Narrative:

Recommendation to ground the A300 fleet. I believe the fleet of A300-600's should be grounded. Reasons as follows: 1) there has been a significant problem with the A300 experiencing uncommanded rudder inputs. To my knowledge the first documented incident occurred in approximately 1990. An A300 from ZZZ1/us to ZZZ2/us had a multiple system failure incident that caused a deviation into ZZZZ1/first officer. The flight had continuous stick shaker, loss of flight instruments, no landing gear or flap indications, and continuous uncontrollable rudder deflections. They flew raw data and stand-by instruments all the way to touchdown. The aircraft in question experienced a significant yawing moment on takeoff that caused it to almost depart the runway. Later in 1990, in ZZZZ2/first officer, an A300 on takeoff experienced a significant yawing moment to the left. The captain aborted the takeoff and departed or almost departed the runway. In may 1999, a flight from ZZZZ3/first officer to ZZZ4/us experienced significant uncommanded rudder inputs on final. In october 1999, a departure from ZZZZ4/first officer to ZZZ5/us experienced an uncommanded rudder jolt. In 2000, an A300 departing ZZZZ5/first officer experienced uncommanded rudder inputs that resulted in an engine flameout and the aircraft returning to ZZZZ5/first officer. In november 2001, an A300 departing ZZZZ6/first officer experienced uncommanded rudder inputs. It returned to ZZZZ6/first officer and remained there for approximately 1 week. In dec, 2001, an aircraft on approach into ZZZ6/us experienced rudder pulsing. In jan, 2002, a flight from ZZZ7/us to ZZZZ7/first officer experienced significant uncommanded rudder inputs on departure from ZZZ7/us climbing through 10000 ft. The aircraft returned to ZZZ7/us. In jan, 2002, this same aircraft from ZZZ7/us to ZZZZ7/first officer experienced uncommanded rudder inputs after having both facility and yaw damper servo actuator replaced the previous night. The aircraft continued to ZZZZ7/first officer. It was ferried back to ZZZ7/us and then on to mntnc. So many incidents of uncommanded rudder input have occurred on that A300 that when the captain called mntnc to discuss the problem, the comment made by the representative was 'that's the airbus yaw damper for you.' numerous other incidents of uncommanded rudder input have also occurred. There is no way to check the structural integrity of the composite material used in the vertical stabilizer while it is on the airplane. The visual test currently being conducted has been widely criticized as being wholly inadequate by many composite experts. It was represented that composites were much stronger and durable than metal. It is interesting to note that the vertical stabilizer has never come off a metal airplane. No test equipment was ever developed to check the structural integrity of the A300's composite vertical stabilizer. The military uses non-destructive ndi type testing to check the structural integrity of all its aircraft with composite components. According to the director of the composites research lab at a university, composites that were thought to have a useful life of 30 yrs may, in fact, only have a useful life of approximately 1/3 of the original estimate because they become brittle and lose elasticity. The sailboat manufacturing industry has experienced unanticipated problems with composite masts breaking unexpectedly yrs before what was considered to be their useful life. The NTSB issued an advisory stating that delamination was discovered in the vertical stabilizer. They are not yet sure if the delamination occurred when the vertical stabilizer hit the water or existed prior to the tail separating from the aircraft. Modern aviation is replete with examples of aircraft that crashed because of design flaws. We have discovered much about the A-300. Perhaps the most significant thing is that no sophisticated, definitive inspection procedure exists to ensure the interior integrity of the tail composites of the A300. A300's have a long history of uncommanded rudder inputs and fluctuations. These facts should lead us to err on the side of caution and ground the remainder of the A300's until such time as we can either: 1) determine the exact cause for the crash of flight abc and ensure the problem is corrected, or 2) develop a method of non-destructive composite testing that unequivocally will determine the structural integrity of the vertical stabilizer.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A-300-600 PLT QUESTIONS WHETHER THE A-300 ACFT SHOULD BE GROUNDED UNTIL THE CAUSE OF AN ACR CRASH CAN BE POSITIVELY DETERMINED.

