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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 531532 |
Time | |
Date | 200111 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : tpa.airport |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : lax.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Ultralight |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 3000 flight time type : 1200 |
ASRS Report | 531532 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure non adherence other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : itt engine temp ind other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
On nov/sat/2001 I was first officer on a part 121 flight. After the passenger were loaded I was heads down calculating the load manifests while the captain started engine #2. This is normal practice as spelled out in the company procedures and there is no requirement for the first officer to monitor the engine starts. Unknown to me, the gpu had failed during the start sequence. While still heads down, I heard the captain say something to the effect that, 'it's going to go hot,' followed quickly by, 'there it is.' he aborted the start sequence and told me that the gpu had failed. He called for a second gpu while I finished the weight and balance. We got the second gpu, started up, and taxied off the gate. We flew the aircraft in four subsequent part 121 revenue flights that day. Ten days later, I received a call from the company asking me about the hot start. I told our program manager that the captain was 'on top of it.' by 'on top of it' I meant that it sounded like after the gpu failure he was anticipating the hot start, and I believed he had shut it down in a timely manner. The program manager told me that when the captain submitted his written incident report, he claimed that during the hot start the itt exceeded 950 degrees C, a power plant limitation. Thus, the aircraft was not legal for further part 121 flights until it had been inspected by maintenance. This was the first moment that I became aware that we had exceeded a limitation. I have flown with this captain on many occasions and found him to be very knowledgeable and conscientious of the regulations, aircraft system, and company procedures. I am at a loss to explain why the captain did not inform me that the itt limitation had been exceeded. What can be done to prevent a recurrence? Require that both crewmembers monitor engine starts. Also, in the event of a hot start, hung start, or other abnormal, require that both crewmembers discuss any and all applicable limitations and confirm that none have been exceeded.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLC OF AN MDT TURBO PROP OPERATED ACFT IN PAX SCHEDULED SVC WHEN ONE OF THE ENGS EXCEEDED ITT TEMP DURING START. HOWEVER, THE CAPT DID NOT TELL THE FO OF THE INCIDENT AND PROCEEDED TO FLY THE ACFT WHEN THE ENG NEEDED INSPECTION.
Narrative: ON NOV/SAT/2001 I WAS FO ON A PART 121 FLIGHT. AFTER THE PAX WERE LOADED I WAS HEADS DOWN CALCULATING THE LOAD MANIFESTS WHILE THE CAPT STARTED ENG #2. THIS IS NORMAL PRACTICE AS SPELLED OUT IN THE COMPANY PROCS AND THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR THE FO TO MONITOR THE ENG STARTS. UNKNOWN TO ME, THE GPU HAD FAILED DURING THE START SEQUENCE. WHILE STILL HEADS DOWN, I HEARD THE CAPT SAY SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT, 'IT'S GOING TO GO HOT,' FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY, 'THERE IT IS.' HE ABORTED THE START SEQUENCE AND TOLD ME THAT THE GPU HAD FAILED. HE CALLED FOR A SECOND GPU WHILE I FINISHED THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE. WE GOT THE SECOND GPU, STARTED UP, AND TAXIED OFF THE GATE. WE FLEW THE ACFT IN FOUR SUBSEQUENT PART 121 REVENUE FLIGHTS THAT DAY. TEN DAYS LATER, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE COMPANY ASKING ME ABOUT THE HOT START. I TOLD OUR PROGRAM MGR THAT THE CAPT WAS 'ON TOP OF IT.' BY 'ON TOP OF IT' I MEANT THAT IT SOUNDED LIKE AFTER THE GPU FAILURE HE WAS ANTICIPATING THE HOT START, AND I BELIEVED HE HAD SHUT IT DOWN IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE PROGRAM MGR TOLD ME THAT WHEN THE CAPT SUBMITTED HIS WRITTEN INCIDENT REPORT, HE CLAIMED THAT DURING THE HOT START THE ITT EXCEEDED 950 DEGS C, A PWR PLANT LIMITATION. THUS, THE ACFT WAS NOT LEGAL FOR FURTHER PART 121 FLIGHTS UNTIL IT HAD BEEN INSPECTED BY MAINT. THIS WAS THE FIRST MOMENT THAT I BECAME AWARE THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED A LIMITATION. I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ON MANY OCCASIONS AND FOUND HIM TO BE VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND CONSCIENTIOUS OF THE REGULATIONS, ACFT SYS, AND COMPANY PROCS. I AM AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE CAPT DID NOT INFORM ME THAT THE ITT LIMITATION HAD BEEN EXCEEDED. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE? REQUIRE THAT BOTH CREWMEMBERS MONITOR ENG STARTS. ALSO, IN THE EVENT OF A HOT START, HUNG START, OR OTHER ABNORMAL, REQUIRE THAT BOTH CREWMEMBERS DISCUSS ANY AND ALL APPLICABLE LIMITATIONS AND CONFIRM THAT NONE HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.