Narrative:

We were en route from bur to tvl on a part 135 repos leg. En route, we were cleared direct to squaw valley VOR. About 25 mi from squaw valley VOR we were asked what our intentions were. We asked for the lda 18 to tvl. We then were cleared to squaw valley VOR and the lda 18 at 12000 ft. The copilot informed me that he had entered the information on the FMS. This was my first complacent mistake. I was descending into mountainous terrain and I believed that he had input the correct data. We also had squall valley VOR entered as raw data. Approximately 6.7 mi from squaw valley VOR, the FMS gave me a right turn to an intersection that was not on the lda 18 approach. I initiated the right turn and looked at my copilot's HSI and realized this was a bad intercept for the approach. The error chain was coming full circle. ATC then told us to maintain 13000 ft and asked where we were going. At this time we had broken out of the clouds and we were in VMC. We also had a visual on tvl airport. I told the copilot to ask for a visual approach and ask ATC what they would like us to do. In the middle of the navigation error, we thought we were now cleared for the visual. I turned toward the airport and once again ATC got upset with us and then cleared us for a visual. We landed normally. During this mix-up, there were no targets on our TCASII. The lesson learned is to never become complacent, even if you have flown with and trust your other crew member. I failed to doublechk his work and the error chain began. A side note: we discovered that the copilot entered the VOR approach instead of the lda 18. The strange thing about the FMS is that we still had direct squaw valley in the FMS and it decided to shoot the VOR approach before we got to squaw valley. Supplemental information from acn 533541: I questioned the turn, noting that the DME indicated we hadn't reached the VOR yet, as required by the approach. During this time we had descended below the overcast and saw the airport/runway visually. The captain elected to continue turning over lake tahoe, to join the lda course/visual approach. ZOA questioned us as to why we had turned, and we advised them we would like a visual approach and they said the visual approach was approved. While we continued turning to join a long final, center again asked us what we were doing. We told them that we thought he understood we were proceeding visually. He responded that that was not the case, which surprised us. He asked if we had the runway in sight. We said yes, and all was fine after that.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MLG CREW, CLRED FOR AN LDA DME 1 APCH TO TVL, DISCOVERED THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED FOR THE VOR APCH WHEN IT COMMANDED AN UNEXPECTED TURN.

Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE FROM BUR TO TVL ON A PART 135 REPOS LEG. ENRTE, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO SQUAW VALLEY VOR. ABOUT 25 MI FROM SQUAW VALLEY VOR WE WERE ASKED WHAT OUR INTENTIONS WERE. WE ASKED FOR THE LDA 18 TO TVL. WE THEN WERE CLRED TO SQUAW VALLEY VOR AND THE LDA 18 AT 12000 FT. THE COPLT INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD ENTERED THE INFO ON THE FMS. THIS WAS MY FIRST COMPLACENT MISTAKE. I WAS DSNDING INTO MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN AND I BELIEVED THAT HE HAD INPUT THE CORRECT DATA. WE ALSO HAD SQUALL VALLEY VOR ENTERED AS RAW DATA. APPROX 6.7 MI FROM SQUAW VALLEY VOR, THE FMS GAVE ME A R TURN TO AN INTXN THAT WAS NOT ON THE LDA 18 APCH. I INITIATED THE R TURN AND LOOKED AT MY COPLT'S HSI AND REALIZED THIS WAS A BAD INTERCEPT FOR THE APCH. THE ERROR CHAIN WAS COMING FULL CIRCLE. ATC THEN TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 13000 FT AND ASKED WHERE WE WERE GOING. AT THIS TIME WE HAD BROKEN OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND WE WERE IN VMC. WE ALSO HAD A VISUAL ON TVL ARPT. I TOLD THE COPLT TO ASK FOR A VISUAL APCH AND ASK ATC WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE US TO DO. IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NAV ERROR, WE THOUGHT WE WERE NOW CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. I TURNED TOWARD THE ARPT AND ONCE AGAIN ATC GOT UPSET WITH US AND THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL. WE LANDED NORMALLY. DURING THIS MIX-UP, THERE WERE NO TARGETS ON OUR TCASII. THE LESSON LEARNED IS TO NEVER BECOME COMPLACENT, EVEN IF YOU HAVE FLOWN WITH AND TRUST YOUR OTHER CREW MEMBER. I FAILED TO DOUBLECHK HIS WORK AND THE ERROR CHAIN BEGAN. A SIDE NOTE: WE DISCOVERED THAT THE COPLT ENTERED THE VOR APCH INSTEAD OF THE LDA 18. THE STRANGE THING ABOUT THE FMS IS THAT WE STILL HAD DIRECT SQUAW VALLEY IN THE FMS AND IT DECIDED TO SHOOT THE VOR APCH BEFORE WE GOT TO SQUAW VALLEY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 533541: I QUESTIONED THE TURN, NOTING THAT THE DME INDICATED WE HADN'T REACHED THE VOR YET, AS REQUIRED BY THE APCH. DURING THIS TIME WE HAD DSNDED BELOW THE OVCST AND SAW THE ARPT/RWY VISUALLY. THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE TURNING OVER LAKE TAHOE, TO JOIN THE LDA COURSE/VISUAL APCH. ZOA QUESTIONED US AS TO WHY WE HAD TURNED, AND WE ADVISED THEM WE WOULD LIKE A VISUAL APCH AND THEY SAID THE VISUAL APCH WAS APPROVED. WHILE WE CONTINUED TURNING TO JOIN A LONG FINAL, CTR AGAIN ASKED US WHAT WE WERE DOING. WE TOLD THEM THAT WE THOUGHT HE UNDERSTOOD WE WERE PROCEEDING VISUALLY. HE RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE, WHICH SURPRISED US. HE ASKED IF WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. WE SAID YES, AND ALL WAS FINE AFTER THAT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.