Narrative:

This traffic conflict occurred because of miscom between myself, my first officer, and the cmi tower. On descent into cmi, we called the airport in sight approximately 10 NM northeast of the field. It was then that the tower issued us a TA, a VFR target just north of the field. I had the traffic on TCASII and pointed him out to my first officer, who then called traffic in sight. I never had a visual on the traffic, only on TCASII. Instead of advising tower that we did not have a visual on the traffic, I accepted the visual approach clearance and turned 30 degrees right to join a 5 mi final for runway 22. I assumed I would have no problem picking up the traffic, given the excellent visibility and our proximity to the traffic (approximately 10 NM). This was the first broken link in the chain of events. As we continued on about a 5 NM base leg, we were still looking for the traffic, who appeared to be becoming more of a conflict, the target was now about 5 NM off our 10 O'clock position and less than 500 ft below with regard to altitude. I began to configure for landing, flaps and gear down, and called for the final checklist. At this time we were turning a 5 NM final for runway 22, and the traffic was less than 4 mi and 12 O'clock position, 300 ft below our altitude, and we still had not got a visual on the traffic. The first officer was running the final checklist, asking me to confirm checklist items. It was then that we received a TA from the TCASII. I asked the first officer to help locate the traffic, which was now 12 O'clock, 3 mi, and 300 ft below our altitude -- a definite conflict. Unable to ask for deviation from the tower due to frequency saturation, I called for a go around and began a right climbing 270 degree turn to reintercept final. Tower immediately asked us our intentions, the first officer replied that we were making a climbing right 270 degree turn to rejoin final, but did not explain why. I asked him to tell the tower that it was due to us receiving a TCASII TA. He then explained to them and they told us to turn back left and rejoin final, and that the traffic was no factor, and to please give them a telephone call once on the ground. We landed without incident and I contacted the tower personnel. They wanted my name and aircraft n-number. I then learned that the traffic we were looking for was actually on a low approach to runway 4 at cmi, overflying the field and continuing north to an airport 8 mi north of cmi which was a direct conflict with us. The tower said that the traffic was not a conflict when they first told us about it, but because we turned 30 degrees right to set up on a 5 mi final, it then became a conflict for us. It is in our operations manual that we are established on final approximately 5 mi out with proper confign and airspeed, etc. I think that the lack of information from mci tower about the direction and intentions of the traffic was the other link in the chain of events. This situation was a distraction to us when we needed to be focusing on flying the aircraft, and could have been easily been avoided had I not assumed I would get a visual on the traffic, and if cmi tower had given us all the information with respect to our traffic. No actions were taken to further investigate. No deviations occurred other than maneuvering to avoid conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TURBOPROP ACR ACCEPTS APCH CLRNC. TA WITH TFC ONLY OBSERVED ON TCASII, BUT WAS THE WRONG ACFT, WHILE DSNDING INTO CMI.

Narrative: THIS TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF MISCOM BTWN MYSELF, MY FO, AND THE CMI TWR. ON DSCNT INTO CMI, WE CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT APPROX 10 NM NE OF THE FIELD. IT WAS THEN THAT THE TWR ISSUED US A TA, A VFR TARGET JUST N OF THE FIELD. I HAD THE TFC ON TCASII AND POINTED HIM OUT TO MY FO, WHO THEN CALLED TFC IN SIGHT. I NEVER HAD A VISUAL ON THE TFC, ONLY ON TCASII. INSTEAD OF ADVISING TWR THAT WE DID NOT HAVE A VISUAL ON THE TFC, I ACCEPTED THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC AND TURNED 30 DEGS R TO JOIN A 5 MI FINAL FOR RWY 22. I ASSUMED I WOULD HAVE NO PROB PICKING UP THE TFC, GIVEN THE EXCELLENT VISIBILITY AND OUR PROX TO THE TFC (APPROX 10 NM). THIS WAS THE FIRST BROKEN LINK IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS. AS WE CONTINUED ON ABOUT A 5 NM BASE LEG, WE WERE STILL LOOKING FOR THE TFC, WHO APPEARED TO BE BECOMING MORE OF A CONFLICT, THE TARGET WAS NOW ABOUT 5 NM OFF OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS AND LESS THAN 500 FT BELOW WITH REGARD TO ALT. I BEGAN TO CONFIGURE FOR LNDG, FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN, AND CALLED FOR THE FINAL CHKLIST. AT THIS TIME WE WERE TURNING A 5 NM FINAL FOR RWY 22, AND THE TFC WAS LESS THAN 4 MI AND 12 O'CLOCK POS, 300 FT BELOW OUR ALT, AND WE STILL HAD NOT GOT A VISUAL ON THE TFC. THE FO WAS RUNNING THE FINAL CHKLIST, ASKING ME TO CONFIRM CHKLIST ITEMS. IT WAS THEN THAT WE RECEIVED A TA FROM THE TCASII. I ASKED THE FO TO HELP LOCATE THE TFC, WHICH WAS NOW 12 O'CLOCK, 3 MI, AND 300 FT BELOW OUR ALT -- A DEFINITE CONFLICT. UNABLE TO ASK FOR DEV FROM THE TWR DUE TO FREQ SATURATION, I CALLED FOR A GAR AND BEGAN A R CLBING 270 DEG TURN TO REINTERCEPT FINAL. TWR IMMEDIATELY ASKED US OUR INTENTIONS, THE FO REPLIED THAT WE WERE MAKING A CLBING R 270 DEG TURN TO REJOIN FINAL, BUT DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY. I ASKED HIM TO TELL THE TWR THAT IT WAS DUE TO US RECEIVING A TCASII TA. HE THEN EXPLAINED TO THEM AND THEY TOLD US TO TURN BACK L AND REJOIN FINAL, AND THAT THE TFC WAS NO FACTOR, AND TO PLEASE GIVE THEM A TELEPHONE CALL ONCE ON THE GND. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND I CONTACTED THE TWR PERSONNEL. THEY WANTED MY NAME AND ACFT N-NUMBER. I THEN LEARNED THAT THE TFC WE WERE LOOKING FOR WAS ACTUALLY ON A LOW APCH TO RWY 4 AT CMI, OVERFLYING THE FIELD AND CONTINUING N TO AN ARPT 8 MI N OF CMI WHICH WAS A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH US. THE TWR SAID THAT THE TFC WAS NOT A CONFLICT WHEN THEY FIRST TOLD US ABOUT IT, BUT BECAUSE WE TURNED 30 DEGS R TO SET UP ON A 5 MI FINAL, IT THEN BECAME A CONFLICT FOR US. IT IS IN OUR OPS MANUAL THAT WE ARE ESTABLISHED ON FINAL APPROX 5 MI OUT WITH PROPER CONFIGN AND AIRSPD, ETC. I THINK THAT THE LACK OF INFO FROM MCI TWR ABOUT THE DIRECTION AND INTENTIONS OF THE TFC WAS THE OTHER LINK IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS. THIS SIT WAS A DISTR TO US WHEN WE NEEDED TO BE FOCUSING ON FLYING THE ACFT, AND COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY BEEN AVOIDED HAD I NOT ASSUMED I WOULD GET A VISUAL ON THE TFC, AND IF CMI TWR HAD GIVEN US ALL THE INFO WITH RESPECT TO OUR TFC. NO ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE. NO DEVS OCCURRED OTHER THAN MANEUVERING TO AVOID CONFLICT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.