Narrative:

We departed durango, co, at XA30 on nov/mon/01 for tvl for a pickup. Our gross takeoff weight was approximately 42000 pounds. (Our maximum takeoff weight is 49000 pounds.) we were cleared to our filed cruise altitude of FL390. All altitudes above about FL250 were very turbulent with mostly light turbulence initially at FL390. After approximately 45 mins, the ride became worse and FL410 was requested. It was denied, as there was traffic at our 12 O'clock position. After a check of the performance page of our FMS, a climb was requested to FL430. The controller asked when we could be level. We responded '3 or 4 mins' at which point a clearance was issued to climb to FL430 with a climb rate of no less than 1000 FPM. Our cruise at that time was .82 mach. A climb was initiated at 1000 FPM and held to FL430. Our speed decayed rapidly in the climb until at leveloff we were at .70 mach. Our concern was on the increase. We felt that the rapid climb rate that was requested of us to sustain, and the still turbulent air, was taking us off of the back side of the power curve. An immediate descent was requested and denied. Our speed slowed at this point to .68 mach. Again a request for lower was made with an off course vector -- again denied. I explained that we were unable to maintain altitude and needed an immediate descent. This was once again denied with 'maintain FL430.' I stressed that we were in a very critical situation and we were unable to maintain anything at this point as our speed had dropped to approximately .64 mach. We were given a turn of 50 degrees in a firm tone of voice, which we refused. We felt that a turn could put us at risk of a stall, as an already ominous burble was beginning to develop. During this last conversation with the controller, my partner had started a very slow drift down from altitude, as our speed was still decaying at a rapid rate. We showed nothing on TCASII at this point for at least 10-15 mi. (Apparently, this was the traffic that the controller was worried about.) our altitude deteriorated to between FL426 and FL423 (not sure) when I think I heard the controller turn our traffic. At this point, a clearance was issued to us to descend to FL350. Some time later, approximately 5 mins, the controller asked what the problem had been and I explained that the rapid rate of climb requested of us to FL430, and the turbulence had caused us to slow to a point where we could no longer maintain altitude. I asked for a phone number to explain further and was told that was not necessary. This aircraft is new to our flight department. Both of us are experienced airmen and well trained in this aircraft. However, this was a situation where I feel that poor judgement all the way around was exercised by everyone, myself included. A clearance to 'maintain a climb rate of 1000 FPM to FL430,' at our weight and in our flying conditions (turbulence), should never have been accepted. We also feel that the controller, after being advised of our problem, could have been a bit more accommodating and turned the conflicting traffic while there was still a good separation between us. Granted, we did not have the picture of other traffic as he did, he was, however, advised early on that a problem existed and that our situation was rapidly 'heading south.' our performance FMS stated that at this weight and temperature, we could safely climb to and maintain FL430. What it did not say is that an excessive rate of climb could be sustained to this altitude at our weight. I feel that we all have come to rely on our 'bells and whistles' way too much. The pilot is still the only resource who must, with experience and training, be relied upon to handle sits that may arise outside the box, literally, but first, must wake up and resort to good common sense. We survived, we learned. Thank god that the lesson wasn't any more expensive than that.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F900 CREW CLBED ACFT TOO HIGH FOR THE ACFT GROSS WT AND CONDITIONS.