Narrative:

I was involved in getting checked out in a P28R/200 at whp. This was my second time out with the same instructor as the first time we had insufficient light to complete the check-out. We had started around XA00 pm and completed 6 lndgs at whp. During these lndgs we were focused on airspds and confirming '3 green' during each segment of the pattern. I was aware of a helicopter practicing in the pattern as well with a similar sounding call sign to mine. Mine was XXX and the helicopter's sounds like xxy. After my 6TH landing, I taxied back to runway 30 and called tower to say I was ready for takeoff. I was told to 'hold short.' the helicopter also called 'ready for close pattern.' I had called 'ready for straight out departure.' both the helicopter and I waited, he at an intersection, and I at the end of runway 30. Tower was talking to other traffic during this time. Inside the plane the instructor and I were discussing criteria he wanted to see in order to feel able to check me out. After a few mins tower called the helicopter 'without delay, cleared for immediate takeoff right closed pattern approved.' I heard the helicopter's call sign as mine and so did the instructor and I answered 'XXX cleared for immediate takeoff.' as I crossed the hold short line I added, approximately 10 seconds later, 'and XXX will be a straight out departure.' tower promptly responded that the clearance was not for me, but the helicopter. I stopped approximately 15 ft from the hold short line before turning to be straight with the runway. Tower had landing traffic that he had cleared to land do a go around and then cleared me to take off. I see several factors which contributed to my mistake: 1) I was tense about the check out and not fully concentrating on my situational awareness, 2) I was emotionally assuming that the instructor would be correct in what was said since he had more training than me, 3) tower said nothing when I first responded and only told me of my mistake after I added the part about the 'straight out departure.' while I fully accept my responsibility and mistake I feel that not hearing anything after I called back my clearance led me to believe I had heard accurately when I had not. This situation could have been avoided in the following ways: 1) prioritizing situational awareness during critical times during takeoff is a must for me, 2) I must have more confidence in my ability to question control directly and not rely on other's with me who have more experience, and 3) I must not react, but rather respond by remaining calm when I hear tower say 'without delay' plus a direction. I have learned that listening includes reducing emotional interference and is a major responsibility placed upon me as PIC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SIMILAR CALL SIGNS CONTRIBUTE TO A RWY INCURSION AND A GO AROUND.

Narrative: I WAS INVOLVED IN GETTING CHKED OUT IN A P28R/200 AT WHP. THIS WAS MY SECOND TIME OUT WITH THE SAME INSTRUCTOR AS THE FIRST TIME WE HAD INSUFFICIENT LIGHT TO COMPLETE THE CHK-OUT. WE HAD STARTED AROUND XA00 PM AND COMPLETED 6 LNDGS AT WHP. DURING THESE LNDGS WE WERE FOCUSED ON AIRSPDS AND CONFIRMING '3 GREEN' DURING EACH SEGMENT OF THE PATTERN. I WAS AWARE OF A HELI PRACTICING IN THE PATTERN AS WELL WITH A SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGN TO MINE. MINE WAS XXX AND THE HELI'S SOUNDS LIKE XXY. AFTER MY 6TH LNDG, I TAXIED BACK TO RWY 30 AND CALLED TWR TO SAY I WAS READY FOR TKOF. I WAS TOLD TO 'HOLD SHORT.' THE HELI ALSO CALLED 'READY FOR CLOSE PATTERN.' I HAD CALLED 'READY FOR STRAIGHT OUT DEP.' BOTH THE HELI AND I WAITED, HE AT AN INTXN, AND I AT THE END OF RWY 30. TWR WAS TALKING TO OTHER TFC DURING THIS TIME. INSIDE THE PLANE THE INSTRUCTOR AND I WERE DISCUSSING CRITERIA HE WANTED TO SEE IN ORDER TO FEEL ABLE TO CHK ME OUT. AFTER A FEW MINS TWR CALLED THE HELI 'WITHOUT DELAY, CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF R CLOSED PATTERN APPROVED.' I HEARD THE HELI'S CALL SIGN AS MINE AND SO DID THE INSTRUCTOR AND I ANSWERED 'XXX CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF.' AS I CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE I ADDED, APPROX 10 SECONDS LATER, 'AND XXX WILL BE A STRAIGHT OUT DEP.' TWR PROMPTLY RESPONDED THAT THE CLRNC WAS NOT FOR ME, BUT THE HELI. I STOPPED APPROX 15 FT FROM THE HOLD SHORT LINE BEFORE TURNING TO BE STRAIGHT WITH THE RWY. TWR HAD LNDG TFC THAT HE HAD CLRED TO LAND DO A GAR AND THEN CLRED ME TO TAKE OFF. I SEE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO MY MISTAKE: 1) I WAS TENSE ABOUT THE CHK OUT AND NOT FULLY CONCENTRATING ON MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, 2) I WAS EMOTIONALLY ASSUMING THAT THE INSTRUCTOR WOULD BE CORRECT IN WHAT WAS SAID SINCE HE HAD MORE TRAINING THAN ME, 3) TWR SAID NOTHING WHEN I FIRST RESPONDED AND ONLY TOLD ME OF MY MISTAKE AFTER I ADDED THE PART ABOUT THE 'STRAIGHT OUT DEP.' WHILE I FULLY ACCEPT MY RESPONSIBILITY AND MISTAKE I FEEL THAT NOT HEARING ANYTHING AFTER I CALLED BACK MY CLRNC LED ME TO BELIEVE I HAD HEARD ACCURATELY WHEN I HAD NOT. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS: 1) PRIORITIZING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DURING CRITICAL TIMES DURING TKOF IS A MUST FOR ME, 2) I MUST HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN MY ABILITY TO QUESTION CTL DIRECTLY AND NOT RELY ON OTHER'S WITH ME WHO HAVE MORE EXPERIENCE, AND 3) I MUST NOT REACT, BUT RATHER RESPOND BY REMAINING CALM WHEN I HEAR TWR SAY 'WITHOUT DELAY' PLUS A DIRECTION. I HAVE LEARNED THAT LISTENING INCLUDES REDUCING EMOTIONAL INTERFERENCE AND IS A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY PLACED UPON ME AS PIC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.