Narrative:

We took the aircraft from another crew at XA00 in ZZZ. The inbound crew had written up the l-hand dc generator and we were on maintenance. There were already 3 deferred items in the logbook (galley light inoperative, cabin interior lighting, and cycle ice timer). About 1 hour later, contract maintenance informed us they were going to exchange the l-hand generator for the r-hand generator so that the inoperative generator could be deferred. (A l-hand generator cannot be deferred in the aircraft.) we assisted contract maintenance in the form of engine starts/stops. After the generators were exchanged, all system (except the r-hand generator) were tested and operated normally. Contract maintenance went to confer with air carrier maintenance over the phone and returned at approximately XE15 and told us the r-hand generator was deferred properly and handed me the logbook. I pointed out to him that the r-hand generator was not properly deferred. The slip contained the wrong MEL number, the wrong category (and therefore the wrong expiration date), and no maintenance procedures had been filled in. Additionally, maintenance had completely ignored almost 3 pages of procedures in the MEL. We helped contract maintenance perform these procedures in the form of engine starts/stops and then conferred with air carrier maintenance to pen and ink the maintenance slip correctly. About 30 mins into the flight, we noticed an amber right fuel pressure low cas message and complied with the QRH. Although the message was at first intermittent, it eventually stayed on continuously. The QRH simply says to minimize thrust lever movement and avoid sudden roll movements. We messaged dispatch concerning this via ACARS. About 45 mins later we noticed a 'vibration' icon on the EICAS and when we pulled up the engine page we saw a l-hand engine vibration of only .1 inches per second, but a r-hand engine vibrations of .3 to .4 inches per second. We complied with the QRH, but bringing the thrust lever back to idle did not help. Soon after the vibration got to 1.3 inches per second. We both heard a low frequency humming we were not accustomed to, and later the first officer related that he also felt a definite vibration. I cannot verify the sensation of vibration, only the low hum. In accordance with the QRH, we secured the r-hand engine. I was the PF and declared an emergency as my first officer followed the QRH and began the process of notifying dispatch. This notification became a time consuming process because an air carrier Y flight was having problems of its own (with a possible emergency). Without being able to confer with dispatch, I asked ATC for the nearest airport and he began giving me vectors for ZZZ1. I informed my first officer to simply tell dispatch that we were diverting single engine to ZZZ1 and that I needed him 'back in the cockpit.' while descending into the ZZZ1 area, we now had a 'bleed sov fail' message and I noticed that the l-hand engine low pressure bleed had failed closed. We were in icing conditions for a short duration during the descent and when we selected the single mode cycle ice we indeed received an air foil deice fail message. Fortunately, we were not in icing conditions long enough for this to be a problem. The entire QRH was completed before we made an uneventful landing in ZZZ1 and taxied to the gate without further incident. Crash fire rescue equipment escorted us to the gate. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the maintenance findings were the starter drive shaft had failed on the accessory gear box side allowing the shaft to be driven by the engine causing the vibration and hum. The FAA safety inspector checked the logbook on arrival and was interested in the swapping of the generators prior to departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DORNIER 328J IN CRUISE AT FL270 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO THE R ENG VIBRATION INDICATION AND AUDIBLE HUM. CAUSED BY A FAILED STARTED DRIVE SHAFT.