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED DURANGO, CO, AT XA30 ON NOV/MON/01 FOR TVL FOR A PICKUP. OUR GROSS TKOF WT WAS APPROX 42000 LBS. (OUR MAX TKOF WT IS 49000 LBS.) WE WERE CLRED TO OUR FILED CRUISE ALT OF FL390. ALL ALTS ABOVE ABOUT FL250 WERE VERY TURBULENT WITH MOSTLY LIGHT TURB INITIALLY AT FL390. AFTER APPROX 45 MINS, THE RIDE BECAME WORSE AND FL410 WAS REQUESTED. IT WAS DENIED, AS THERE WAS TFC AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS. AFTER A CHK OF THE PERFORMANCE PAGE OF OUR FMS, A CLB WAS REQUESTED TO FL430. THE CTLR ASKED WHEN WE COULD BE LEVEL. WE RESPONDED '3 OR 4 MINS' AT WHICH POINT A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO CLB TO FL430 WITH A CLB RATE OF NO LESS THAN 1000 FPM. OUR CRUISE AT THAT TIME WAS .82 MACH. A CLB WAS INITIATED AT 1000 FPM AND HELD TO FL430. OUR SPD DECAYED RAPIDLY IN THE CLB UNTIL AT LEVELOFF WE WERE AT .70 MACH. OUR CONCERN WAS ON THE INCREASE. WE FELT THAT THE RAPID CLB RATE THAT WAS REQUESTED OF US TO SUSTAIN, AND THE STILL TURBULENT AIR, WAS TAKING US OFF OF THE BACK SIDE OF THE PWR CURVE. AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT WAS REQUESTED AND DENIED. OUR SPD SLOWED AT THIS POINT TO .68 MACH. AGAIN A REQUEST FOR LOWER WAS MADE WITH AN OFF COURSE VECTOR -- AGAIN DENIED. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT AND NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. THIS WAS ONCE AGAIN DENIED WITH 'MAINTAIN FL430.' I STRESSED THAT WE WERE IN A VERY CRITICAL SIT AND WE WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ANYTHING AT THIS POINT AS OUR SPD HAD DROPPED TO APPROX .64 MACH. WE WERE GIVEN A TURN OF 50 DEGS IN A FIRM TONE OF VOICE, WHICH WE REFUSED. WE FELT THAT A TURN COULD PUT US AT RISK OF A STALL, AS AN ALREADY OMINOUS BURBLE WAS BEGINNING TO DEVELOP. DURING THIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLR, MY PARTNER HAD STARTED A VERY SLOW DRIFT DOWN FROM ALT, AS OUR SPD WAS STILL DECAYING AT A RAPID RATE. WE SHOWED NOTHING ON TCASII AT THIS POINT FOR AT LEAST 10-15 MI. (APPARENTLY, THIS WAS THE TFC THAT THE CTLR WAS WORRIED ABOUT.) OUR ALT DETERIORATED TO BTWN FL426 AND FL423 (NOT SURE) WHEN I THINK I HEARD THE CTLR TURN OUR TFC. AT THIS POINT, A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO US TO DSND TO FL350. SOME TIME LATER, APPROX 5 MINS, THE CTLR ASKED WHAT THE PROB HAD BEEN AND I EXPLAINED THAT THE RAPID RATE OF CLB REQUESTED OF US TO FL430, AND THE TURB HAD CAUSED US TO SLOW TO A POINT WHERE WE COULD NO LONGER MAINTAIN ALT. I ASKED FOR A PHONE NUMBER TO EXPLAIN FURTHER AND WAS TOLD THAT WAS NOT NECESSARY. THIS ACFT IS NEW TO OUR FLT DEPT. BOTH OF US ARE EXPERIENCED AIRMEN AND WELL TRAINED IN THIS ACFT. HOWEVER, THIS WAS A SIT WHERE I FEEL THAT POOR JUDGEMENT ALL THE WAY AROUND WAS EXERCISED BY EVERYONE, MYSELF INCLUDED. A CLRNC TO 'MAINTAIN A CLB RATE OF 1000 FPM TO FL430,' AT OUR WT AND IN OUR FLYING CONDITIONS (TURB), SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED. WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE CTLR, AFTER BEING ADVISED OF OUR PROB, COULD HAVE BEEN A BIT MORE ACCOMMODATING AND TURNED THE CONFLICTING TFC WHILE THERE WAS STILL A GOOD SEPARATION BTWN US. GRANTED, WE DID NOT HAVE THE PICTURE OF OTHER TFC AS HE DID, HE WAS, HOWEVER, ADVISED EARLY ON THAT A PROB EXISTED AND THAT OUR SIT WAS RAPIDLY 'HEADING S.' OUR PERFORMANCE FMS STATED THAT AT THIS WT AND TEMP, WE COULD SAFELY CLB TO AND MAINTAIN FL430. WHAT IT DID NOT SAY IS THAT AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF CLB COULD BE SUSTAINED TO THIS ALT AT OUR WT. I FEEL THAT WE ALL HAVE COME TO RELY ON OUR 'BELLS AND WHISTLES' WAY TOO MUCH. THE PLT IS STILL THE ONLY RESOURCE WHO MUST, WITH EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING, BE RELIED UPON TO HANDLE SITS THAT MAY ARISE OUTSIDE THE BOX, LITERALLY, BUT FIRST, MUST WAKE UP AND RESORT TO GOOD COMMON SENSE. WE SURVIVED, WE LEARNED. THANK GOD THAT THE LESSON WASN'T ANY MORE EXPENSIVE THAN THAT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.