Narrative:

Flight from kudd-klas. We had programmed the FMS to our filed route and departed udd VFR and picked up our clearance en route, remaining VFR. We picked up our clearance from psp departure, and it was different than what was filed. The PNF proceeded to change the route in the FMS. The biggest change was the arrival into las. The filed arrival was the cresso 3, which was changed to the skebr 1. Both arrs can start at crams. As he was checking the fixes, I called them out to him to verify it was correct, but he had the crams 1 arrival in hand, so it looked good. As we started the arrival, we were instructed to descend to 11000 ft, and continue on skebr 1, neither of us realized that we still did not have the correct arrival and continued. Then approach asked us our heading, which was 015 degrees. We were then instructed to turn to 350 degrees, and the previous heading would not keep us on skebr 1 arrival. At this point we realized something was wrong and I started turning to 035 degrees. Again, approach queried us of our heading and instructed us to turn to 350 degrees. Approach then vectored us the remainder of the arrival and we landed with no other problems. At the time, we were IMC, in turbulence, getting light ice. Just previously, PNF was getting ATIS and informing the FBO of our arrival. At that time, PF was flying and monitoring center frequency. At about the time of the problem, both pilots were performing their duties, but both were confused about the situation. I feel if I would have asked the PNF to repeat the arrival after initial clearance was given and should have been verifying the arrival as PNF was entering the information into the FMS, this would not have happened. Supplemental information from acn 538181: I entered crams and then inadvertently entered the crams 1 arrival into the FMS. Several factors led to this situation. As the PNF, it was my duty to program the FMS and changes. These are to be discussed and confirmed by the PF. I allowed myself to be distraction from communicating and completing this confirmation by simultaneously attempting to retrieve ATIS and notify the FBO of our arrival and confirm passenger ground transportation requirements. This situation could have been prevented by: 1) additional concentration, focus, and personal commitment to 'correctly' enter clrncs and changes into the FMS. 2) adherence to company policy to properly communicate, confirm, and verify FMS entries. 3) properly prioritizing the workload to include flying the airplane, complying with ATC clrncs, and omitting non essential duties to prevent flight crew distraction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C560 CREW HAD TRACK DEV AFTER A CHANGE IN STAR INTO LAS.

Narrative: FLT FROM KUDD-KLAS. WE HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMS TO OUR FILED RTE AND DEPARTED UDD VFR AND PICKED UP OUR CLRNC ENRTE, REMAINING VFR. WE PICKED UP OUR CLRNC FROM PSP DEP, AND IT WAS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT WAS FILED. THE PNF PROCEEDED TO CHANGE THE RTE IN THE FMS. THE BIGGEST CHANGE WAS THE ARR INTO LAS. THE FILED ARR WAS THE CRESSO 3, WHICH WAS CHANGED TO THE SKEBR 1. BOTH ARRS CAN START AT CRAMS. AS HE WAS CHKING THE FIXES, I CALLED THEM OUT TO HIM TO VERIFY IT WAS CORRECT, BUT HE HAD THE CRAMS 1 ARR IN HAND, SO IT LOOKED GOOD. AS WE STARTED THE ARR, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 11000 FT, AND CONTINUE ON SKEBR 1, NEITHER OF US REALIZED THAT WE STILL DID NOT HAVE THE CORRECT ARR AND CONTINUED. THEN APCH ASKED US OUR HDG, WHICH WAS 015 DEGS. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO TURN TO 350 DEGS, AND THE PREVIOUS HDG WOULD NOT KEEP US ON SKEBR 1 ARR. AT THIS POINT WE REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND I STARTED TURNING TO 035 DEGS. AGAIN, APCH QUERIED US OF OUR HDG AND INSTRUCTED US TO TURN TO 350 DEGS. APCH THEN VECTORED US THE REMAINDER OF THE ARR AND WE LANDED WITH NO OTHER PROBS. AT THE TIME, WE WERE IMC, IN TURB, GETTING LIGHT ICE. JUST PREVIOUSLY, PNF WAS GETTING ATIS AND INFORMING THE FBO OF OUR ARR. AT THAT TIME, PF WAS FLYING AND MONITORING CTR FREQ. AT ABOUT THE TIME OF THE PROB, BOTH PLTS WERE PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES, BUT BOTH WERE CONFUSED ABOUT THE SIT. I FEEL IF I WOULD HAVE ASKED THE PNF TO REPEAT THE ARR AFTER INITIAL CLRNC WAS GIVEN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN VERIFYING THE ARR AS PNF WAS ENTERING THE INFO INTO THE FMS, THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 538181: I ENTERED CRAMS AND THEN INADVERTENTLY ENTERED THE CRAMS 1 ARR INTO THE FMS. SEVERAL FACTORS LED TO THIS SIT. AS THE PNF, IT WAS MY DUTY TO PROGRAM THE FMS AND CHANGES. THESE ARE TO BE DISCUSSED AND CONFIRMED BY THE PF. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE DISTR FROM COMMUNICATING AND COMPLETING THIS CONFIRMATION BY SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTEMPTING TO RETRIEVE ATIS AND NOTIFY THE FBO OF OUR ARR AND CONFIRM PAX GND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY: 1) ADDITIONAL CONCENTRATION, FOCUS, AND PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO 'CORRECTLY' ENTER CLRNCS AND CHANGES INTO THE FMS. 2) ADHERENCE TO COMPANY POLICY TO PROPERLY COMMUNICATE, CONFIRM, AND VERIFY FMS ENTRIES. 3) PROPERLY PRIORITIZING THE WORKLOAD TO INCLUDE FLYING THE AIRPLANE, COMPLYING WITH ATC CLRNCS, AND OMITTING NON ESSENTIAL DUTIES TO PREVENT FLC DISTR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.