37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 531892 |
Time | |
Date | 200111 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | intersection : mugzy |
State Reference | NJ |
Altitude | msl single value : 6000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Weather Elements | Turbulence |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : n90.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Citation X |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | arrival star : lv23 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 75 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 50 |
ASRS Report | 531892 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 60 flight time total : 5650 flight time type : 40 |
ASRS Report | 531599 |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : undershoot non adherence : clearance non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert controller : issued new clearance none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were traveling from gary, in, to morristown, nj, in a new aircraft which we had approximately 50 hours in type. On our arrival the (LVZ3) into morristown, we were issued a hold within 5 mi of mugzy intersection. I was PIC/PNF for the trip. I had programmed the long-range navs earlier in the flight, and had returned the chart to its holder. As I reached for the chart to see how the hold was depicted, my first officer/PF informed me all published holds are stored within the FMS. Based on his previous and extensive experience using these FMS units from previous aircraft he had flown, I took him at his word. When we reached mugzy intersection he was high and fast but was working on slowing the aircraft to holding speed. The autoplt was engaged and the aircraft started a right turn. I informed the controller we were entering the hold. She acknowledged. Shortly thereafter the controller said that it appeared we were turning right, when the published hold was left turns. We continued around to the right to proceed back to mugzy intersection and started the left turn for the published hold. As we did this the controller cleared us to continue with the STAR. There were no conflicts with other traffic that we were aware of. Contributing factors were as follows: 1) I should have kept the arrival chart in front of me, 2) verify everything, pilots are human and we make mistakes, 3) start the descent sooner and at a slower speed while on the arrival, 4) late clearance issuance, and 5) unfamiliar with the complete use of the FMS units. In the future I will require that all charts are out for the duration of the flight, and not allow complacency to factor into our flying. Supplemental information from acn 531599: while on a vpath descent with the autoplt engaged on the LVZ3 arrival into mmu descending to cross mugzy intersection at 6000 ft we were told to hold as published at mugzy while only 7 mi from the fix. The captain/PNF reached for the chart (STAR) which had already been put away after programming the FMS. I told him not to worry about it as the hold would be in the 'box.' as he was setting up the hold I received a 'maximum speed' alert on my pfd and the nose of the aircraft was automatically pulled up putting us above the glide path. We were not exceeding 250 KTS but we are new in type and the plane is new also, less than 70 hours total time airframe. One of the squawks is that the overspd protection kicks in too early sometimes as slow as 235 KIAS. By the time I disconnected the autoplt we were crossing the fix almost 1000 ft high and starting a right turn in the hold. At this point the controller told us the hold was left turns. As far as we could tell there was no conflict with either other aircraft or airspace. Primary cause: complacency. Contributing factors: 1) late clearance issuance by ATC, and 2) low time in type in an aircraft with a software problem that pulls the nose of the aircraft up too early. Conclusion: if the charts had been left out and we had flown a more conservative descent (ie, started down sooner and planned a crossing a few mi prior to mugzy) then even the late clearance issuance and the 'teething problems' and learning curve we were experiencing in the new aircraft would not have resulted in a blown clearance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C750 CREW WAS NOT USING ACCEPTED FMC OPERATING PROTOCOL WHICH RESULTED IN AN INCORRECT HOLDING PATTERN ENTRY AND A XING RESTR NOT MET.
