Narrative:

Over approximately orf talking with ZDC, we were continuing to climb in an effort to find smooth air. I was the captain, but for this leg I was the PNF. The PF was a company instructor with more experience and company seniority, however, due to our company policy, had not been 'released' in the aircraft since he had only been in the falcon for a few months. The aircraft was handling very well at FL450 and had seemed to climb there with little or no effort. Both of us were commenting on how much we were impressed with the handling characteristics of the falcon as he was still hand flying at that particular time. Our only problem was nagging pockets of light to moderate chop at FL450. It was at this time that the first officer asked me for FL470 (the airplane's maximum altitude). I remember being a little hesitant about that, but at the same time didn't want to continue flying in the chop we had either. I asked ZDC for the altitude, and we were given clearance at that time. The first officer initiated a slow climb and before too long we were in smooth air -- finally! However, as we climbed through FL460 the aircraft performance and airspeed were decreasing at a steady rate, but we had soon leveled off and watched as our airspeed leveled off, as expected. To our surprise, center called company traffic for us at FL450 (who else would be up this high!). But wouldn't you know it, just like turbulence to rear its ugly head, we hit a couple of pockets of light to moderate again, but this time our aircraft performance was unable to keep up with the bumps as we watched our airspeed fluctuate to levels beyond our personal comfort. We had the company aircraft in sight and asked center for a descent to FL450 for turbulence. They were unable at the time, but said in 5 mi. Unfortunately, our aircraft continued to decelerate with the oncoming bumps and we told center we were on our way down slowly. Center gave us a 30 degree turn to the right with a descent to FL450. All was fine, and we decided to put up with the chop at FL450 instead of descending further. Center advised us that we had set off their altitude alerter within the 5 mi they needed for clearance, but said all was fine due to the fact that we had the aircraft in sight and needed to descend for turbulence. Correct! However, in the back of my mind I wish I had been more forthcoming about the first officer's decision to continue to climb and also that I had consulted the aircraft manual before attempting the climb. Things could have ended up much worse than they did all because we had a breakdown in CRM, and that we were relying on the feeling of the aircraft over the facts of its known performance. Supplemental information from acn 541597: after leveling at our initial cruise altitude of FL430, we were getting a rough ride from FL410 and again at FL450, so we requested FL470. During the climb, the air seemed to be smoothing out. However, after reaching FL470 the ride worsened to moderate occasionally severe. This was causing me great concern as the airspeed was varying greatly and at the top of climb FL470 we cannot afford to get slow or lose airspeed. We asked for lower. ATC had a company citation 10 closing head-on. I had that aircraft both visually and on TCASII. As soon as we passed, we immediately descended. Altitude separation may well have been lost. However, we were past the aircraft and notified ATC as soon as possible. The greatest danger was losing airspeed and altitude at FL470. I felt a buffet, stall or both were a very real possibilities, and exercised a PIC decision to descend and gain airspeed immediately as well as to leave the worsening turbulence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F2000 CREW CLBED ACFT TOO HIGH FOR THE ACFT GROSS WT AND CONDITIONS.

