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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 540469 |
Time | |
Date | 200203 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 540469 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact other |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Company Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
During preflight activities in ZZZ, us, the flight release paperwork had MEL xx-xx-xx 'auxiliary fuel tank boost pumps' listed under the aircraft notes as being inoperative. At the aircraft, maintenance personnel assured me and my flight engineer that the discrepancy was cleared and that we may proceed normally. My requested fuel load of 55000 pounds allowed for 2600 pounds of fuel to go into the now 'repaired' auxiliary tank. Due to oversight, we departed ZZZ without having the item removed from the dispatch release. Therefore, we violated the terms of the release. During predep planning at our next stop, my dispatcher informed me that the repair had been rejected by maintenance control personnel and that MEL xx-xx-xx was never removed from the dispatch release and was still in effect. Factors leading to this oversight were numerous: other preflight considerations, miscom on the part of local maintenance personnel and maintenance control -- my flight engineer, and myself among them. More importantly, the extremely time consuming security measures at the international terminal in ZZZ. These procedures seriously shortened our time available from crew show time to departure time. Had my crew and I not endured this all too routine shakedown, we more than likely would have had ample time to sort out all these details and avoid this oversight. The organization has a solution that has been ignored by our policy makers for some time now. That is, to implement a universal access identify card, so that air crew can bypass security and get to their aircraft in a timely manner. I'm disappointed for allowing myself to get rushed to make an on-time departure. But, I am angered at the security system that's designed to protect us, creating problems like this. It was detrimental in my case.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B727 CREW WAS TOLD BY LCL STATION MAINT THAT AN MEL ITEM HAD BEEN CLRED.
Narrative: DURING PREFLT ACTIVITIES IN ZZZ, US, THE FLT RELEASE PAPERWORK HAD MEL XX-XX-XX 'AUX FUEL TANK BOOST PUMPS' LISTED UNDER THE ACFT NOTES AS BEING INOP. AT THE ACFT, MAINT PERSONNEL ASSURED ME AND MY FE THAT THE DISCREPANCY WAS CLRED AND THAT WE MAY PROCEED NORMALLY. MY REQUESTED FUEL LOAD OF 55000 LBS ALLOWED FOR 2600 LBS OF FUEL TO GO INTO THE NOW 'REPAIRED' AUX TANK. DUE TO OVERSIGHT, WE DEPARTED ZZZ WITHOUT HAVING THE ITEM REMOVED FROM THE DISPATCH RELEASE. THEREFORE, WE VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE RELEASE. DURING PREDEP PLANNING AT OUR NEXT STOP, MY DISPATCHER INFORMED ME THAT THE REPAIR HAD BEEN REJECTED BY MAINT CTL PERSONNEL AND THAT MEL XX-XX-XX WAS NEVER REMOVED FROM THE DISPATCH RELEASE AND WAS STILL IN EFFECT. FACTORS LEADING TO THIS OVERSIGHT WERE NUMEROUS: OTHER PREFLT CONSIDERATIONS, MISCOM ON THE PART OF LCL MAINT PERSONNEL AND MAINT CTL -- MY FE, AND MYSELF AMONG THEM. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE EXTREMELY TIME CONSUMING SECURITY MEASURES AT THE INTL TERMINAL IN ZZZ. THESE PROCS SERIOUSLY SHORTENED OUR TIME AVAILABLE FROM CREW SHOW TIME TO DEP TIME. HAD MY CREW AND I NOT ENDURED THIS ALL TOO ROUTINE SHAKEDOWN, WE MORE THAN LIKELY WOULD HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO SORT OUT ALL THESE DETAILS AND AVOID THIS OVERSIGHT. THE ORGANIZATION HAS A SOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN IGNORED BY OUR POLICY MAKERS FOR SOME TIME NOW. THAT IS, TO IMPLEMENT A UNIVERSAL ACCESS IDENT CARD, SO THAT AIR CREW CAN BYPASS SECURITY AND GET TO THEIR ACFT IN A TIMELY MANNER. I'M DISAPPOINTED FOR ALLOWING MYSELF TO GET RUSHED TO MAKE AN ON-TIME DEP. BUT, I AM ANGERED AT THE SECURITY SYS THAT'S DESIGNED TO PROTECT US, CREATING PROBS LIKE THIS. IT WAS DETRIMENTAL IN MY CASE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.