Narrative:

Conditions: ILS DME runway 08 approach to bishkek, kyrgystan. Night, VMC, cavok beneath a high overcast, airport and runway in sight, radar contact, vectors for the approach. Four crewmembers (two capts and two first officer's) in cockpit at the time of initial contact with approach control. PF was first officer, PNF was captain. Operation: winds at bishkek were reported as light, 130 at 2 mps. Prior to top of descent, the PF briefed both precision approachs to bishkek, one for runway 08 and the other for runway 26. The descent checklist was completed. On initial call to bishkek approach control, PNF requested the approach to runway 26, which was available in the aircraft database: the approach to runway 08 was not available in the database. Approach control advised the crew to expect vectors for the ILS DME runway 08 approach, and issued the wind as reported above. The crew initially received a QFE altimeter setting: because QFE operations are prohibited, the PNF requested and the crew received from approach control a qnh altimeter setting, which was set and cross checked by the PF and PNF in all three aircraft altimeters. The frequency and inbound course for the ILS runway 08 were manually entered into the FMC and the approach checklist was completed. Communications and vectors from approach control were unusual and confusing, e.g., the airway leading to bishkek and our inbound hdging toward the airport were most suitable for radar vectors to a left base entry to the approach to runway 08, but the controller issued a turn to a heading of 255 degrees, making the entry a left downwind. Additionally, the PNF expected the controller to issue altitudes in ft (best corresponding to the initial request for and receipt of a qnh altimeter setting) but the controller issued altitudes in meters. (See factors, approach plates, below.) also unusual, the final clearance from bishkek approach control was: turn left heading 075 (the runway heading and a 180 degree vector turn from the aircraft's previously assigned heading of 255 degrees), descend to 700 meters, cleared for the approach. The PNF converted 700 meters to be an altitude of 2300 ft, set this in the altimeter window on the MCP and so advised the PF. The touchdown zone elevation is 2090 ft. The PNF announced altitude of 2300 ft was clearly inappropriate for an altitude to intercept the GS for the final approach, but none of the four crewmembers in the cockpit noted this error. All crewmembers, the PNF most notably failed to recognize that the approach controller was apparently issuing clearance reference to QFE, despite the initial request for and receipt of qnh information. The final vector heading of 075 degrees was insufficient to capture the localizer, as this heading only paralleled the localizer. The PNF noted this aloud as the PF was in a descending left turn to a heading of 075 degrees, and the PNF suggested a heading of 090 degrees to intercept the localizer. As the PF was commanding changes in aircraft configuration, the PNF was configuring the aircraft, and while in a descending left turn from the heading of 255 degrees to the assigned heading of 075 degrees (prior to correcting the heading to 090 degrees), the crew received the GPWS warning 'too low, gear.' the PNF commanded an immediate climb, which the PF had already begun, and suggested extension of the gear, which the PF commanded and which was accomplished. The warning did not repeat and the remainder of the approach was without incident, the PF captured the localizer on the corrected heading of 090 degrees, captured the GS and continued to landing. After arrival at bishkek and after completion of the shutdown checklist, all four crewmembers debriefed the approach. The consensus reached was that the principal factor in this incident was the controller's issuance of clrncs referenced to QFE rather than qnh and the failure of the PNF to recognize the controller's intentions and to properly reference the altitude/height conversion section on the plane view of the approach plate so as to set the altitude selector on the MCP correctly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B744 CREW, ON APCH TO BISHKEK, KYRGYZSTAN (UAFM), MISINTERPRETED THE ALT CONVERSION, RESULTING IN A 'GPWS' WARNING.

