Narrative:

Touchdown was normal in the touchdown zone on runway 25L and the spoilers were manually deployed. For passenger comfort I requested the first officer not to get on the brakes to try to make taxiway M, but take taxiway north or P which were the next two available exits. Tower called and said 'take the next high speed and hold short of runway 25R' so we acknowledged and expedited down past txwys north and P to taxiway T. It sounded like the controller had traffic behind us so we were expediting off the runway 25L making sure our tail was clear and making a smooth continuous stop at the hold short line. We were in the final portions of the stop when the tower suddenly called 'air carrier stop, air carrier stop.' we were stopping and did stop with the hold short line just touching the glareshield on the first officer's side. The geometry of the seat position/cockpit view placed the actual aircraft position short of the hold short/stop bar line. We also acknowledged the clearance to stop. The controller canceled the takeoff clearance of the aircraft holding on the runway and cleared us 'to cross runway 25R and contact ground.' I informed tower we had heard their instructions to hold short and were complying. After a normal shutdown in the gate we called the tower by phone. I spoke with ZZZ1 and later to the supervisor ZZZ2 to explain my actions. With the recent events at lax and other airports I can see why the controllers might be predisposed to error on the side of caution (as we all are in this profession) when it comes to possible runway incursion. I took control of the aircraft just prior to txwys north and P and relaxed the brake pressure to expedite on toward taxiway T high speed turnoff. As I began the turn I felt I had the proper deceleration rate to allow us to comfortably come to a stop prior to the hold short line. Pilot fatigue may have played a role in this instance. This subtle fatigue may have had an effect on my situational awareness regarding this event. We all are striving for a safe and flawless operation both in the cockpit and the tower. I would also add that I have not flown much since september 2001 due to schedule cutbacks. Total flight time since the september event is 57 hours 15 mins. Supplemental information from acn 533551: we cleared runway 25L at taxiway T. As we cleared, tower repeated the hold short instructions, I acknowledged this too, and repeated it to the captain, when the tower controller shouted, 'stop, air carrier, stop.' I responded that we were stopping and said, 'stop' to the captain. I think our speed might have been a factor in the tower controller's estimation that we were not stopping and led to his reaction. The captain stated that he felt we were to expedite to the high speed to clear for landing traffic thus he kept the speed up. In the future, I think that taxi speed should be slower when exiting the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD11 CREW, CLRING THE RWY AT LAX, PASSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE TO THE PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ON RWY 25L AND THE SPOILERS WERE MANUALLY DEPLOYED. FOR PAX COMFORT I REQUESTED THE FO NOT TO GET ON THE BRAKES TO TRY TO MAKE TXWY M, BUT TAKE TXWY N OR P WHICH WERE THE NEXT TWO AVAILABLE EXITS. TWR CALLED AND SAID 'TAKE THE NEXT HIGH SPD AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25R' SO WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND EXPEDITED DOWN PAST TXWYS N AND P TO TXWY T. IT SOUNDED LIKE THE CTLR HAD TFC BEHIND US SO WE WERE EXPEDITING OFF THE RWY 25L MAKING SURE OUR TAIL WAS CLR AND MAKING A SMOOTH CONTINUOUS STOP AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE. WE WERE IN THE FINAL PORTIONS OF THE STOP WHEN THE TWR SUDDENLY CALLED 'ACR STOP, ACR STOP.' WE WERE STOPPING AND DID STOP WITH THE HOLD SHORT LINE JUST TOUCHING THE GLARESHIELD ON THE FO'S SIDE. THE GEOMETRY OF THE SEAT POS/COCKPIT VIEW PLACED THE ACTUAL ACFT POS SHORT OF THE HOLD SHORT/STOP BAR LINE. WE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC TO STOP. THE CTLR CANCELED THE TKOF CLRNC OF THE ACFT HOLDING ON THE RWY AND CLRED US 'TO CROSS RWY 25R AND CONTACT GND.' I INFORMED TWR WE HAD HEARD THEIR INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT AND WERE COMPLYING. AFTER A NORMAL SHUTDOWN IN THE GATE WE CALLED THE TWR BY PHONE. I SPOKE WITH ZZZ1 AND LATER TO THE SUPVR ZZZ2 TO EXPLAIN MY ACTIONS. WITH THE RECENT EVENTS AT LAX AND OTHER ARPTS I CAN SEE WHY THE CTLRS MIGHT BE PREDISPOSED TO ERROR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION (AS WE ALL ARE IN THIS PROFESSION) WHEN IT COMES TO POSSIBLE RWY INCURSION. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT JUST PRIOR TO TXWYS N AND P AND RELAXED THE BRAKE PRESSURE TO EXPEDITE ON TOWARD TXWY T HIGH SPD TURNOFF. AS I BEGAN THE TURN I FELT I HAD THE PROPER DECELERATION RATE TO ALLOW US TO COMFORTABLY COME TO A STOP PRIOR TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE. PLT FATIGUE MAY HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS INSTANCE. THIS SUBTLE FATIGUE MAY HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REGARDING THIS EVENT. WE ALL ARE STRIVING FOR A SAFE AND FLAWLESS OP BOTH IN THE COCKPIT AND THE TWR. I WOULD ALSO ADD THAT I HAVE NOT FLOWN MUCH SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001 DUE TO SCHEDULE CUTBACKS. TOTAL FLT TIME SINCE THE SEPTEMBER EVENT IS 57 HRS 15 MINS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 533551: WE CLRED RWY 25L AT TXWY T. AS WE CLRED, TWR REPEATED THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS, I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS TOO, AND REPEATED IT TO THE CAPT, WHEN THE TWR CTLR SHOUTED, 'STOP, ACR, STOP.' I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE STOPPING AND SAID, 'STOP' TO THE CAPT. I THINK OUR SPD MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THE TWR CTLR'S ESTIMATION THAT WE WERE NOT STOPPING AND LED TO HIS REACTION. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE FELT WE WERE TO EXPEDITE TO THE HIGH SPD TO CLR FOR LNDG TFC THUS HE KEPT THE SPD UP. IN THE FUTURE, I THINK THAT TAXI SPD SHOULD BE SLOWER WHEN EXITING THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.