Narrative:

The first leg from geg to las was uneventful. Our second leg was from las to iah. We departed las (about 20 mins late) due to a minor maintenance issue and the gate having been advised of a weight restr on an overbooked flight. I held off boarding and determined that we would be able to accommodate all of the passenger and baggage provided we performed a bleeds closed takeoff as necessitated by the density altitude in las vegas that evening. With planned fuel on board; our takeoff weight was very close to the maximum limit. Our dispatcher had planned our flight with 500 pounds of taxi fuel; 2500 pounds of reserve fuel (45 mins at FL370); alternate fuel for aus; and no hold fuel. The taf for our arrival at iah was IFR with thunderstorms in the area. Though I would have preferred more fuel; I felt we were within the guidelines of our new fuel policy and FARS regarding fuel planning; and that taking more fuel would have required bumping passenger. About 200 mi from iah we could see lightning on the eastern horizon. As we flew over our alternate of aus; we noted that the WX was clear there in the event we would have to return. I briefed the ILS runway 8R approach at iah and continued onward. About 40 mi from iah; we were handed off to approach control. The controller advised us of windshear affecting the runway 8R and runway 8L approach courses and stated that he did not expect it to last long. My first officer and I agreed that we would not attempt the approach if conditions did not permit it. A min or two later; the approach controller advised us the windshear had ceased and the surface winds were calm although we now observed a line of cells developing west of the airport; with gaps between them. We were given a vector to intercept the runway 8R localizer. Inbound on the localizer; we observed a cell exhibiting a magenta return between the FAF and the runway. We requested a 180 degree turn and queried the controller as to what he observed on his radar. He replied that it was just rain and we could hold on the localizer course if we desired until it passed. Turning outbound on the localizer; the controller advised us that runway 26L was available; the winds were calm and that no precipitation was observed in the eastern side of the airport. We requested and were given vectors for the ILS runway 26L approach and at safe speed we retracted the flaps to zero. At 6000 ft we were burning about 4500 pounds per hour. As we passed a point about 25 NM north of the field; the FMS indicated we had used up the 600 'extra' pounds of fuel. Though we still had our alternate fuel; we were now slightly below our 2500 pounds of reserve fuel which at our present burn rate I now calculated was only about 1/2 hour worth; and now we had WX between our present position and aus. It occurred to me that we were in a minimum fuel situation but it did not occur to me to declare minimum fuel to ATC; perhaps because there was no other traffic to be concerned with; perhaps related to the realization I was having that due to the workload and the fact that I was feeling the onset of fatigue. The approach controller vectored us onto the runway 26L localizer; cleared us for the approach; and handed us off to tower. Tower cleared us to land and advised the winds were from 100 degrees at 14 KTS. Realizing that this was in excess of our 10 KT limitation on tailwind component for landing and given our fuel situation; the WX picture and fatigue beginning to onset; I felt the best course of action was to land on the 9400 ft runway 26L in front of us. I wondered what I had done wrong to get into the position of having to make such a decision. How had we gone from having extra fuel to being at minimum fuel simply by taking a vector to the other side of the airport? Due to this distraction; I realized as I was crossing the localizer that I had neglected to arm the approach mode on the flight director. I considered executing a missed approach but rejected the idea believing that using normal maneuvers I would be able to recapture the localizer and GS and execute a stabilized approach; and once again considering our overall situation believed that would be the safest course of action. I indeed executed a stabilized approach; broke out about 500 ft AGL; and executed a normal landing. I believe that despite the positive outcome of the flight that a number of factors (poor decision making; poor understanding of the new company fuel policy; WX in the houston area; and the onset of fatigue) all contributed to the possibility of a negative outcome. My decision to depart las vegas with minimum fuel was not necessarily a poor one; but I did not appreciate that it left us with no option other than to divert at the first sign that we would not be able to land immediately at iah. I did not appreciate that we had really began to burn into our 45 mins of reserve fuel the moment we initiated descent from FL370. Diversion should have occurred the moment we turned off of the runway 8R localizer. I do not believe I knowingly or intentionally violated any FARS; however; I can see that poor decision making on my part contributed to a situation in which I was denied some of the margin of safety which is essential for part 121 operations and in which I was left only with options which were akin to picking the lesser of 2 evils.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL600 FLT CREW FINDS ITSELF RUNNING OUT OF OPTIONS ON MINIMUM FUEL ARR TO IAH DURING CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY.