Narrative: OVER APPROX ORF TALKING WITH ZDC, WE WERE CONTINUING TO CLB IN AN EFFORT TO FIND SMOOTH AIR. I WAS THE CAPT, BUT FOR THIS LEG I WAS THE PNF. THE PF WAS A COMPANY INSTRUCTOR WITH MORE EXPERIENCE AND COMPANY SENIORITY, HOWEVER, DUE TO OUR COMPANY POLICY, HAD NOT BEEN 'RELEASED' IN THE ACFT SINCE HE HAD ONLY BEEN IN THE FALCON FOR A FEW MONTHS. THE ACFT WAS HANDLING VERY WELL AT FL450 AND HAD SEEMED TO CLB THERE WITH LITTLE OR NO EFFORT. BOTH OF US WERE COMMENTING ON HOW MUCH WE WERE IMPRESSED WITH THE HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FALCON AS HE WAS STILL HAND FLYING AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. OUR ONLY PROB WAS NAGGING POCKETS OF LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP AT FL450. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT THE FO ASKED ME FOR FL470 (THE AIRPLANE'S MAX ALT). I REMEMBER BEING A LITTLE HESITANT ABOUT THAT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME DIDN'T WANT TO CONTINUE FLYING IN THE CHOP WE HAD EITHER. I ASKED ZDC FOR THE ALT, AND WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC AT THAT TIME. THE FO INITIATED A SLOW CLB AND BEFORE TOO LONG WE WERE IN SMOOTH AIR -- FINALLY! HOWEVER, AS WE CLBED THROUGH FL460 THE ACFT PERFORMANCE AND AIRSPD WERE DECREASING AT A STEADY RATE, BUT WE HAD SOON LEVELED OFF AND WATCHED AS OUR AIRSPD LEVELED OFF, AS EXPECTED. TO OUR SURPRISE, CTR CALLED COMPANY TFC FOR US AT FL450 (WHO ELSE WOULD BE UP THIS HIGH!). BUT WOULDN'T YOU KNOW IT, JUST LIKE TURB TO REAR ITS UGLY HEAD, WE HIT A COUPLE OF POCKETS OF LIGHT TO MODERATE AGAIN, BUT THIS TIME OUR ACFT PERFORMANCE WAS UNABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE BUMPS AS WE WATCHED OUR AIRSPD FLUCTUATE TO LEVELS BEYOND OUR PERSONAL COMFORT. WE HAD THE COMPANY ACFT IN SIGHT AND ASKED CTR FOR A DSCNT TO FL450 FOR TURB. THEY WERE UNABLE AT THE TIME, BUT SAID IN 5 MI. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR ACFT CONTINUED TO DECELERATE WITH THE ONCOMING BUMPS AND WE TOLD CTR WE WERE ON OUR WAY DOWN SLOWLY. CTR GAVE US A 30 DEG TURN TO THE R WITH A DSCNT TO FL450. ALL WAS FINE, AND WE DECIDED TO PUT UP WITH THE CHOP AT FL450 INSTEAD OF DSNDING FURTHER. CTR ADVISED US THAT WE HAD SET OFF THEIR ALT ALERTER WITHIN THE 5 MI THEY NEEDED FOR CLRNC, BUT SAID ALL WAS FINE DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND NEEDED TO DSND FOR TURB. CORRECT! HOWEVER, IN THE BACK OF MY MIND I WISH I HAD BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE FO'S DECISION TO CONTINUE TO CLB AND ALSO THAT I HAD CONSULTED THE ACFT MANUAL BEFORE ATTEMPTING THE CLB. THINGS COULD HAVE ENDED UP MUCH WORSE THAN THEY DID ALL BECAUSE WE HAD A BREAKDOWN IN CRM, AND THAT WE WERE RELYING ON THE FEELING OF THE ACFT OVER THE FACTS OF ITS KNOWN PERFORMANCE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 541597: AFTER LEVELING AT OUR INITIAL CRUISE ALT OF FL430, WE WERE GETTING A ROUGH RIDE FROM FL410 AND AGAIN AT FL450, SO WE REQUESTED FL470. DURING THE CLB, THE AIR SEEMED TO BE SMOOTHING OUT. HOWEVER, AFTER REACHING FL470 THE RIDE WORSENED TO MODERATE OCCASIONALLY SEVERE. THIS WAS CAUSING ME GREAT CONCERN AS THE AIRSPD WAS VARYING GREATLY AND AT THE TOP OF CLB FL470 WE CANNOT AFFORD TO GET SLOW OR LOSE AIRSPD. WE ASKED FOR LOWER. ATC HAD A COMPANY CITATION 10 CLOSING HEAD-ON. I HAD THAT ACFT BOTH VISUALLY AND ON TCASII. AS SOON AS WE PASSED, WE IMMEDIATELY DSNDED. ALT SEPARATION MAY WELL HAVE BEEN LOST. HOWEVER, WE WERE PAST THE ACFT AND NOTIFIED ATC ASAP. THE GREATEST DANGER WAS LOSING AIRSPD AND ALT AT FL470. I FELT A BUFFET, STALL OR BOTH WERE A VERY REAL POSSIBILITIES, AND EXERCISED A PIC DECISION TO DSND AND GAIN AIRSPD IMMEDIATELY AS WELL AS TO LEAVE THE WORSENING TURB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.