Narrative:

Departed ZZZ at a relating light weight (36904 pounds vs 45414 pounds maximum). Shortly after takeoff, raised landing gear, then began trimming as visual. Aircraft began to feel out of trim nose up. I released pitch trim thumb switches on yoke and reselected trim in case the 3 second timer had reset the trim. By this time, I was holding the yoke full forward to the stops with both hands needed to hold it there yet nose was still rising. Called for first officer to reduce thrust and de-select both trim systems. We then verified trim was not moving. I asked first officer re-select back-up trim system. Rolled aircraft into left bank in an attempt to lower nose. First officer activated back-up pitch trim switches on centre pedestal. Recovered control of aircraft, declared emergency, landed on runway 8R at ZZZ using back-up trim system. There was a technical bulletin about this problem with this airplane but I do not believe it adequately prepared us for the situation, or ways to prevent this problem. I believe that it should be emphasized in training that the pilot flying should verify on EICAS that trim is moving at the first activation of primary trim system after takeoff and what steps should be taken (go immediately to back-up trim and/or reduce thrust immediately) to maintain control of aircraft.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the failure of the stabilizer trim was caused by the main electric trim actuator which has inadequate power to move the stabilizer airload. The reporter said the airplane was ground checked ok by maintenance on the return to the field. The reporter stated he flew the airplane the next day with no problems. The reporter said this is a recurrent rpob in this fleet as four incidents of this failure are known and always on takeoff climb. The reporter stated the company has issued a bulletin with no procedures but advises trimming to be accomplished prior to 160 KTS and has placarded the cockpit the same. The reporter said the bulletin makes no reference as to the cause of the failure and is obviously written by a lawyer. The reporter stated with the stabilizer trimmed nose up and failing in this position the neutral shift sensing will limit the elevator window of control. The reporter stated in these failures no EICAS warnings are annunciated in these failures. The reporter stated these failures should be added to the simulator training. The reporter said in this incident the airplane was lightly loaded and went through 160 KTS 4 to 6 seconds after rotation. Callback from acn 535010: the reporter stated this is a fleet wide problem and the company and the manufacturer believe that trimming prior to 160 knots after takeoff will correct the problem. The reporter said any trimming over 160 knots the airloads are too great for the main electric actuator to handle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMBRAER 145 ON TKOF CLB AT 400 FT AGL DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE.

Narrative: DEPARTED ZZZ AT A RELATING LIGHT WT (36904 LBS VS 45414 LBS MAX). SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, RAISED LNDG GEAR, THEN BEGAN TRIMMING AS VISUAL. ACFT BEGAN TO FEEL OUT OF TRIM NOSE UP. I RELEASED PITCH TRIM THUMB SWITCHES ON YOKE AND RESELECTED TRIM IN CASE THE 3 SEC TIMER HAD RESET THE TRIM. BY THIS TIME, I WAS HOLDING THE YOKE FULL FORWARD TO THE STOPS WITH BOTH HANDS NEEDED TO HOLD IT THERE YET NOSE WAS STILL RISING. CALLED FOR FO TO REDUCE THRUST AND DE-SELECT BOTH TRIM SYSTEMS. WE THEN VERIFIED TRIM WAS NOT MOVING. I ASKED FO RE-SELECT BACK-UP TRIM SYSTEM. ROLLED ACFT INTO LEFT BANK IN AN ATTEMPT TO LOWER NOSE. FO ACTIVATED BACK-UP PITCH TRIM SWITCHES ON CENTRE PEDESTAL. RECOVERED CTL OF ACFT, DECLARED EMER, LANDED ON RWY 8R AT ZZZ USING BACK-UP TRIM SYSTEM. THERE WAS A TECHNICAL BULLETIN ABOUT THIS PROB WITH THIS AIRPLANE BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE IT ADEQUATELY PREPARED US FOR THE SIT, OR WAYS TO PREVENT THIS PROB. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED IN TRAINING THAT THE PLT FLYING SHOULD VERIFY ON EICAS THAT TRIM IS MOVING AT THE FIRST ACTIVATION OF PRIMARY TRIM SYSTEM AFTER TKOF AND WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN (GO IMMEDIATELY TO BACK-UP TRIM AND/OR REDUCE THRUST IMMEDIATELY) TO MAINTAIN CTL OF ACFT.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE FAILURE OF THE STABILIZER TRIM WAS CAUSED BY THE MAIN ELECTRIC TRIM ACTUATOR WHICH HAS INADEQUATE POWER TO MOVE THE STABILIZER AIRLOAD. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE WAS GND CHECKED OK BY MAINT ON THE RETURN TO THE FIELD. THE RPTR STATED HE FLEW THE AIRPLANE THE NEXT DAY WITH NO PROBS. THE RPTR SAID THIS IS A RECURRENT RPOB IN THIS FLEET AS FOUR INCIDENTS OF THIS FAILURE ARE KNOWN AND ALWAYS ON TKOF CLB. THE RPTR STATED THE COMPANY HAS ISSUED A BULLETIN WITH NO PROCS BUT ADVISES TRIMMING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO 160 KTS AND HAS PLACARDED THE COCKPIT THE SAME. THE RPTR SAID THE BULLETIN MAKES NO REFERENCE AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE AND IS OBVIOUSLY WRITTEN BY A LAWYER. THE RPTR STATED WITH THE STABILIZER TRIMMED NOSE UP AND FAILING IN THIS POS THE NEUTRAL SHIFT SENSING WILL LIMIT THE ELEVATOR WINDOW OF CTL. THE RPTR STATED IN THESE FAILURES NO EICAS WARNINGS ARE ANNUNCIATED IN THESE FAILURES. THE RPTR STATED THESE FAILURES SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE SIMULATOR TRAINING. THE RPTR SAID IN THIS INCIDENT THE AIRPLANE WAS LIGHTLY LOADED AND WENT THROUGH 160 KTS 4 TO 6 SECS AFTER ROTATION. CALLBACK FROM ACN 535010: THE RPTR STATED THIS IS A FLEET WIDE PROB AND THE COMPANY AND THE MANUFACTURER BELIEVE THAT TRIMMING PRIOR TO 160 KNOTS AFTER TKOF WILL CORRECT THE PROB. THE RPTR SAID ANY TRIMMING OVER 160 KNOTS THE AIRLOADS ARE TOO GREAT FOR THE MAIN ELECTRIC ACTUATOR TO HANDLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.