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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 535960 |
Time | |
Date | 200201 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : cvg.vortac |
State Reference | KY |
Altitude | msl single value : 3000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : cvg.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer & glide slope : 18r |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 225 flight time total : 2800 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 535960 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | cabin event : passenger electronic device cabin event : passenger misconduct other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to original clearance flight crew : regained aircraft control flight crew : returned to intended or assigned course |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Passenger Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Passenger Human Performance |
Narrative:
Conditions: VMC, cleared for visual to cvg runway 18R, autoplt on, heading mode set to 150 degrees to intercept, runway 18R localizer (111.55/184 degrees) tuned and idented, green data selected, approach armed. Event: while in level flight awaiting capture of the localizer, the autoplt began a standard rate turn to the inbound course approximately 7 mi prior to intercepting the localizer. Since we were VMC, we immediately recognized the error and disconnected the autoplt. The rest of the approach was hand flown. Upon landing, I asked the flight attendant if she noticed anybody using their phone in-flight. She stated that she observed a passenger in seat xyz placing a call during the time we were on approach to cvg. Comments: this type of autoplt error has happened to me at okc and at another airport, and during those occurrences I suspected cell phone interference, however, I was never able to prove that someone was actually using their phone in-flight. On this occasion, it was confirmed by the flight attendant. My concern is that if this type of interference occurs while IMC, it could result in serious consequences. Missed approach, traffic conflicts, crew violations, or even CFIT could be possible. Unfortunately, we have absolutely no way of knowing if a ped is on during flight, and therefore, have no way of knowing if our navigation equipment is being degraded. Cell phones, wireless pda's, the new 'blackberry' devices, and other wireless devices are commonplace and it is almost impossible to ensure that they are not inadvertently left on or used while airborne. (In fact, several months ago, one of the television ads for a blackberry device showed a passenger checking his e-mail while in-flight.) I ask for your assistance in addressing this situation. I am concerned by the possibility that this type of interference could lead to legal ramifications or an accident. I would like to offer a possible solution. Implement a receiver/detector on board the aircraft which can detect xmissions by these types of devices. Since these devices are assigned frequencys, the presence of these frequencys on the aircraft would indicate that such a device is on and that the accuracy of the navigation equipment may be degraded. With this information, the crew would at least have some indication in that there is the possibility of interference. The crew would then take an appropriate course of action. Regardless of how a long-term solution is devised, I would also like to suggest that flight attendants immediately (even if sterile cockpit is in effect) advise the crew if they observe a passenger using a ped on approach, or climb out, since this is an issue of safety.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CL65 CREW HAD POSSIBLE PAX ORIGINATED RF INTERFERENCE WITH AN AUTOFLT SYS DURING VECTORS FOR THE APCH.
Narrative: CONDITIONS: VMC, CLRED FOR VISUAL TO CVG RWY 18R, AUTOPLT ON, HDG MODE SET TO 150 DEGS TO INTERCEPT, RWY 18R LOC (111.55/184 DEGS) TUNED AND IDENTED, GREEN DATA SELECTED, APCH ARMED. EVENT: WHILE IN LEVEL FLT AWAITING CAPTURE OF THE LOC, THE AUTOPLT BEGAN A STANDARD RATE TURN TO THE INBOUND COURSE APPROX 7 MI PRIOR TO INTERCEPTING THE LOC. SINCE WE WERE VMC, WE IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED THE ERROR AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS HAND FLOWN. UPON LNDG, I ASKED THE FLT ATTENDANT IF SHE NOTICED ANYBODY USING THEIR PHONE INFLT. SHE STATED THAT SHE OBSERVED A PAX IN SEAT XYZ PLACING A CALL DURING THE TIME WE WERE ON APCH TO CVG. COMMENTS: THIS TYPE OF AUTOPLT ERROR HAS HAPPENED TO ME AT OKC AND AT ANOTHER ARPT, AND DURING THOSE OCCURRENCES I SUSPECTED CELL PHONE INTERFERENCE, HOWEVER, I WAS NEVER ABLE TO PROVE THAT SOMEONE WAS ACTUALLY USING THEIR PHONE INFLT. ON THIS OCCASION, IT WAS CONFIRMED BY THE FLT ATTENDANT. MY CONCERN IS THAT IF THIS TYPE OF INTERFERENCE OCCURS WHILE IMC, IT COULD RESULT IN SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. MISSED APCH, TFC CONFLICTS, CREW VIOLATIONS, OR EVEN CFIT COULD BE POSSIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO WAY OF KNOWING IF A PED IS ON DURING FLT, AND THEREFORE, HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING IF OUR NAV EQUIP IS BEING DEGRADED. CELL PHONES, WIRELESS PDA'S, THE NEW 'BLACKBERRY' DEVICES, AND OTHER WIRELESS DEVICES ARE COMMONPLACE AND IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE NOT INADVERTENTLY LEFT ON OR USED WHILE AIRBORNE. (IN FACT, SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, ONE OF THE TELEVISION ADS FOR A BLACKBERRY DEVICE SHOWED A PAX CHKING HIS E-MAIL WHILE INFLT.) I ASK FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN ADDRESSING THIS SIT. I AM CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS TYPE OF INTERFERENCE COULD LEAD TO LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OR AN ACCIDENT. I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A POSSIBLE SOLUTION. IMPLEMENT A RECEIVER/DETECTOR ON BOARD THE ACFT WHICH CAN DETECT XMISSIONS BY THESE TYPES OF DEVICES. SINCE THESE DEVICES ARE ASSIGNED FREQS, THE PRESENCE OF THESE FREQS ON THE ACFT WOULD INDICATE THAT SUCH A DEVICE IS ON AND THAT THE ACCURACY OF THE NAV EQUIP MAY BE DEGRADED. WITH THIS INFO, THE CREW WOULD AT LEAST HAVE SOME INDICATION IN THAT THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERFERENCE. THE CREW WOULD THEN TAKE AN APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION. REGARDLESS OF HOW A LONG-TERM SOLUTION IS DEVISED, I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT FLT ATTENDANTS IMMEDIATELY (EVEN IF STERILE COCKPIT IS IN EFFECT) ADVISE THE CREW IF THEY OBSERVE A PAX USING A PED ON APCH, OR CLBOUT, SINCE THIS IS AN ISSUE OF SAFETY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.