Narrative:

It was our first leg on this aircraft. The captain performed the preflight walkaround before leaving for the leg from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. He found the aircraft to be in an airworthy condition and was aware of dents on the aircraft including a dent on the #2 engine cowl. He felt it did not affect the airworthiness of the aircraft. Prior to this leg, maintenance had been working on the aircraft and had signed it off ready for flight. Upon arrival to ZZZ, the ramp crew performed a walkaround of the aircraft. They observed the same dents that the captain had previously recognized. While performing my walkaround in ZZZ for the return to ZZZ1 the baggage handlers who observed the dent brought it to my attention. I did not feel that the dent in the cowl presented any problem. I told the ground crew I would inform the captain. Upon notifying the captain he said he was aware of the dent. Without the flight crew's knowledge, the ground crew notified maintenance control of the dent in the engine cowl. With the dent now on file with maintenance control, they had a contract mechanic meet the aircraft. Not being completely aware of the company's standards, the mechanic had to try and determine the severity of the dent by receiving instruction over the phone from ZZZ1 maintenance control. With the flight crew not being able to report the problem to maintenance, we were now completely left out of the decision making process. The problem was now in the hands of the engineers at our company as well as those of the aircraft manufacturer. Since none of the engineers were able to physically see the dent, none were willing to sign off that the aircraft was airworthy based only on the measurements performed by a contract mechanic. The return leg was canceled and the aircraft was ferried back to ZZZ1. No problems were noted on either leg by the flight crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD88 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A KNOWN UNRPTED DENT IN #2 ENG INLET COWLING.

Narrative: IT WAS OUR FIRST LEG ON THIS ACFT. THE CAPT PERFORMED THE PREFLT WALKAROUND BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE LEG FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ. HE FOUND THE ACFT TO BE IN AN AIRWORTHY CONDITION AND WAS AWARE OF DENTS ON THE ACFT INCLUDING A DENT ON THE #2 ENG COWL. HE FELT IT DID NOT AFFECT THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ACFT. PRIOR TO THIS LEG, MAINT HAD BEEN WORKING ON THE ACFT AND HAD SIGNED IT OFF READY FOR FLT. UPON ARR TO ZZZ, THE RAMP CREW PERFORMED A WALKAROUND OF THE ACFT. THEY OBSERVED THE SAME DENTS THAT THE CAPT HAD PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED. WHILE PERFORMING MY WALKAROUND IN ZZZ FOR THE RETURN TO ZZZ1 THE BAGGAGE HANDLERS WHO OBSERVED THE DENT BROUGHT IT TO MY ATTN. I DID NOT FEEL THAT THE DENT IN THE COWL PRESENTED ANY PROB. I TOLD THE GND CREW I WOULD INFORM THE CAPT. UPON NOTIFYING THE CAPT HE SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THE DENT. WITHOUT THE FLC'S KNOWLEDGE, THE GND CREW NOTIFIED MAINT CTL OF THE DENT IN THE ENG COWL. WITH THE DENT NOW ON FILE WITH MAINT CTL, THEY HAD A CONTRACT MECH MEET THE ACFT. NOT BEING COMPLETELY AWARE OF THE COMPANY'S STANDARDS, THE MECH HAD TO TRY AND DETERMINE THE SEVERITY OF THE DENT BY RECEIVING INSTRUCTION OVER THE PHONE FROM ZZZ1 MAINT CTL. WITH THE FLC NOT BEING ABLE TO RPT THE PROB TO MAINT, WE WERE NOW COMPLETELY LEFT OUT OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. THE PROB WAS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE ENGINEERS AT OUR COMPANY AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE ACFT MANUFACTURER. SINCE NONE OF THE ENGINEERS WERE ABLE TO PHYSICALLY SEE THE DENT, NONE WERE WILLING TO SIGN OFF THAT THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY BASED ONLY ON THE MEASUREMENTS PERFORMED BY A CONTRACT MECH. THE RETURN LEG WAS CANCELED AND THE ACFT WAS FERRIED BACK TO ZZZ1. NO PROBS WERE NOTED ON EITHER LEG BY THE FLC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.