Narrative: WE TOOK THE ACFT FROM ANOTHER CREW AT XA00 IN ZZZ. THE INBOUND CREW HAD WRITTEN UP THE L-HAND DC GENERATOR AND WE WERE ON MAINT. THERE WERE ALREADY 3 DEFERRED ITEMS IN THE LOGBOOK (GALLEY LIGHT INOP, CABIN INTERIOR LIGHTING, AND CYCLE ICE TIMER). ABOUT 1 HR LATER, CONTRACT MAINT INFORMED US THEY WERE GOING TO EXCHANGE THE L-HAND GENERATOR FOR THE R-HAND GENERATOR SO THAT THE INOP GENERATOR COULD BE DEFERRED. (A L-HAND GENERATOR CANNOT BE DEFERRED IN THE ACFT.) WE ASSISTED CONTRACT MAINT IN THE FORM OF ENG STARTS/STOPS. AFTER THE GENERATORS WERE EXCHANGED, ALL SYS (EXCEPT THE R-HAND GENERATOR) WERE TESTED AND OPERATED NORMALLY. CONTRACT MAINT WENT TO CONFER WITH ACR MAINT OVER THE PHONE AND RETURNED AT APPROX XE15 AND TOLD US THE R-HAND GENERATOR WAS DEFERRED PROPERLY AND HANDED ME THE LOGBOOK. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE R-HAND GENERATOR WAS NOT PROPERLY DEFERRED. THE SLIP CONTAINED THE WRONG MEL NUMBER, THE WRONG CATEGORY (AND THEREFORE THE WRONG EXPIRATION DATE), AND NO MAINT PROCS HAD BEEN FILLED IN. ADDITIONALLY, MAINT HAD COMPLETELY IGNORED ALMOST 3 PAGES OF PROCS IN THE MEL. WE HELPED CONTRACT MAINT PERFORM THESE PROCS IN THE FORM OF ENG STARTS/STOPS AND THEN CONFERRED WITH ACR MAINT TO PEN AND INK THE MAINT SLIP CORRECTLY. ABOUT 30 MINS INTO THE FLT, WE NOTICED AN AMBER R FUEL PRESSURE LOW CAS MESSAGE AND COMPLIED WITH THE QRH. ALTHOUGH THE MESSAGE WAS AT FIRST INTERMITTENT, IT EVENTUALLY STAYED ON CONTINUOUSLY. THE QRH SIMPLY SAYS TO MINIMIZE THRUST LEVER MOVEMENT AND AVOID SUDDEN ROLL MOVEMENTS. WE MESSAGED DISPATCH CONCERNING THIS VIA ACARS. ABOUT 45 MINS LATER WE NOTICED A 'VIBRATION' ICON ON THE EICAS AND WHEN WE PULLED UP THE ENG PAGE WE SAW A L-HAND ENG VIBRATION OF ONLY .1 INCHES PER SECOND, BUT A R-HAND ENG VIBRATIONS OF .3 TO .4 INCHES PER SECOND. WE COMPLIED WITH THE QRH, BUT BRINGING THE THRUST LEVER BACK TO IDLE DID NOT HELP. SOON AFTER THE VIBRATION GOT TO 1.3 INCHES PER SECOND. WE BOTH HEARD A LOW FREQ HUMMING WE WERE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO, AND LATER THE FO RELATED THAT HE ALSO FELT A DEFINITE VIBRATION. I CANNOT VERIFY THE SENSATION OF VIBRATION, ONLY THE LOW HUM. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE QRH, WE SECURED THE R-HAND ENG. I WAS THE PF AND DECLARED AN EMER AS MY FO FOLLOWED THE QRH AND BEGAN THE PROCESS OF NOTIFYING DISPATCH. THIS NOTIFICATION BECAME A TIME CONSUMING PROCESS BECAUSE AN ACR Y FLT WAS HAVING PROBS OF ITS OWN (WITH A POSSIBLE EMER). WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO CONFER WITH DISPATCH, I ASKED ATC FOR THE NEAREST ARPT AND HE BEGAN GIVING ME VECTORS FOR ZZZ1. I INFORMED MY FO TO SIMPLY TELL DISPATCH THAT WE WERE DIVERTING SINGLE ENG TO ZZZ1 AND THAT I NEEDED HIM 'BACK IN THE COCKPIT.' WHILE DSNDING INTO THE ZZZ1 AREA, WE NOW HAD A 'BLEED SOV FAIL' MESSAGE AND I NOTICED THAT THE L-HAND ENG LOW PRESSURE BLEED HAD FAILED CLOSED. WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS FOR A SHORT DURATION DURING THE DSCNT AND WHEN WE SELECTED THE SINGLE MODE CYCLE ICE WE INDEED RECEIVED AN AIR FOIL DEICE FAIL MESSAGE. FORTUNATELY, WE WERE NOT IN ICING CONDITIONS LONG ENOUGH FOR THIS TO BE A PROB. THE ENTIRE QRH WAS COMPLETED BEFORE WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG IN ZZZ1 AND TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CFR ESCORTED US TO THE GATE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE MAINT FINDINGS WERE THE STARTER DRIVE SHAFT HAD FAILED ON THE ACCESSORY GEAR BOX SIDE ALLOWING THE SHAFT TO BE DRIVEN BY THE ENG CAUSING THE VIBRATION AND HUM. THE FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR CHKED THE LOGBOOK ON ARR AND WAS INTERESTED IN THE SWAPPING OF THE GENERATORS PRIOR TO DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.