37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 531631 |
Time | |
Date | 200112 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : ckb.vor |
State Reference | OH |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 2000 msl bound upper : 5000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zob.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 2800 flight time type : 1500 |
ASRS Report | 531631 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain |
Events | |
Anomaly | airspace violation : entry non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | atc equipment other atc equipment : radar other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert controller : issued new clearance flight crew : exited penetrated airspace flight crew : returned to intended or assigned course |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airspace Structure ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Inter Facility Coordination Failure |
Narrative:
Just prior to departing ckb airport, we called elkins FSS on 122.1 and listened on VOR 112.6. The FSS specialist provided a clearance that appeared to be in a non standard format. I copied the clearance trying to place it in the logical format normally received. The clearance was: 'clrd to the cvg airport direct hvq as filed 330 KTS in 10500 ft, cleveland on 126.95.' our flight planned route was ckb...hvq SWEED6. Cvg. I rewrote the clearance to be: caf, climb and maintain 5000 ft expect FL330 in 10 mins, departure on 126.95, and squawk XXXX. Before I read back the clearance, I asked the captain if he concurred with what I wrote, noting to him the non standard clearance received and he said I was correct. I then read back the clearance to which the FSS specialist confirmed direct hvq. We departed ckb on runway 21 using the obstacle departure procedure, which required climb straight ahead to 2000 ft before proceeding on course. Passing through 2000 ft, I called cleveland center stating passing through 2000 ft climbing 5000 ft direct hvq. The controller said something garbled with a new altitude. I read back the new altitude, but asked him to repeat the other portion of his transmission. He called back somewhat tersely and said for us to fly our clearance, to which I responded roger and again acknowledging the new altitude and direct hvq. A few mins passed and the controller asked if we were in the turn to which I responded, no, we are direct hvq. At this point the controller stated we were supposed to be flying on a heading of 330 degrees radar vectors for hvq and that was what the FSS specialist was to have given us. He went on to say we had flown through someone else's airspace. I responded that we were not given those instructions and that we would turn to a heading of 330 degrees now. He said never mind, he would call the FSS, and for us to contact indianapolis center. The captain and I discussed the events and both realized that the out of sequence cruise altitude must have been the heading to fly. So '...direct hvq as filed 330 KTS in 10...' was actually '...direct hvq heading 330 degree...' or something to that effect. No one made any effort to make sure we were heading 330 degrees either before we departed or after we were airborne. While these events all occurred at night, we do not believe it responsible for the miscommunications. The captain and I took extra precautions to ensure we briefed the departure, reviewed the clearance as we understood it, and continued to query controllers and FSS regarding what was expected of us.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CL65 CREW HAD TRACK DEV AFTER THE CLRNC GIVEN BY THE FSS BRIEFER DIFFERED FROM WHAT ZOB RADAR CTLR THOUGHT THEY WOULD DO.
Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING CKB ARPT, WE CALLED ELKINS FSS ON 122.1 AND LISTENED ON VOR 112.6. THE FSS SPECIALIST PROVIDED A CLRNC THAT APPEARED TO BE IN A NON STD FORMAT. I COPIED THE CLRNC TRYING TO PLACE IT IN THE LOGICAL FORMAT NORMALLY RECEIVED. THE CLRNC WAS: 'CLRD TO THE CVG ARPT DIRECT HVQ AS FILED 330 KTS IN 10500 FT, CLEVELAND ON 126.95.' OUR FLT PLANNED ROUTE WAS CKB...HVQ SWEED6. CVG. I REWROTE THE CLRNC TO BE: CAF, CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT EXPECT FL330 IN 10 MINS, DEPARTURE ON 126.95, AND SQUAWK XXXX. BEFORE I READ BACK THE CLRNC, I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE CONCURRED WITH WHAT I WROTE, NOTING TO HIM THE NON STD CLRNC RECEIVED AND HE SAID I WAS CORRECT. I THEN READ BACK THE CLRNC TO WHICH THE FSS SPECIALIST CONFIRMED DIRECT HVQ. WE DEPARTED CKB ON RWY 21 USING THE OBSTACLE DEP PROC, WHICH REQUIRED CLB STRAIGHT AHEAD TO 2000 FT BEFORE PROCEEDING ON COURSE. PASSING THROUGH 2000 FT, I CALLED CLEVELAND CENTER STATING PASSING THROUGH 2000 FT CLBING 5000 FT DIRECT HVQ. THE CTLR SAID SOMETHING GARBLED WITH A NEW ALT. I READ BACK THE NEW ALT, BUT ASKED HIM TO REPEAT THE OTHER PORTION OF HIS TRANSMISSION. HE CALLED BACK SOMEWHAT TERSELY AND SAID FOR US TO FLY OUR CLRNC, TO WHICH I RESPONDED ROGER AND AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEW ALT AND DIRECT HVQ. A FEW MINS PASSED AND THE CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE IN THE TURN TO WHICH I RESPONDED, NO, WE ARE DIRECT HVQ. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR STATED WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE FLYING ON A HEADING OF 330 DEGS RADAR VECTORS FOR HVQ AND THAT WAS WHAT THE FSS SPECIALIST WAS TO HAVE GIVEN US. HE WENT ON TO SAY WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH SOMEONE ELSE'S AIRSPACE. I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE NOT GIVEN THOSE INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT WE WOULD TURN TO A HEADING OF 330 DEGS NOW. HE SAID NEVER MIND, HE WOULD CALL THE FSS, AND FOR US TO CONTACT INDIANAPOLIS CENTER. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE EVENTS AND BOTH REALIZED THAT THE OUT OF SEQUENCE CRUISE ALT MUST HAVE BEEN THE HEADING TO FLY. SO '...DIRECT HVQ AS FILED 330 KTS IN 10...' WAS ACTUALLY '...DIRECT HVQ HEADING 330 DEG...' OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. NO ONE MADE ANY EFFORT TO MAKE SURE WE WERE HEADING 330 DEGS EITHER BEFORE WE DEPARTED OR AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE. WHILE THESE EVENTS ALL OCCURRED AT NIGHT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISCOMMUNICATIONS. THE CAPT AND I TOOK EXTRA PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE WE BRIEFED THE DEP, REVIEWED THE CLRNC AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, AND CONTINUED TO QUERY CTLRS AND FSS REGARDING WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF US.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.