Narrative:

Air carrier X was outside the OM for ILS runway 16R sea at approximately 3500 ft MSL when final approach controller issued missed approach instruction due to insufficient spacing with preceding aircraft. Aircraft X was given a clearance to maintain 3200 ft and turn right to 260 degrees. First officer noted this heading would conflict with area of very heavy precipitation on radar screen. Numerous vectors were issued to keep air carrier X clear of heavy precipitation and return to a downwind leg west of the ILS runway 16R approach course. Soon we were given a clearance to climb immediately to 4000 ft and to state the heading we were turning through. Apparently our maneuvering track had taken us close to the approach course of runway 16R and into a conflict with an aircraft now on the approach. A clearance was issued to continue our turn further to the right. We avoided another WX area on the radar and were now established on a downwind leg for ILS runway 16R. ATC then advised us to call the approach supervisor in regard to a possible pilot deviation report to be issued. Inside the marker during the second approach our aircraft was struck by lightning at approximately 1000 ft AGL, the base of the overcast. All system remained operational and a normal landing was made. Contributing factors: both the first officer and I felt that spacing on our first approach was more than adequate to continue and land safely on runway 16R however, if it was not we both felt that we could have safely performed a side step VFR once we broke out to runway 16L. Due to the current WX with heavy precipitation to the right of the approach course, I would rather have executed a published missed approach, which was clear. During this sequence of events our operations chief at sea informed me that we were 1 of 7 aircraft that were hit by lightning during this immediate time frame. Why did ATC continue to operate at sea if this was the case? I felt that my performance as the PF was compromised due to poor crew rest the preceding night and a very long crew day. I think we missed one of ATC's instructions and continued a turn back toward the final approach course and into a possible conflict with another aircraft on final. Supplemental information from acn 540140: aircraft was on final approach in IMC conditions. Due to lack of spacing with preceding aircraft, approach clearance was terminated and vectors and climb were assigned. New heading was straight toward area of heavy radar return so new instructions were requested. During maneuvering for next approach attempt, while attempting to avoid heavy WX, approach controller became concerned that our track could cause possible conflicts with subsequent arrival traffic. Once established on next approach, at base of clouds, aircraft received a direct lightning strike. All system remained functional and a normal landing was made. At no time did our TCASII system alert with TA or RA, in fact no traffic was displayed on our system subsequent to initial go around. Vectors into the direction of known convective activity confounded our situation. I believe that area was used to avoid the very noise critical area to the east. WX avoidance should take precedence. It came to our knowledge, once on the ground, that a total of 7 aircraft took lightning strikes while landing in sea in the preceding hour!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CREW WOULD NOT ACCEPT VECTORS INTO INTENSE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY ON A CTLR DIRECTED GAR AT SEA.

Narrative: ACR X WAS OUTSIDE THE OM FOR ILS RWY 16R SEA AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL WHEN FINAL APCH CTLR ISSUED MISSED APCH INSTRUCTION DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SPACING WITH PRECEDING ACFT. ACFT X WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 3200 FT AND TURN R TO 260 DEGS. FO NOTED THIS HEADING WOULD CONFLICT WITH AREA OF VERY HVY PRECIPITATION ON RADAR SCREEN. NUMEROUS VECTORS WERE ISSUED TO KEEP ACR X CLR OF HVY PRECIPITATION AND RETURN TO A DOWNWIND LEG W OF THE ILS RWY 16R APCH COURSE. SOON WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CLB IMMEDIATELY TO 4000 FT AND TO STATE THE HEADING WE WERE TURNING THROUGH. APPARENTLY OUR MANEUVERING TRACK HAD TAKEN US CLOSE TO THE APCH COURSE OF RWY 16R AND INTO A CONFLICT WITH AN ACFT NOW ON THE APCH. A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO CONTINUE OUR TURN FURTHER TO THE R. WE AVOIDED ANOTHER WX AREA ON THE RADAR AND WERE NOW ESTABLISHED ON A DOWNWIND LEG FOR ILS RWY 16R. ATC THEN ADVISED US TO CALL THE APCH SUPVR IN REGARD TO A POSSIBLE PLTDEV RPT TO BE ISSUED. INSIDE THE MARKER DURING THE SECOND APCH OUR ACFT WAS STRUCK BY LIGHTNING AT APPROX 1000 FT AGL, THE BASE OF THE OVCST. ALL SYS REMAINED OPERATIONAL AND A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: BOTH THE FO AND I FELT THAT SPACING ON OUR FIRST APCH WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO CONTINUE AND LAND SAFELY ON RWY 16R HOWEVER, IF IT WAS NOT WE BOTH FELT THAT WE COULD HAVE SAFELY PERFORMED A SIDE STEP VFR ONCE WE BROKE OUT TO RWY 16L. DUE TO THE CURRENT WX WITH HVY PRECIPITATION TO THE R OF THE APCH COURSE, I WOULD RATHER HAVE EXECUTED A PUBLISHED MISSED APCH, WHICH WAS CLR. DURING THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OUR OPS CHIEF AT SEA INFORMED ME THAT WE WERE 1 OF 7 ACFT THAT WERE HIT BY LIGHTNING DURING THIS IMMEDIATE TIME FRAME. WHY DID ATC CONTINUE TO OPERATE AT SEA IF THIS WAS THE CASE? I FELT THAT MY PERFORMANCE AS THE PF WAS COMPROMISED DUE TO POOR CREW REST THE PRECEDING NIGHT AND A VERY LONG CREW DAY. I THINK WE MISSED ONE OF ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS AND CONTINUED A TURN BACK TOWARD THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND INTO A POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 540140: ACFT WAS ON FINAL APCH IN IMC CONDITIONS. DUE TO LACK OF SPACING WITH PRECEDING ACFT, APCH CLRNC WAS TERMINATED AND VECTORS AND CLB WERE ASSIGNED. NEW HEADING WAS STRAIGHT TOWARD AREA OF HVY RADAR RETURN SO NEW INSTRUCTIONS WERE REQUESTED. DURING MANEUVERING FOR NEXT APCH ATTEMPT, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID HVY WX, APCH CTLR BECAME CONCERNED THAT OUR TRACK COULD CAUSE POSSIBLE CONFLICTS WITH SUBSEQUENT ARR TFC. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON NEXT APCH, AT BASE OF CLOUDS, ACFT RECEIVED A DIRECT LIGHTNING STRIKE. ALL SYS REMAINED FUNCTIONAL AND A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE. AT NO TIME DID OUR TCASII SYS ALERT WITH TA OR RA, IN FACT NO TFC WAS DISPLAYED ON OUR SYS SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL GAR. VECTORS INTO THE DIRECTION OF KNOWN CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY CONFOUNDED OUR SIT. I BELIEVE THAT AREA WAS USED TO AVOID THE VERY NOISE CRITICAL AREA TO THE E. WX AVOIDANCE SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE. IT CAME TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, ONCE ON THE GND, THAT A TOTAL OF 7 ACFT TOOK LIGHTNING STRIKES WHILE LNDG IN SEA IN THE PRECEDING HR!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.