Narrative: RECOMMENDATION TO GND THE A300 FLEET. I BELIEVE THE FLEET OF A300-600'S SHOULD BE GROUNDED. REASONS AS FOLLOWS: 1) THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT PROB WITH THE A300 EXPERIENCING UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS. TO MY KNOWLEDGE THE FIRST DOCUMENTED INCIDENT OCCURRED IN APPROXIMATELY 1990. AN A300 FROM ZZZ1/US TO ZZZ2/US HAD A MULTIPLE SYS FAILURE INCIDENT THAT CAUSED A DEVIATION INTO ZZZZ1/FO. THE FLT HAD CONTINUOUS STICK SHAKER, LOSS OF FLT INSTRUMENTS, NO LNDG GEAR OR FLAP INDICATIONS, AND CONTINUOUS UNCONTROLLABLE RUDDER DEFLECTIONS. THEY FLEW RAW DATA AND STAND-BY INSTRUMENTS ALL THE WAY TO TOUCHDOWN. THE ACFT IN QUESTION EXPERIENCED A SIGNIFICANT YAWING MOMENT ON TKOF THAT CAUSED IT TO ALMOST DEPART THE RWY. LATER IN 1990, IN ZZZZ2/FO, AN A300 ON TKOF EXPERIENCED A SIGNIFICANT YAWING MOMENT TO THE LEFT. THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF AND DEPARTED OR ALMOST DEPARTED THE RWY. IN MAY 1999, A FLT FROM ZZZZ3/FO TO ZZZ4/US EXPERIENCED SIGNIFICANT UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS ON FINAL. IN OCTOBER 1999, A DEP FROM ZZZZ4/FO TO ZZZ5/US EXPERIENCED AN UNCOMMANDED RUDDER JOLT. IN 2000, AN A300 DEPARTING ZZZZ5/FO EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS THAT RESULTED IN AN ENG FLAMEOUT AND THE ACFT RETURNING TO ZZZZ5/FO. IN NOVEMBER 2001, AN A300 DEPARTING ZZZZ6/FO EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS. IT RETURNED TO ZZZZ6/FO AND REMAINED THERE FOR APPROX 1 WEEK. IN DEC, 2001, AN ACFT ON APCH INTO ZZZ6/US EXPERIENCED RUDDER PULSING. IN JAN, 2002, A FLT FROM ZZZ7/US TO ZZZZ7/FO EXPERIENCED SIGNIFICANT UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS ON DEP FROM ZZZ7/US CLBING THROUGH 10000 FT. THE ACFT RETURNED TO ZZZ7/US. IN JAN, 2002, THIS SAME ACFT FROM ZZZ7/US TO ZZZZ7/FO EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS AFTER HAVING BOTH FAC AND YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR REPLACED THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. THE ACFT CONTINUED TO ZZZZ7/FO. IT WAS FERRIED BACK TO ZZZ7/US AND THEN ON TO MNTNC. SO MANY INCIDENTS OF UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUT HAVE OCCURRED ON THAT A300 THAT WHEN THE CAPT CALLED MNTNC TO DISCUSS THE PROB, THE COMMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE WAS 'THAT'S THE AIRBUS YAW DAMPER FOR YOU.' NUMEROUS OTHER INCIDENTS OF UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUT HAVE ALSO OCCURRED. THERE IS NO WAY TO CHK THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE COMPOSITE MATERIAL USED IN THE VERTICAL STABILIZER WHILE IT IS ON THE AIRPLANE. THE VISUAL TEST CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED HAS BEEN WIDELY CRITICIZED AS BEING WHOLLY INADEQUATE BY MANY COMPOSITE EXPERTS. IT WAS REPRESENTED THAT COMPOSITES WERE MUCH STRONGER AND DURABLE THAN METAL. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE VERTICAL STABILIZER HAS NEVER COME OFF A METAL AIRPLANE. NO TEST EQUIP WAS EVER DEVELOPED TO CHK THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE A300'S COMPOSITE VERTICAL STABILIZER. THE MILITARY USES NON-DESTRUCTIVE NDI TYPE TESTING TO CHK THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF ALL ITS ACFT WITH COMPOSITE COMPONENTS. ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE COMPOSITES RESEARCH LAB AT A UNIVERSITY, COMPOSITES THAT WERE THOUGHT TO HAVE A USEFUL LIFE OF 30 YRS MAY, IN FACT, ONLY HAVE A USEFUL LIFE OF APPROX 1/3 OF THE ORIGINAL ESTIMATE BECAUSE THEY BECOME BRITTLE AND LOSE ELASTICITY. THE SAILBOAT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY HAS EXPERIENCED UNANTICIPATED PROBS WITH COMPOSITE MASTS BREAKING UNEXPECTEDLY YRS BEFORE WHAT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THEIR USEFUL LIFE. THE NTSB ISSUED AN ADVISORY STATING THAT DELAMINATION WAS DISCOVERED IN THE VERTICAL STABILIZER. THEY ARE NOT YET SURE IF THE DELAMINATION OCCURRED WHEN THE VERTICAL STABILIZER HIT THE WATER OR EXISTED PRIOR TO THE TAIL SEPARATING FROM THE ACFT. MODERN AVIATION IS REPLETE WITH EXAMPLES OF ACFT THAT CRASHED BECAUSE OF DESIGN FLAWS. WE HAVE DISCOVERED MUCH ABOUT THE A-300. PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT THING IS THAT NO SOPHISTICATED, DEFINITIVE INSPECTION PROC EXISTS TO ENSURE THE INTERIOR INTEGRITY OF THE TAIL COMPOSITES OF THE A300. A300'S HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF UNCOMMANDED RUDDER INPUTS AND FLUCTUATIONS. THESE FACTS SHOULD LEAD US TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION AND GND THE REMAINDER OF THE A300'S UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE CAN EITHER: 1) DETERMINE THE EXACT CAUSE FOR THE CRASH OF FLT ABC AND ENSURE THE PROB IS CORRECTED, OR 2) DEVELOP A METHOD OF NON-DESTRUCTIVE COMPOSITE TESTING THAT UNEQUIVOCALLY WILL DETERMINE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VERTICAL STABILIZER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.