Narrative:

Confusing acronyms/miscom led to unintentional airspace infraction. I just finished a conversation with our company operations specifications experts about a recent flight across the north atlantic. It appears we violated the requirements for operating in mnps airspace. I now believe our dispatcher confused the terms 'mnps' and 'ETOPS.' we had a left FMC failure just prior to entering track a. This jet did not have a CDU backup, so abnormal prods required us to remain clear of class ii and mnps airspaces. Dispatch advised us to proceed to an oceanic entry point farther north while he worked on a new flight plan and routing along a 60-min route. The captain became involved with ACARS messaging, and then satcom with dispatch, as well as coordinating our routing request with shanwick on the #2 radio. I worked center on #1, flew the jet on autoplt, started the checklists for oceanic airspace entry (navigation accuracy, compass, and altimeter checks),and reprogrammed the remaining FMC with the proposed route, as well as plotting it on the north atlantic chart. It was a busy time. We were only a few mins before oceanic entry when the final flight plan came across the printer. At the same time, the captain advised that shanwick cleared us along this new route. The captain and I questioned the altitude filed for the route, FL330. This was not a good altitude unless we were north of mnps airspace. The captain quickly made another satcom to dispatch to check legality. He told me dispatch said we were legal. We decided to press on, and made our position report at the entry point. I then took a good look at the atlantic orientation chart to see if we wre north of mnps airspace. I could not be certain. However, as we coasted into canada and began using the hi altitude canada 5/6 chart, it became obvious that mnps airspace covered virtually the entire north atlantic. While we were not 100% certain prior to oceanic entry if our altitude was correct, we decided that dispatch had a lot of information resources to help them make their decisions. These folks are experts in their jobs. We decided to trust them. Perhaps the dispatcher thought we were concerned about ETOPS instead of mnps operations. This use of the term '60-min route' certainly makes me wonder. That is an ETOPS term. I am surprised that this mistake was possible. Had we had more time prior to oceanic entry, we could have figured out that mnps airspace extends over most of the north atlantic, and that we did in fact need to be below FL285. Fuel was not a problem. We certainly had plenty of it to fly the route at FL280. The folks at operations specifications tell me the dispatchers go through recurrent training annually, just as we do. I'm sure our situation will be presented at all of the international operations specifications classes now.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 CREW ENTERED ATLANTIC MNPS AIRSPACE WITH AN INOP FMC.

Narrative: CONFUSING ACRONYMS/MISCOM LED TO UNINTENTIONAL AIRSPACE INFRACTION. I JUST FINISHED A CONVERSATION WITH OUR COMPANY OPS SPECS EXPERTS ABOUT A RECENT FLT ACROSS THE NORTH ATLANTIC. IT APPEARS WE VIOLATED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING IN MNPS AIRSPACE. I NOW BELIEVE OUR DISPATCHER CONFUSED THE TERMS 'MNPS' AND 'ETOPS.' WE HAD A L FMC FAILURE JUST PRIOR TO ENTERING TRACK A. THIS JET DID NOT HAVE A CDU BACKUP, SO ABNORMAL PRODS REQUIRED US TO REMAIN CLR OF CLASS II AND MNPS AIRSPACES. DISPATCH ADVISED US TO PROCEED TO AN OCEANIC ENTRY POINT FARTHER N WHILE HE WORKED ON A NEW FLT PLAN AND ROUTING ALONG A 60-MIN RTE. THE CAPT BECAME INVOLVED WITH ACARS MESSAGING, AND THEN SATCOM WITH DISPATCH, AS WELL AS COORDINATING OUR ROUTING REQUEST WITH SHANWICK ON THE #2 RADIO. I WORKED CTR ON #1, FLEW THE JET ON AUTOPLT, STARTED THE CHKLISTS FOR OCEANIC AIRSPACE ENTRY (NAV ACCURACY, COMPASS, AND ALTIMETER CHKS),AND REPROGRAMMED THE REMAINING FMC WITH THE PROPOSED RTE, AS WELL AS PLOTTING IT ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC CHART. IT WAS A BUSY TIME. WE WERE ONLY A FEW MINS BEFORE OCEANIC ENTRY WHEN THE FINAL FLT PLAN CAME ACROSS THE PRINTER. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT ADVISED THAT SHANWICK CLRED US ALONG THIS NEW RTE. THE CAPT AND I QUESTIONED THE ALT FILED FOR THE RTE, FL330. THIS WAS NOT A GOOD ALT UNLESS WE WERE N OF MNPS AIRSPACE. THE CAPT QUICKLY MADE ANOTHER SATCOM TO DISPATCH TO CHK LEGALITY. HE TOLD ME DISPATCH SAID WE WERE LEGAL. WE DECIDED TO PRESS ON, AND MADE OUR POS RPT AT THE ENTRY POINT. I THEN TOOK A GOOD LOOK AT THE ATLANTIC ORIENTATION CHART TO SEE IF WE WRE N OF MNPS AIRSPACE. I COULD NOT BE CERTAIN. HOWEVER, AS WE COASTED INTO CANADA AND BEGAN USING THE HI ALT CANADA 5/6 CHART, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT MNPS AIRSPACE COVERED VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE NORTH ATLANTIC. WHILE WE WERE NOT 100% CERTAIN PRIOR TO OCEANIC ENTRY IF OUR ALT WAS CORRECT, WE DECIDED THAT DISPATCH HAD A LOT OF INFO RESOURCES TO HELP THEM MAKE THEIR DECISIONS. THESE FOLKS ARE EXPERTS IN THEIR JOBS. WE DECIDED TO TRUST THEM. PERHAPS THE DISPATCHER THOUGHT WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT ETOPS INSTEAD OF MNPS OPS. THIS USE OF THE TERM '60-MIN RTE' CERTAINLY MAKES ME WONDER. THAT IS AN ETOPS TERM. I AM SURPRISED THAT THIS MISTAKE WAS POSSIBLE. HAD WE HAD MORE TIME PRIOR TO OCEANIC ENTRY, WE COULD HAVE FIGURED OUT THAT MNPS AIRSPACE EXTENDS OVER MOST OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC, AND THAT WE DID IN FACT NEED TO BE BELOW FL285. FUEL WAS NOT A PROB. WE CERTAINLY HAD PLENTY OF IT TO FLY THE RTE AT FL280. THE FOLKS AT OPS SPECS TELL ME THE DISPATCHERS GO THROUGH RECURRENT TRAINING ANNUALLY, JUST AS WE DO. I'M SURE OUR SIT WILL BE PRESENTED AT ALL OF THE INTL OPS SPECS CLASSES NOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.