Narrative: CONDITIONS: ILS DME RWY 08 APCH TO BISHKEK, KYRGYSTAN. NIGHT, VMC, CAVOK BENEATH A HIGH OVERCAST, ARPT AND RWY IN SIGHT, RADAR CONTACT, VECTORS FOR THE APCH. FOUR CREWMEMBERS (TWO CAPTS AND TWO FO'S) IN COCKPIT AT THE TIME OF INITIAL CONTACT WITH APCH CTL. PF WAS FO, PNF WAS CAPT. OPERATION: WINDS AT BISHKEK WERE RPTED AS LIGHT, 130 AT 2 MPS. PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT, THE PF BRIEFED BOTH PRECISION APCHS TO BISHKEK, ONE FOR RWY 08 AND THE OTHER FOR RWY 26. THE DSCNT CHECKLIST WAS COMPLETED. ON INITIAL CALL TO BISHKEK APCH CTL, PNF REQUESTED THE APCH TO RWY 26, WHICH WAS AVAILABLE IN THE ACFT DATABASE: THE APCH TO RWY 08 WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN THE DATABASE. APCH CTL ADVISED THE CREW TO EXPECT VECTORS FOR THE ILS DME RWY 08 APCH, AND ISSUED THE WIND AS RPTED ABOVE. THE CREW INITIALLY RECEIVED A QFE ALTIMETER SETTING: BECAUSE QFE OPERATIONS ARE PROHIBITED, THE PNF REQUESTED AND THE CREW RECEIVED FROM APCH CTL A QNH ALTIMETER SETTING, WHICH WAS SET AND CROSS CHECKED BY THE PF AND PNF IN ALL THREE ACFT ALTIMETERS. THE FREQ AND INBOUND COURSE FOR THE ILS RWY 08 WERE MANUALLY ENTERED INTO THE FMC AND THE APCH CHECKLIST WAS COMPLETED. COMS AND VECTORS FROM APCH CTL WERE UNUSUAL AND CONFUSING, E.G., THE AIRWAY LEADING TO BISHKEK AND OUR INBOUND HDGING TOWARD THE ARPT WERE MOST SUITABLE FOR RADAR VECTORS TO A LEFT BASE ENTRY TO THE APCH TO RWY 08, BUT THE CTLR ISSUED A TURN TO A HDG OF 255 DEGS, MAKING THE ENTRY A LEFT DOWNWIND. ADDITIONALLY, THE PNF EXPECTED THE CTLR TO ISSUE ALTITUDES IN FT (BEST CORRESPONDING TO THE INITIAL REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF A QNH ALTIMETER SETTING) BUT THE CTLR ISSUED ALTITUDES IN METERS. (SEE FACTORS, APCH PLATES, BELOW.) ALSO UNUSUAL, THE FINAL CLRNC FROM BISHKEK APCH CTL WAS: TURN LEFT HDG 075 (THE RWY HDG AND A 180 DEG VECTOR TURN FROM THE ACFT'S PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED HDG OF 255 DEGS), DSND TO 700 METERS, CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE PNF CONVERTED 700 METERS TO BE AN ALT OF 2300 FT, SET THIS IN THE ALTIMETER WINDOW ON THE MCP AND SO ADVISED THE PF. THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ELEVATION IS 2090 FT. THE PNF ANNOUNCED ALT OF 2300 FT WAS CLRLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR AN ALTITUDE TO INTERCEPT THE GS FOR THE FINAL APCH, BUT NONE OF THE FOUR CREWMEMBERS IN THE COCKPIT NOTED THIS ERROR. ALL CREWMEMBERS, THE PNF MOST NOTABLY FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE APCH CTLR WAS APPARENTLY ISSUING CLRNC REFERENCE TO QFE, DESPITE THE INITIAL REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF QNH INFO. THE FINAL VECTOR HDG OF 075 DEGS WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CAPTURE THE LOCALIZER, AS THIS HDG ONLY PARALLELED THE LOCALIZER. THE PNF NOTED THIS ALOUD AS THE PF WAS IN A DSNDING LEFT TURN TO A HDG OF 075 DEGS, AND THE PNF SUGGESTED A HDG OF 090 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOCALIZER. AS THE PF WAS COMMANDING CHANGES IN ACFT CONFIGURATION, THE PNF WAS CONFIGURING THE ACFT, AND WHILE IN A DSNDING LEFT TURN FROM THE HDG OF 255 DEGS TO THE ASSIGNED HDG OF 075 DEGS (PRIOR TO CORRECTING THE HDG TO 090 DEGS), THE CREW RECEIVED THE GPWS WARNING 'TOO LOW, GEAR.' THE PNF COMMANDED AN IMMEDIATE CLB, WHICH THE PF HAD ALREADY BEGUN, AND SUGGESTED EXTENSION OF THE GEAR, WHICH THE PF COMMANDED AND WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE WARNING DID NOT REPEAT AND THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT, THE PF CAPTURED THE LOCALIZER ON THE CORRECTED HDG OF 090 DEGS, CAPTURED THE GS AND CONTINUED TO LNDG. AFTER ARRIVAL AT BISHKEK AND AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST, ALL FOUR CREWMEMBERS DEBRIEFED THE APCH. THE CONSENSUS REACHED WAS THAT THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS THE CTLR'S ISSUANCE OF CLRNCS REFERENCED TO QFE RATHER THAN QNH AND THE FAILURE OF THE PNF TO RECOGNIZE THE CTLR'S INTENTIONS AND TO PROPERLY REFERENCE THE ALT/HEIGHT CONVERSION SECTION ON THE PLANE VIEW OF THE APCH PLATE SO AS TO SET THE ALT SELECTOR ON THE MCP CORRECTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.