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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 538705 |
Time | |
Date | 200202 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hsv.airport |
State Reference | AL |
Altitude | agl bound upper : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : hsv.tracon tower : wrb.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | controller military : 15 controller radar : 21 controller supervisory : 10 flight time last 90 days : 80 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 4000 |
ASRS Report | 538705 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence : clearance other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | atc equipment other atc equipment : radar other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued advisory |
Consequence | faa : investigated faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : hsv.tracon |
Narrative:
As I was nearing a departure for a flight from huntsville, I requested my first officer to get our clearance. We received 'cleared HSV1 departure, clearance amended as follows: comply with the restrs on the HSV1 departure, but route changed to direct prone, direct choo choo. The first officer read back all including 'direct prone, direct choo choo.' we briefed departure, entered the new clearance point on to the legs page of our FMC. The hsv one departure states: cleared as filed. Climb via runway heading or as assigned for vectors to join filed route. The first officer and I were both clear in the understanding that we had been assigned direct prone. This is what we briefed, planned and executed. At no time was there any suspicion or question that anything else was expected. We believed the instructions 'to comply with restrs' referred to the assigned altitude. Following takeoff, we reached 500 ft and commenced a shallow turn towards prone. The first officer checked in to departure with, 'direct prone.' the controller questioned, 'weren't you assigned runway heading.' we responded in the negative, that we were cleared direct prone. Shortly after we were requested to contact the supervisor to discuss a possible 'pilot deviation.' subsequent discussions with the supervisory helped to determine that the clearance was not executed as they expected. They stated that a 'pilot deviation' would be filed with the FSDO. The supervisor admitted to having had similar problems in the past and that the controllers needed to be more explicit in their directions. Further discussions with other pilots from my company revealed similar problems. My director of training relates that he was given a similar clearance and when he chose to hold runway heading as per the HSV1, the departure controller chastised him for not going direct. Communication is only successful when it is understood completely. The execution of this departure was flawed because the communication was incomplete. If the controller required that runway heading be maintained, then he should have directed it, particularly when the published departure includes the language of 'or as assigned.' we executed the departure as we believe we were directed. I believe possible solutions lie in 3 areas: the instructions on the departure should be more clear. The controllers should specify exactly what they expect and avoid unclr, open remarks such as 'comply with restrs,' crews must question any clearance that is non-standard or leaves possibility for doubt. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised of no response from FAA. During discussion with supervisor, the supervisor acknowledged similar departure clearance interpretation events in the past.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DEPARTING HSV, B747 FLC WAS CONFUSED BY AMENDED CLRNC AND TURNED EARLY, RATHER THAN FLY RWY HDG.
Narrative: AS I WAS NEARING A DEP FOR A FLT FROM HUNTSVILLE, I REQUESTED MY FO TO GET OUR CLRNC. WE RECEIVED 'CLRED HSV1 DEP, CLRNC AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: COMPLY WITH THE RESTRS ON THE HSV1 DEP, BUT RTE CHANGED TO DIRECT PRONE, DIRECT CHOO CHOO. THE FO READ BACK ALL INCLUDING 'DIRECT PRONE, DIRECT CHOO CHOO.' WE BRIEFED DEP, ENTERED THE NEW CLRNC POINT ON TO THE LEGS PAGE OF OUR FMC. THE HSV ONE DEP STATES: CLRED AS FILED. CLB VIA RWY HEADING OR AS ASSIGNED FOR VECTORS TO JOIN FILED RTE. THE FO AND I WERE BOTH CLR IN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED DIRECT PRONE. THIS IS WHAT WE BRIEFED, PLANNED AND EXECUTED. AT NO TIME WAS THERE ANY SUSPICION OR QUESTION THAT ANYTHING ELSE WAS EXPECTED. WE BELIEVED THE INSTRUCTIONS 'TO COMPLY WITH RESTRS' REFERRED TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. FOLLOWING TKOF, WE REACHED 500 FT AND COMMENCED A SHALLOW TURN TOWARDS PRONE. THE FO CHKED IN TO DEP WITH, 'DIRECT PRONE.' THE CTLR QUESTIONED, 'WEREN'T YOU ASSIGNED RWY HEADING.' WE RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE, THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT PRONE. SHORTLY AFTER WE WERE REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE SUPVR TO DISCUSS A POSSIBLE 'PLTDEV.' SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SUPERVISORY HELPED TO DETERMINE THAT THE CLRNC WAS NOT EXECUTED AS THEY EXPECTED. THEY STATED THAT A 'PLTDEV' WOULD BE FILED WITH THE FSDO. THE SUPVR ADMITTED TO HAVING HAD SIMILAR PROBS IN THE PAST AND THAT THE CTLRS NEEDED TO BE MORE EXPLICIT IN THEIR DIRECTIONS. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER PLTS FROM MY COMPANY REVEALED SIMILAR PROBS. MY DIRECTOR OF TRAINING RELATES THAT HE WAS GIVEN A SIMILAR CLRNC AND WHEN HE CHOSE TO HOLD RWY HEADING AS PER THE HSV1, THE DEP CTLR CHASTISED HIM FOR NOT GOING DIRECT. COM IS ONLY SUCCESSFUL WHEN IT IS UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY. THE EXECUTION OF THIS DEP WAS FLAWED BECAUSE THE COM WAS INCOMPLETE. IF THE CTLR REQUIRED THAT RWY HEADING BE MAINTAINED, THEN HE SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED IT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PUBLISHED DEP INCLUDES THE LANGUAGE OF 'OR AS ASSIGNED.' WE EXECUTED THE DEP AS WE BELIEVE WE WERE DIRECTED. I BELIEVE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS LIE IN 3 AREAS: THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE DEP SHOULD BE MORE CLR. THE CTLRS SHOULD SPECIFY EXACTLY WHAT THEY EXPECT AND AVOID UNCLR, OPEN REMARKS SUCH AS 'COMPLY WITH RESTRS,' CREWS MUST QUESTION ANY CLRNC THAT IS NON-STANDARD OR LEAVES POSSIBILITY FOR DOUBT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED OF NO RESPONSE FROM FAA. DURING DISCUSSION WITH SUPVR, THE SUPVR ACKNOWLEDGED SIMILAR DEP CLRNC INTERP EVENTS IN THE PAST.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.