Narrative: WE WERE TRAVELING FROM GARY, IN, TO MORRISTOWN, NJ, IN A NEW ACFT WHICH WE HAD APPROX 50 HRS IN TYPE. ON OUR ARR THE (LVZ3) INTO MORRISTOWN, WE WERE ISSUED A HOLD WITHIN 5 MI OF MUGZY INTXN. I WAS PIC/PNF FOR THE TRIP. I HAD PROGRAMMED THE LONG-RANGE NAVS EARLIER IN THE FLT, AND HAD RETURNED THE CHART TO ITS HOLDER. AS I REACHED FOR THE CHART TO SEE HOW THE HOLD WAS DEPICTED, MY FO/PF INFORMED ME ALL PUBLISHED HOLDS ARE STORED WITHIN THE FMS. BASED ON HIS PREVIOUS AND EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE USING THESE FMS UNITS FROM PREVIOUS ACFT HE HAD FLOWN, I TOOK HIM AT HIS WORD. WHEN WE REACHED MUGZY INTXN HE WAS HIGH AND FAST BUT WAS WORKING ON SLOWING THE ACFT TO HOLDING SPD. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND THE ACFT STARTED A R TURN. I INFORMED THE CTLR WE WERE ENTERING THE HOLD. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE CTLR SAID THAT IT APPEARED WE WERE TURNING R, WHEN THE PUBLISHED HOLD WAS L TURNS. WE CONTINUED AROUND TO THE R TO PROCEED BACK TO MUGZY INTXN AND STARTED THE L TURN FOR THE PUBLISHED HOLD. AS WE DID THIS THE CTLR CLRED US TO CONTINUE WITH THE STAR. THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS WITH OTHER TFC THAT WE WERE AWARE OF. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE AS FOLLOWS: 1) I SHOULD HAVE KEPT THE ARR CHART IN FRONT OF ME, 2) VERIFY EVERYTHING, PLTS ARE HUMAN AND WE MAKE MISTAKES, 3) START THE DSCNT SOONER AND AT A SLOWER SPD WHILE ON THE ARR, 4) LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE, AND 5) UNFAMILIAR WITH THE COMPLETE USE OF THE FMS UNITS. IN THE FUTURE I WILL REQUIRE THAT ALL CHARTS ARE OUT FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT, AND NOT ALLOW COMPLACENCY TO FACTOR INTO OUR FLYING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 531599: WHILE ON A VPATH DSCNT WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED ON THE LVZ3 ARR INTO MMU DSNDING TO CROSS MUGZY INTXN AT 6000 FT WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED AT MUGZY WHILE ONLY 7 MI FROM THE FIX. THE CAPT/PNF REACHED FOR THE CHART (STAR) WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PUT AWAY AFTER PROGRAMMING THE FMS. I TOLD HIM NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT AS THE HOLD WOULD BE IN THE 'BOX.' AS HE WAS SETTING UP THE HOLD I RECEIVED A 'MAX SPD' ALERT ON MY PFD AND THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS AUTOMATICALLY PULLED UP PUTTING US ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH. WE WERE NOT EXCEEDING 250 KTS BUT WE ARE NEW IN TYPE AND THE PLANE IS NEW ALSO, LESS THAN 70 HRS TOTAL TIME AIRFRAME. ONE OF THE SQUAWKS IS THAT THE OVERSPD PROTECTION KICKS IN TOO EARLY SOMETIMES AS SLOW AS 235 KIAS. BY THE TIME I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT WE WERE XING THE FIX ALMOST 1000 FT HIGH AND STARTING A R TURN IN THE HOLD. AT THIS POINT THE CTLR TOLD US THE HOLD WAS L TURNS. AS FAR AS WE COULD TELL THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH EITHER OTHER ACFT OR AIRSPACE. PRIMARY CAUSE: COMPLACENCY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE BY ATC, AND 2) LOW TIME IN TYPE IN AN ACFT WITH A SOFTWARE PROB THAT PULLS THE NOSE OF THE ACFT UP TOO EARLY. CONCLUSION: IF THE CHARTS HAD BEEN LEFT OUT AND WE HAD FLOWN A MORE CONSERVATIVE DSCNT (IE, STARTED DOWN SOONER AND PLANNED A XING A FEW MI PRIOR TO MUGZY) THEN EVEN THE LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE AND THE 'TEETHING PROBS' AND LEARNING CURVE WE WERE EXPERIENCING IN THE NEW ACFT WOULD NOT HAVE RESULTED IN A BLOWN CLRNC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.