Narrative: THE FIRST LEG FROM GEG TO LAS WAS UNEVENTFUL. OUR SECOND LEG WAS FROM LAS TO IAH. WE DEPARTED LAS (ABOUT 20 MINS LATE) DUE TO A MINOR MAINT ISSUE AND THE GATE HAVING BEEN ADVISED OF A WT RESTR ON AN OVERBOOKED FLT. I HELD OFF BOARDING AND DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE ALL OF THE PAX AND BAGGAGE PROVIDED WE PERFORMED A BLEEDS CLOSED TKOF AS NECESSITATED BY THE DENSITY ALT IN LAS VEGAS THAT EVENING. WITH PLANNED FUEL ON BOARD; OUR TKOF WT WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE MAX LIMIT. OUR DISPATCHER HAD PLANNED OUR FLT WITH 500 LBS OF TAXI FUEL; 2500 LBS OF RESERVE FUEL (45 MINS AT FL370); ALTERNATE FUEL FOR AUS; AND NO HOLD FUEL. THE TAF FOR OUR ARR AT IAH WAS IFR WITH TSTMS IN THE AREA. THOUGH I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED MORE FUEL; I FELT WE WERE WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF OUR NEW FUEL POLICY AND FARS REGARDING FUEL PLANNING; AND THAT TAKING MORE FUEL WOULD HAVE REQUIRED BUMPING PAX. ABOUT 200 MI FROM IAH WE COULD SEE LIGHTNING ON THE EASTERN HORIZON. AS WE FLEW OVER OUR ALTERNATE OF AUS; WE NOTED THAT THE WX WAS CLR THERE IN THE EVENT WE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN. I BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 8R APCH AT IAH AND CONTINUED ONWARD. ABOUT 40 MI FROM IAH; WE WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL. THE CTLR ADVISED US OF WINDSHEAR AFFECTING THE RWY 8R AND RWY 8L APCH COURSES AND STATED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT IT TO LAST LONG. MY FO AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT THE APCH IF CONDITIONS DID NOT PERMIT IT. A MIN OR TWO LATER; THE APCH CTLR ADVISED US THE WINDSHEAR HAD CEASED AND THE SURFACE WINDS WERE CALM ALTHOUGH WE NOW OBSERVED A LINE OF CELLS DEVELOPING W OF THE ARPT; WITH GAPS BTWN THEM. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 8R LOC. INBOUND ON THE LOC; WE OBSERVED A CELL EXHIBITING A MAGENTA RETURN BTWN THE FAF AND THE RWY. WE REQUESTED A 180 DEG TURN AND QUERIED THE CTLR AS TO WHAT HE OBSERVED ON HIS RADAR. HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS JUST RAIN AND WE COULD HOLD ON THE LOC COURSE IF WE DESIRED UNTIL IT PASSED. TURNING OUTBOUND ON THE LOC; THE CTLR ADVISED US THAT RWY 26L WAS AVAILABLE; THE WINDS WERE CALM AND THAT NO PRECIP WAS OBSERVED IN THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE ARPT. WE REQUESTED AND WERE GIVEN VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 26L APCH AND AT SAFE SPD WE RETRACTED THE FLAPS TO ZERO. AT 6000 FT WE WERE BURNING ABOUT 4500 LBS PER HR. AS WE PASSED A POINT ABOUT 25 NM N OF THE FIELD; THE FMS INDICATED WE HAD USED UP THE 600 'EXTRA' LBS OF FUEL. THOUGH WE STILL HAD OUR ALTERNATE FUEL; WE WERE NOW SLIGHTLY BELOW OUR 2500 LBS OF RESERVE FUEL WHICH AT OUR PRESENT BURN RATE I NOW CALCULATED WAS