Narrative:

The B737-200 was not slowed enough to land on runway 6 at isp from a visual approach. A go around was initiated. After retracting the gear, a red nose gear disagreement light remained illuminated. The abnormal procedure was followed. A normal ILS runway 6 was performed as well as normal landing and taxi-in. The problem was in the hiding of the problem from the passenger, the flight attendant, the next captain taking the aircraft and from the company by not writing up the gear problem. This was due to the immense embarrassment of the captain's unstable approach which caused the go around. Also, the first officer feels responsible for not getting on the captain more to do the right thing by telling the truth. The captain made the correct judgement in executing a go around, in doing the abnormal. We should have called the company while in the air to let them give us more information about the gear that would allow us to take the most appropriate action like rolling the emergency trucks in case of a gear problem. The gear did come down normally and showed only 3 green lights. The captain seemed rushed to get back on the ground. I should have told him 'slow down, what's the hurry? Let's call flight control.' he told the passenger the gear problem was the reason for the go around. I did not know this until we got on the ground when he told me that, he didn't want the flight attendants to make fun at him, so that is why they told the passenger that lie. Because he was embarrassed and then because he lied to the flight attendants, as the next captain came onto the plane in earshot of our flight attendants he lied to him also. He was vague and surprisingly the next captain did not ask any questions. I confronted my captain after we were out of earshot of everyone, but I did not press him on the matter. We both realized the next day that the matter was not handled very well, especially not writing the gear light problem in the logbook and calling flight control while we were in the air. The more I thought about it, the more I cringe in that we could have had a real gear problem upon touchdown and we should have rolled the trucks to be on the conservative side. I asked the captain to talk to professional standards and I did as well. I need to press more to do what is right.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT DID NOT RECORD A LNDG GEAR DISCREPANCY IN THE ACFT MAINT LOG.

Narrative: THE B737-200 WAS NOT SLOWED ENOUGH TO LAND ON RWY 6 AT ISP FROM A VISUAL APCH. A GAR WAS INITIATED. AFTER RETRACTING THE GEAR, A RED NOSE GEAR DISAGREEMENT LIGHT REMAINED ILLUMINATED. THE ABNORMAL PROC WAS FOLLOWED. A NORMAL ILS RWY 6 WAS PERFORMED AS WELL AS NORMAL LNDG AND TAXI-IN. THE PROB WAS IN THE HIDING OF THE PROB FROM THE PAX, THE FLT ATTENDANT, THE NEXT CAPT TAKING THE ACFT AND FROM THE COMPANY BY NOT WRITING UP THE GEAR PROB. THIS WAS DUE TO THE IMMENSE EMBARRASSMENT OF THE CAPT'S UNSTABLE APCH WHICH CAUSED THE GAR. ALSO, THE FO FEELS RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT GETTING ON THE CAPT MORE TO DO THE RIGHT THING BY TELLING THE TRUTH. THE CAPT MADE THE CORRECT JUDGEMENT IN EXECUTING A GAR, IN DOING THE ABNORMAL. WE SHOULD HAVE CALLED THE COMPANY WHILE IN THE AIR TO LET THEM GIVE US MORE INFO ABOUT THE GEAR THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO TAKE THE MOST APPROPRIATE ACTION LIKE ROLLING THE EMER TRUCKS IN CASE OF A GEAR PROB. THE GEAR DID COME DOWN NORMALLY AND SHOWED ONLY 3 GREEN LIGHTS. THE CAPT SEEMED RUSHED TO GET BACK ON THE GND. I SHOULD HAVE TOLD HIM 'SLOW DOWN, WHAT'S THE HURRY? LET'S CALL FLT CTL.' HE TOLD THE PAX THE GEAR PROB WAS THE REASON FOR THE GAR. I DID NOT KNOW THIS UNTIL WE GOT ON THE GND WHEN HE TOLD ME THAT, HE DIDN'T WANT THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO MAKE FUN AT HIM, SO THAT IS WHY THEY TOLD THE PAX THAT LIE. BECAUSE HE WAS EMBARRASSED AND THEN BECAUSE HE LIED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS, AS THE NEXT CAPT CAME ONTO THE PLANE IN EARSHOT OF OUR FLT ATTENDANTS HE LIED TO HIM ALSO. HE WAS VAGUE AND SURPRISINGLY THE NEXT CAPT DID NOT ASK ANY QUESTIONS. I CONFRONTED MY CAPT AFTER WE WERE OUT OF EARSHOT OF EVERYONE, BUT I DID NOT PRESS HIM ON THE MATTER. WE BOTH REALIZED THE NEXT DAY THAT THE MATTER WAS NOT HANDLED VERY WELL, ESPECIALLY NOT WRITING THE GEAR LIGHT PROB IN THE LOGBOOK AND CALLING FLT CTL WHILE WE WERE IN THE AIR. THE MORE I THOUGHT ABOUT IT, THE MORE I CRINGE IN THAT WE COULD HAVE HAD A REAL GEAR PROB UPON TOUCHDOWN AND WE SHOULD HAVE ROLLED THE TRUCKS TO BE ON THE CONSERVATIVE SIDE. I ASKED THE CAPT TO TALK TO PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND I DID AS WELL. I NEED TO PRESS MORE TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.