Narrative:

Operating an air carrier flight from myr to atl, a question of making a crossing restr arose. While I was on the sinca 3 arrival from over colliers (irq) VOR, the captain and I completed the in-range checklist. Part of the procedure before the checklist is to address the cabin. Per operating procedures, I left the frequency to address the cabin. I told the captain I would be off frequency. He acknowledged by stating he had ATC. While I was off ATC frequency, the captain may have misinterped a crossing restr. Upon returning to the frequency, I checked back in with the captain. He stated that we are to cross 40 mi out of atl at 14000 ft and 250 KTS. As we approached the crossing restr, center gave us a radar vector 10 degrees left and to expedite down through 15000 ft, and to contact atl approach. As we checked in with atl approach, we told him we were at 14000 ft slowing to 250 KTS. Then the controller stated for us to confirm altitude. I stated 14000 ft. He responded by asking 'what altitude did center assign?' I stated '14000 ft, what do you need?' he replied, 'I will call center, standby.' he came back and gave us a clearance to cross husky at 10000 ft and 250 KTS. The captain then said the crossing restr was unrealistic, and the controller might have said 12000 ft and that he didn't know for sure. As we made the original crossing restr 40 mi out of atl now at 12000 ft now at 12000 ft, the captain said that we still made it. A corrective action that I have gained from this experience is to be more proactive in communication when returning to the frequency. By first verifying any changes made on the clearance, and then confirming it with published procedures. In the future, if there is a discrepancy between what is published and what is assigned, I will open up a line of dialog with the captain, and query ATC as to the crossing restr. Complacency is bad for us airline pilots!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9-30 CAPT MISUNDERSTOOD DSCNT CLRNC XING RESTR BY ARTCC CTLR CAUSING APCH CTLR TO QUESTION THEIR ALT AND GIVE THEM A NEW ONE.

Narrative: OPERATING AN ACR FLT FROM MYR TO ATL, A QUESTION OF MAKING A XING RESTR AROSE. WHILE I WAS ON THE SINCA 3 ARR FROM OVER COLLIERS (IRQ) VOR, THE CAPT AND I COMPLETED THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. PART OF THE PROC BEFORE THE CHKLIST IS TO ADDRESS THE CABIN. PER OPERATING PROCS, I LEFT THE FREQ TO ADDRESS THE CABIN. I TOLD THE CAPT I WOULD BE OFF FREQ. HE ACKNOWLEDGED BY STATING HE HAD ATC. WHILE I WAS OFF ATC FREQ, THE CAPT MAY HAVE MISINTERPED A XING RESTR. UPON RETURNING TO THE FREQ, I CHKED BACK IN WITH THE CAPT. HE STATED THAT WE ARE TO CROSS 40 MI OUT OF ATL AT 14000 FT AND 250 KTS. AS WE APCHED THE XING RESTR, CTR GAVE US A RADAR VECTOR 10 DEGS L AND TO EXPEDITE DOWN THROUGH 15000 FT, AND TO CONTACT ATL APCH. AS WE CHKED IN WITH ATL APCH, WE TOLD HIM WE WERE AT 14000 FT SLOWING TO 250 KTS. THEN THE CTLR STATED FOR US TO CONFIRM ALT. I STATED 14000 FT. HE RESPONDED BY ASKING 'WHAT ALT DID CTR ASSIGN?' I STATED '14000 FT, WHAT DO YOU NEED?' HE REPLIED, 'I WILL CALL CTR, STANDBY.' HE CAME BACK AND GAVE US A CLRNC TO CROSS HUSKY AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS. THE CAPT THEN SAID THE XING RESTR WAS UNREALISTIC, AND THE CTLR MIGHT HAVE SAID 12000 FT AND THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW FOR SURE. AS WE MADE THE ORIGINAL XING RESTR 40 MI OUT OF ATL NOW AT 12000 FT NOW AT 12000 FT, THE CAPT SAID THAT WE STILL MADE IT. A CORRECTIVE ACTION THAT I HAVE GAINED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE IS TO BE MORE PROACTIVE IN COM WHEN RETURNING TO THE FREQ. BY FIRST VERIFYING ANY CHANGES MADE ON THE CLRNC, AND THEN CONFIRMING IT WITH PUBLISHED PROCS. IN THE FUTURE, IF THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BTWN WHAT IS PUBLISHED AND WHAT IS ASSIGNED, I WILL OPEN UP A LINE OF DIALOG WITH THE CAPT, AND QUERY ATC AS TO THE XING RESTR. COMPLACENCY IS BAD FOR US AIRLINE PLTS!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.