Narrative:

Captain (PNF), first officer (PF) conducting an IMC RNAV approach to runway 19. Approach was thoroughly briefed, understood and set up in the automation. Approach mode was activated descending through 10000 ft. At 3000 ft we were issued an intercept heading to the final approach course and cleared for the RNAV approach. We had a direct crosswind of 30 KTS that delayed our course intercept somewhat. We were cleared down to 2000 ft for the intercept. Descended to 2000 ft and as we neared the intercept point we noted that the vertical path indicator had come down and was going below us. The course intercept point was reached 1-2 seconds later, but did not capture. PF immediately tried to re-intercept from the other side but was unsuccessful. By that time the vertical path indicator was full scale beneath us (down). We were still level at 2000 ft. The published missed approach altitude at dca on this approach is 1800 ft, which was not set into our altitude window on our flight management panel yet because we had not captured the vertical path guidance. Because of problems with course capture and vertical displacement the PF called out and simultaneously initiated a go around by applying full go around (toga) thrust at which time the autoplt mysteriously disengaged which further added to the confusion factor. PNF immediately made a call to tower advising of the go around but received no reply. Made second call and after a short pause was told to fly runway heading. By this point in time because of the strong crosswind we were pushed east of course before a further turn to the southwest was issued along with a higher altitude clearance. When the go around was initiated, a lot of things started happening, one thing in particular which was not expected (autoplt disengagement), and when full power (toga thrust) was applied we were definitely on our way up -- overshooting the new altitude while we were reconfiguring and were reclred to 5000 ft. Set up for the lda approach with GS to runway 19 and landed shortly thereafter. Briefed the chief pilot on the occurrence and went over the situation in detail. Still do not realize the reason for no capture of the approach course, but at our request the chief pilot retrieved an automation printout from maintenance of our flight. It was registered that at some time during the flight there was a momentary failure of the #1 FMGC which we were unaware of and was probably a factor. We do, however, have a clear understanding of the altitude overshoot factors that were involved. On the next flight I became highly proficient at setting up the automation to provide for and implement a back up approach procedure. I will brief other pilots that I fly with upon what I have learned from this situation. Human factors: 80% of the first officer's that I fly with have been issued lay-off notices. Many are in their mid to late 40's and are not very hopeful for a future in their career field. Some are borderline depressed (this case), some others are riding the edge mentally/behaviorally, and can be unpredictable at inopportune times. The general working environment in the cockpit including cohesiveness, and focus has been affected. It has been an insidious occurrence, but I now recognize it for what it is and will try to compensate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 CREW, MAKING AN RNAV APCH TO DCA, WERE UNABLE TO CAPTURE INBOUND COURSE OR VERT PATH GUIDANCE, EXECUTED A GAR.

Narrative: CAPT (PNF), FO (PF) CONDUCTING AN IMC RNAV APCH TO RWY 19. APCH WAS THOROUGHLY BRIEFED, UNDERSTOOD AND SET UP IN THE AUTOMATION. APCH MODE WAS ACTIVATED DSNDING THROUGH 10000 FT. AT 3000 FT WE WERE ISSUED AN INTERCEPT HEADING TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND CLRED FOR THE RNAV APCH. WE HAD A DIRECT XWIND OF 30 KTS THAT DELAYED OUR COURSE INTERCEPT SOMEWHAT. WE WERE CLRED DOWN TO 2000 FT FOR THE INTERCEPT. DSNDED TO 2000 FT AND AS WE NEARED THE INTERCEPT POINT WE NOTED THAT THE VERTICAL PATH INDICATOR HAD COME DOWN AND WAS GOING BELOW US. THE COURSE INTERCEPT POINT WAS REACHED 1-2 SECONDS LATER, BUT DID NOT CAPTURE. PF IMMEDIATELY TRIED TO RE-INTERCEPT FROM THE OTHER SIDE BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. BY THAT TIME THE VERT PATH INDICATOR WAS FULL SCALE BENEATH US (DOWN). WE WERE STILL LEVEL AT 2000 FT. THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH ALT AT DCA ON THIS APCH IS 1800 FT, WHICH WAS NOT SET INTO OUR ALT WINDOW ON OUR FLT MGMNT PANEL YET BECAUSE WE HAD NOT CAPTURED THE VERT PATH GUIDANCE. BECAUSE OF PROBS WITH COURSE CAPTURE AND VERT DISPLACEMENT THE PF CALLED OUT AND SIMULTANEOUSLY INITIATED A GAR BY APPLYING FULL GAR (TOGA) THRUST AT WHICH TIME THE AUTOPLT MYSTERIOUSLY DISENGAGED WHICH FURTHER ADDED TO THE CONFUSION FACTOR. PNF IMMEDIATELY MADE A CALL TO TWR ADVISING OF THE GAR BUT RECEIVED NO REPLY. MADE SECOND CALL AND AFTER A SHORT PAUSE WAS TOLD TO FLY RWY HEADING. BY THIS POINT IN TIME BECAUSE OF THE STRONG XWIND WE WERE PUSHED E OF COURSE BEFORE A FURTHER TURN TO THE SW WAS ISSUED ALONG WITH A HIGHER ALT CLRNC. WHEN THE GAR WAS INITIATED, A LOT OF THINGS STARTED HAPPENING, ONE THING IN PARTICULAR WHICH WAS NOT EXPECTED (AUTOPLT DISENGAGEMENT), AND WHEN FULL PWR (TOGA THRUST) WAS APPLIED WE WERE DEFINITELY ON OUR WAY UP -- OVERSHOOTING THE NEW ALT WHILE WE WERE RECONFIGURING AND WERE RECLRED TO 5000 FT. SET UP FOR THE LDA APCH WITH GS TO RWY 19 AND LANDED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. BRIEFED THE CHIEF PLT ON THE OCCURRENCE AND WENT OVER THE SIT IN DETAIL. STILL DO NOT REALIZE THE REASON FOR NO CAPTURE OF THE APCH COURSE, BUT AT OUR REQUEST THE CHIEF PLT RETRIEVED AN AUTOMATION PRINTOUT FROM MAINT OF OUR FLT. IT WAS REGISTERED THAT AT SOME TIME DURING THE FLT THERE WAS A MOMENTARY FAILURE OF THE #1 FMGC WHICH WE WERE UNAWARE OF AND WAS PROBABLY A FACTOR. WE DO, HOWEVER, HAVE A CLR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ALT OVERSHOOT FACTORS THAT WERE INVOLVED. ON THE NEXT FLT I BECAME HIGHLY PROFICIENT AT SETTING UP THE AUTOMATION TO PROVIDE FOR AND IMPLEMENT A BACK UP APCH PROC. I WILL BRIEF OTHER PLTS THAT I FLY WITH UPON WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS SIT. HUMAN FACTORS: 80% OF THE FO'S THAT I FLY WITH HAVE BEEN ISSUED LAY-OFF NOTICES. MANY ARE IN THEIR MID TO LATE 40'S AND ARE NOT VERY HOPEFUL FOR A FUTURE IN THEIR CAREER FIELD. SOME ARE BORDERLINE DEPRESSED (THIS CASE), SOME OTHERS ARE RIDING THE EDGE MENTALLY/BEHAVIORALLY, AND CAN BE UNPREDICTABLE AT INOPPORTUNE TIMES. THE GENERAL WORKING ENVIRONMENT IN THE COCKPIT INCLUDING COHESIVENESS, AND FOCUS HAS BEEN AFFECTED. IT HAS BEEN AN INSIDIOUS OCCURRENCE, BUT I NOW RECOGNIZE IT FOR WHAT IT IS AND WILL TRY TO COMPENSATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.