Narrative:

While descending for the ILS runway 9R approach into phl, the first officer inadvertently selected the ILS runway 9L approach and when I asked for a brief on the approach, first officer gave me the frequency and inbound course, initial altitude and GS intercept altitude, and decision ht and missed approach information. However, first officer failed to make absolute certain he was briefing for the correct runway in use. We were given a vector to intercept the ILS runway 9R localizer, a descent to 2000 ft, and cleared for the ILS runway 9R approach. Upon handoff to the tower, first officer stated we were with them on the ILS runway 9R approach and tower cleared us to land on ILS runway 9R. We continued the approach in moderate snow and limited visibility and broke out approximately 200 ft above minimum decision ht with approach lights in sight and continued to a full stop landing. We were cleared off the runway by tower and given our taxi instructions to parking. While inside building during my postflt with company, an airport official advised me to call approach control on the given telephone number. We were advised at that time of the landing on wrong runway incident. Contributing factors: poor judgement on my part as PIC to accept flight in tight IFR conditions at end of a long duty day. Crew fatigue, which led to the failure to recognize and confirm that we, as a crew, had the correct runway information selected on the fujitsu before commencing the approach. Supplemental information from acn 535782: the flight crew had discussed concerns regarding the accumulating duty time and the probability of executing a near minimums approach. Using the electronic navigation flight guide system chart display. The approach chart for runway 9R was selected by the first officer. As per company SOP's, the flight crew briefed the approach. Note: at this point the flight crew had not realized that in fact they were viewing, and briefing, the runway 9L approach chart, which was incorrectly selected. The ILS frequency code had been idented and a heading was given to intercept the ILS for runway 9R, with a clearance to descend. The aircraft was encountering turbulence, icing, heavy snow showers, and low visibility. The runway approach lighting came into view about 200 ft above the decision ht, and a landing, on what was believed to be runway 9R, was made. Taxi instructions to the ramp were given, and acknowledged by the first officer. Contributing factors: failure to confirm that the proper approach chart was being displayed and reviewed. Failure of ATC to monitor the intercept and tracking of the aircraft on the correct ILS course. Fatigue has a dramatic effect on the professional actions of a flight crew. The ability to make and execute judgements and decisions is greatly affected. This event could have been prevented, if either flight crew members would have stated that they were too high on duty time to execute the proposed flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN H25B CREW, ARRIVING PHL, TUNED, IDENTED, AND LANDED ON THE WRONG PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING FOR THE ILS RWY 9R APCH INTO PHL, THE FO INADVERTENTLY SELECTED THE ILS RWY 9L APCH AND WHEN I ASKED FOR A BRIEF ON THE APCH, FO GAVE ME THE FREQ AND INBOUND COURSE, INITIAL ALT AND GS INTERCEPT ALT, AND DECISION HT AND MISSED APCH INFO. HOWEVER, FO FAILED TO MAKE ABSOLUTE CERTAIN HE WAS BRIEFING FOR THE CORRECT RWY IN USE. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 9R LOC, A DSCNT TO 2000 FT, AND CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 9R APCH. UPON HDOF TO THE TWR, FO STATED WE WERE WITH THEM ON THE ILS RWY 9R APCH AND TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON ILS RWY 9R. WE CONTINUED THE APCH IN MODERATE SNOW AND LIMITED VISIBILITY AND BROKE OUT APPROX 200 FT ABOVE MINIMUM DECISION HT WITH APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT AND CONTINUED TO A FULL STOP LNDG. WE WERE CLRED OFF THE RWY BY TWR AND GIVEN OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO PARKING. WHILE INSIDE BUILDING DURING MY POSTFLT WITH COMPANY, AN ARPT OFFICIAL ADVISED ME TO CALL APCH CTL ON THE GIVEN TELEPHONE NUMBER. WE WERE ADVISED AT THAT TIME OF THE LNDG ON WRONG RWY INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: POOR JUDGEMENT ON MY PART AS PIC TO ACCEPT FLT IN TIGHT IFR CONDITIONS AT END OF A LONG DUTY DAY. CREW FATIGUE, WHICH LED TO THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE AND CONFIRM THAT WE, AS A CREW, HAD THE CORRECT RWY INFO SELECTED ON THE FUJITSU BEFORE COMMENCING THE APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 535782: THE FLC HAD DISCUSSED CONCERNS REGARDING THE ACCUMULATING DUTY TIME AND THE PROBABILITY OF EXECUTING A NEAR MINIMUMS APCH. USING THE ELECTRONIC NAV FLT GUIDE SYS CHART DISPLAY. THE APCH CHART FOR RWY 9R WAS SELECTED BY THE FO. AS PER COMPANY SOP'S, THE FLT CREW BRIEFED THE APCH. NOTE: AT THIS POINT THE FLT CREW HAD NOT REALIZED THAT IN FACT THEY WERE VIEWING, AND BRIEFING, THE RWY 9L APCH CHART, WHICH WAS INCORRECTLY SELECTED. THE ILS FREQ CODE HAD BEEN IDENTED AND A HDG WAS GIVEN TO INTERCEPT THE ILS FOR RWY 9R, WITH A CLRNC TO DSND. THE ACFT WAS ENCOUNTERING TURB, ICING, HVY SNOW SHOWERS, AND LOW VISIBILITY. THE RWY APCH LIGHTING CAME INTO VIEW ABOUT 200 FT ABOVE THE DECISION HT, AND A LNDG, ON WHAT WAS BELIEVED TO BE RWY 9R, WAS MADE. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE RAMP WERE GIVEN, AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE FO. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FAILURE TO CONFIRM THAT THE PROPER APCH CHART WAS BEING DISPLAYED AND REVIEWED. FAILURE OF ATC TO MONITOR THE INTERCEPT AND TRACKING OF THE ACFT ON THE CORRECT ILS COURSE. FATIGUE HAS A DRAMATIC EFFECT ON THE PROFESSIONAL ACTIONS OF A FLT CREW. THE ABILITY TO MAKE AND EXECUTE JUDGEMENTS AND DECISIONS IS GREATLY AFFECTED. THIS EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED, IF EITHER FLT CREW MEMBERS WOULD HAVE STATED THAT THEY WERE TOO HIGH ON DUTY TIME TO EXECUTE THE PROPOSED FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.