Narrative:

The problem arose due to a nose gear selector valve failure which caused the nose gear not to retract after takeoff. It was discovered by maintenance personnel after the flight. However, at the time of occurrence, the indications in the cockpit included 2 warning messages (gear disagreement/nose door open). Contributing factors may have been high winds and icing. Corrective actions include QRH procedures which state to maintain 200 KTS, select hydraulic 38 pump on and lower the gear handle. This solved the problem -- all 3 gear were down and locked. Since the gear were down, the aircraft accumulated moderate rime ice at profile altitude (3000 ft). Requested ILS runway 28R and shot coupled approach to a landing. Perceptions, judgements, decisions were fairly straightforward. The cause was unknown, however. The QRH procedures were 3 quick steps and since we were still talking to pit approach control, radar vectors back around went smoothly. Initially, I was concerned because there were numerous 'red light' distrs occurring very close to the ground. Additionally, icing was taking place at 2500 ft. This concerned the crew due to the slower airspds and gear and flaps extended. These concerns caused slight delays assessing what to do. Once things settled down, I flew the aircraft and delegated as much as possible to the first officer in order to remain focused on flying the aircraft. This worked exceptionally well! Factors affecting the quality of human performance would indeed be confusion, distraction, and what to prioritize when multiple problems occur. Corrective action may be to conduct test cells using wind tunnels and icing profiles on nose gear selector valve to determine susceptibility to failure with wind/icing combination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 CREW WAS UNABLE TO RETRACT THE ACFT NOSE GEAR BECAUSE OF NOSE GEAR SELECTOR VALVE FAILURE.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE DUE TO A NOSE GEAR SELECTOR VALVE FAILURE WHICH CAUSED THE NOSE GEAR NOT TO RETRACT AFTER TKOF. IT WAS DISCOVERED BY MAINT PERSONNEL AFTER THE FLT. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE, THE INDICATIONS IN THE COCKPIT INCLUDED 2 WARNING MESSAGES (GEAR DISAGREEMENT/NOSE DOOR OPEN). CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN HIGH WINDS AND ICING. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE QRH PROCS WHICH STATE TO MAINTAIN 200 KTS, SELECT HYD 38 PUMP ON AND LOWER THE GEAR HANDLE. THIS SOLVED THE PROB -- ALL 3 GEAR WERE DOWN AND LOCKED. SINCE THE GEAR WERE DOWN, THE ACFT ACCUMULATED MODERATE RIME ICE AT PROFILE ALT (3000 FT). REQUESTED ILS RWY 28R AND SHOT COUPLED APCH TO A LNDG. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS WERE FAIRLY STRAIGHTFORWARD. THE CAUSE WAS UNKNOWN, HOWEVER. THE QRH PROCS WERE 3 QUICK STEPS AND SINCE WE WERE STILL TALKING TO PIT APCH CTL, RADAR VECTORS BACK AROUND WENT SMOOTHLY. INITIALLY, I WAS CONCERNED BECAUSE THERE WERE NUMEROUS 'RED LIGHT' DISTRS OCCURRING VERY CLOSE TO THE GND. ADDITIONALLY, ICING WAS TAKING PLACE AT 2500 FT. THIS CONCERNED THE CREW DUE TO THE SLOWER AIRSPDS AND GEAR AND FLAPS EXTENDED. THESE CONCERNS CAUSED SLIGHT DELAYS ASSESSING WHAT TO DO. ONCE THINGS SETTLED DOWN, I FLEW THE ACFT AND DELEGATED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO THE FO IN ORDER TO REMAIN FOCUSED ON FLYING THE ACFT. THIS WORKED EXCEPTIONALLY WELL! FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE WOULD INDEED BE CONFUSION, DISTR, AND WHAT TO PRIORITIZE WHEN MULTIPLE PROBS OCCUR. CORRECTIVE ACTION MAY BE TO CONDUCT TEST CELLS USING WIND TUNNELS AND ICING PROFILES ON NOSE GEAR SELECTOR VALVE TO DETERMINE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO FAILURE WITH WIND/ICING COMBINATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.