Narrative:

For me, thus was the third leg, on the third day of a 4-DAY trip. It was the captain's first flight of the day, and the first time we had flown together. On my trip, this was the third captain I had flown with in 3 days. WX at both denver and gunnison was VFR, although it was night. On departure, the captain was the PF. We were cleared to 10000 ft MSL, standard for departures out of denver. Passing 9000 ft, I called out 1000 ft to level and the captain responded, standard SOP at our air carrier. Since he had a vvi of approximately 2000 FPM at 9500 ft, I called out approaching 10000 ft, with no response. At 9800 ft he was still climbing at pretty much the same rate, so I called out approaching 10000 ft. Since the autothrottles were engaged and the flight director had captured 10000 ft, which was bringing the thrust back to hold 250 KTS, I was not overly concerned. At 10000 ft and with still a substantial vvi, I called out again to level at 10000 ft -- this time the captain responded, but with the vvi and a slow response, he went to 10300 ft before correcting to 10000 ft. The total deviation might have been 15 seconds, and no TCASII warnings were generated. Den departure had cleared us direct to the point baylr, however, during the deviation, they turned us right 40 degrees, but never mentioned the altitude. Shortly afterward, we were cleared to FL230 and passed to ZDV. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Since this was my first flight with this captain, and third captain in 3 days, I feel our unfamiliarity played a part in this incident. I figured my callouts and warnings were sufficient, since they usually are with other pilots. However, this was a short, challenging flight to an uncontrolled, mountain airport at night. This captain was zeroed in on that and was working with me for the first time. I should have simply taken the airplane and discussed it later. Since I really didn't know this individual well (we just met 40 mins earlier), I really didn't know what his thoughts were on that type of action. He said later he wished I had done that. I learned a lot from this short flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW, DEPARTING DEN, OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT.

Narrative: FOR ME, THUS WAS THE THIRD LEG, ON THE THIRD DAY OF A 4-DAY TRIP. IT WAS THE CAPT'S FIRST FLT OF THE DAY, AND THE FIRST TIME WE HAD FLOWN TOGETHER. ON MY TRIP, THIS WAS THE THIRD CAPT I HAD FLOWN WITH IN 3 DAYS. WX AT BOTH DENVER AND GUNNISON WAS VFR, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NIGHT. ON DEP, THE CAPT WAS THE PF. WE WERE CLRED TO 10000 FT MSL, STANDARD FOR DEPS OUT OF DENVER. PASSING 9000 FT, I CALLED OUT 1000 FT TO LEVEL AND THE CAPT RESPONDED, STANDARD SOP AT OUR ACR. SINCE HE HAD A VVI OF APPROX 2000 FPM AT 9500 FT, I CALLED OUT APCHING 10000 FT, WITH NO RESPONSE. AT 9800 FT HE WAS STILL CLBING AT PRETTY MUCH THE SAME RATE, SO I CALLED OUT APCHING 10000 FT. SINCE THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE ENGAGED AND THE FLT DIRECTOR HAD CAPTURED 10000 FT, WHICH WAS BRINGING THE THRUST BACK TO HOLD 250 KTS, I WAS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED. AT 10000 FT AND WITH STILL A SUBSTANTIAL VVI, I CALLED OUT AGAIN TO LEVEL AT 10000 FT -- THIS TIME THE CAPT RESPONDED, BUT WITH THE VVI AND A SLOW RESPONSE, HE WENT TO 10300 FT BEFORE CORRECTING TO 10000 FT. THE TOTAL DEV MIGHT HAVE BEEN 15 SECONDS, AND NO TCASII WARNINGS WERE GENERATED. DEN DEP HAD CLRED US DIRECT TO THE POINT BAYLR, HOWEVER, DURING THE DEV, THEY TURNED US R 40 DEGS, BUT NEVER MENTIONED THE ALT. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, WE WERE CLRED TO FL230 AND PASSED TO ZDV. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. SINCE THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT WITH THIS CAPT, AND THIRD CAPT IN 3 DAYS, I FEEL OUR UNFAMILIARITY PLAYED A PART IN THIS INCIDENT. I FIGURED MY CALLOUTS AND WARNINGS WERE SUFFICIENT, SINCE THEY USUALLY ARE WITH OTHER PLTS. HOWEVER, THIS WAS A SHORT, CHALLENGING FLT TO AN UNCTLED, MOUNTAIN ARPT AT NIGHT. THIS CAPT WAS ZEROED IN ON THAT AND WAS WORKING WITH ME FOR THE FIRST TIME. I SHOULD HAVE SIMPLY TAKEN THE AIRPLANE AND DISCUSSED IT LATER. SINCE I REALLY DIDN'T KNOW THIS INDIVIDUAL WELL (WE JUST MET 40 MINS EARLIER), I REALLY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT HIS THOUGHTS WERE ON THAT TYPE OF ACTION. HE SAID LATER HE WISHED I HAD DONE THAT. I LEARNED A LOT FROM THIS SHORT FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.