ONLY ABOUT 1/2 HR WORTH; AND NOW WE HAD WX BTWN OUR PRESENT POS AND AUS. IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT WE WERE IN A MINIMUM FUEL SITUATION BUT IT DID NOT OCCUR TO ME TO DECLARE MINIMUM FUEL TO ATC; PERHAPS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC TO BE CONCERNED WITH; PERHAPS RELATED TO THE REALIZATION I WAS HAVING THAT DUE TO THE WORKLOAD AND THE FACT THAT I WAS FEELING THE ONSET OF FATIGUE. THE APCH CTLR VECTORED US ONTO THE RWY 26L LOC; CLRED US FOR THE APCH; AND HANDED US OFF TO TWR. TWR CLRED US TO LAND AND ADVISED THE WINDS WERE FROM 100 DEGS AT 14 KTS. REALIZING THAT THIS WAS IN EXCESS OF OUR 10 KT LIMITATION ON TAILWIND COMPONENT FOR LNDG AND GIVEN OUR FUEL SITUATION; THE WX PICTURE AND FATIGUE BEGINNING TO ONSET; I FELT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO LAND ON THE 9400 FT RWY 26L IN FRONT OF US. I WONDERED WHAT I HAD DONE WRONG TO GET INTO THE POS OF HAVING TO MAKE SUCH A DECISION. HOW HAD WE GONE FROM HAVING EXTRA FUEL TO BEING AT MINIMUM FUEL SIMPLY BY TAKING A VECTOR TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ARPT? DUE TO THIS DISTR; I REALIZED AS I WAS XING THE LOC THAT I HAD NEGLECTED TO ARM THE APCH MODE ON THE FLT DIRECTOR. I CONSIDERED EXECUTING A MISSED APCH BUT REJECTED THE IDEA BELIEVING THAT USING NORMAL MANEUVERS I WOULD BE ABLE TO RECAPTURE THE LOC AND GS AND EXECUTE A STABILIZED APCH; AND ONCE AGAIN CONSIDERING OUR OVERALL SITUATION BELIEVED THAT WOULD BE THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. I INDEED EXECUTED A STABILIZED APCH; BROKE OUT ABOUT 500 FT AGL; AND EXECUTED A NORMAL LNDG. I BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE FLT THAT A NUMBER OF FACTORS (POOR DECISION MAKING; POOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEW COMPANY FUEL POLICY; WX IN THE HOUSTON AREA; AND THE ONSET OF FATIGUE) ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGATIVE OUTCOME. MY DECISION TO DEPART LAS VEGAS WITH MINIMUM FUEL WAS NOT NECESSARILY A POOR ONE; BUT I DID NOT APPRECIATE THAT IT LEFT US WITH NO OPTION OTHER THAN TO DIVERT AT THE FIRST SIGN THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LAND IMMEDIATELY AT IAH. I DID NOT APPRECIATE THAT WE HAD REALLY BEGAN TO BURN INTO OUR 45 MINS OF RESERVE FUEL THE MOMENT WE INITIATED DSCNT FROM FL370. DIVERSION SHOULD HAVE OCCURRED THE MOMENT WE TURNED OFF OF THE RWY 8R LOC. I DO NOT BELIEVE I KNOWINGLY OR INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED ANY FARS; HOWEVER; I CAN SEE THAT POOR DECISION MAKING ON MY PART CONTRIBUTED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH I WAS DENIED SOME OF THE MARGIN OF SAFETY WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR PART 121 OPS AND IN WHICH I WAS LEFT ONLY WITH OPTIONS WHICH WERE AKIN TO PICKING THE LESSER OF 2 EVILS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.