT THE FUELER TOP OFF THE INBOARD AND OUTBOARD FUEL TANKS WHICH HOLD 56 AND 40 GALLONS EACH RESPECTIVELY FOR A TOTAL OF 192 GALLONS. AS IT TURNED OUT ON ARR AT ERI, I HAD 38 GALLONS OF FUEL REMAINING WHICH EQUATES TO ANOTHER 49 MINS 34 SECONDS, OF ENG RUNNING TIME. CAUSES: 1) INACCURATE WX FORECASTS. 2) FLC FAILURE TO OBTAIN A CURRENT WX BRIEFING FROM FSS PRIOR TO DEP FROM ROC. 3) FAILURE OF THE FLT WATCH PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE REQUESTED INFO. 4) FAILURE OF AOO FSS PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ABOVE WHAT WAS REQUESTED BY THE FLC. 5) INACCURACY OF FUEL GAUGES LEADING THE FLC TO BELIEVE THAT THE SIT WAS MORE DESPERATE THAN ACTUAL. REMEDIES: 1) THIS FLC SHALL BECOME MORE VIGILANT IN OBTAINING CURRENT WX INFO PRIOR TO DEP AND THROUGHOUT THE FLT OP. 2) AN ACFT MECH HAS COMPLETED REPAIR AND CALIBRATION OF THE ACFT FUEL GAUGE IN QUESTION. 3) FLT WATCH SHOULD BE A 24 HR SVC -- NOT JUST WHEN THEY FEEL LIKE IT. 4) WITH CURRENT TECHNOLOGY USED IN WX FORECASTING, IE, FOUS60 AND OTHER DYNAMIC MODELS, THE ACCURACY OF WX FORECASTS SHOULD BE BETTER THAN WHAT WE ARE SEEING. THE FOUS60, NESTED GRID MODEL IS ONE OF MANY TOOLS THAT PROJECTS AMBIENT AND DEWPOINT TEMPS, AMONG OTHER ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS, OVER A GIVEN TIME PERIOD., WITH TOOLS SUCH AS THIS, THE LIKELIHOOD OF FOG DEVELOPMENT BECOMES QUITE APPARENT AND THE FORECASTS SHOULD REFLECT IT ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER, THE REAL PROB HERE IS THAT QUITE OFTEN, A FORECAST MAY BE WRITTEN BY ONE METEOROLOGIST AND SIMPLY UPDATED WITH ONLY A CURRENT TIME BY HIS/HER SUCCESSOR WITHOUT A RE-EVALUATION OF ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT WX EVENT OCCURRING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.