Narrative:

I was involved in a runway incursion at vero beach municipal airport at approximately XA20 on mar/thu/02. I am a student pilot at flight school with a private pilot certificate, currently working on my commercial rating. The situation was as follows: after receiving clearance from ground control to taxi to runway 22 via taxiway a, I entered the run-up area, performed my run-up checklist, and set flaps to 25 degrees in preparation for a soft field takeoff. I then proceeded toward the entrance to runway 22 and stopped behind another aircraft waiting to enter the runway. That aircraft was given a position and hold directive, and did so. I then taxied to the hold short line and waited while the control tower continued with calls. One of those calls was a 'position and hold' command for an aircraft, which was departing on runway 29L. Runway 29L intersects runway 4/22 about 2/3 down the runway from my position, and taxiway C parallels runway 29L/11R on the opposite side. The controller then issued a clearance for the aircraft on runway 22 to take off. As I watched that aircraft depart, I waited a short time to call, as the tower was quite busy. The controller made the call 'whose next on runway 29? -- Correction, runway 22?' I responded 'aircraft X #1 for departure on runway 22.' tower gave the instruction 'aircraft X runway 22, position and hold, traffic departing runway 29L.' I responded 'position and hold on runway 22.' I then proceeded onto the runway. As the traffic departed on runway 29L, a call went out to the tower. 'Vero beach tower, aircraft Y on runway 22 at taxiway C holding.' I did not see him, as he was positioned about 3000 ft down, right of runway 22 on the opposite side of runway 29L/11R. The call came as I was taxiing and performing my line-up check, and I did not notice the similarity of this tail number to my own. I did not attain a clear picture of where that aircraft was. I made the mistake of 'tuning out' the call since it was not directed to me. The tower responded 'aircraft Y, runway 22, intersection C, clear for takeoff.' I failed to notice the word 'intersection,' and mistook the clearance for 'aircraft X.' I responded 'aircraft X clear for takeoff on runway 22.' however, the other aircraft entering runway 22 had also responded, and subsequently the controller heard 'talk-over.' at this point, I had not yet arrived at the runway centerline, and proceeded to pull full aft on the yoke, added full throttle and aligned the aircraft for a soft field takeoff. The controller did not repeat the clearance call, and responded to a call from an aircraft already in the pattern. Once centered and rolling, I checked my airspeed indicator as well as my engine instruments. After this brief scan, I looked up as the aircraft entered a 'nose high' attitude. From my vantage, I could see only the ground on either side, the nose of the aircraft, and the sky above. There was no way for me to see the traffic at the other end of the runway. My aircraft left the ground and I released pressure to remain in ground effect. As I started to build speed, and pushed forward on the yoke, the controller called abruptly, 'aircraft X cancel takeoff clearance and hold position!' this is when I first saw the traffic, which was centered on the runway a few thousand ft away -- I could not determine if it was moving or stationary. I immediately pulled my throttle to idle and pitched down as I called back 'canceling takeoff and holding.' I landed on the runway and used maximum braking. I was down to taxi speed by the time I was crossing runway 29L and would have stopped completely, had it been necessary. By this time the other aircraft was starting to lift off. The tower called 'aircraft X clear at taxiway C and contact ground.' it is my belief, and I think those involved agree, that the sequence of events in this situation played out in an almost 'scripted' manner as if one were attempting to create a scenario to test both pilot and control officer, ie, the similar tail numbers. The abbreviation of those numbers, the common term 'charlie' used, the amount of departing traffic, the unusual entry of traffic on the runway, the 'talk-over' on the radio, the visual limitations of a soft field takeoff, the separation on the runway etc. I take full responsibility as PIC for my miss in failing to listen more carefully to responsibility as PIC for my mistakes in failing to listen more carefully to the calls given during this event. I now have a full understanding of what I did wrong, and how I can act differently in the future to avoid a recurrence of this type of incursion. According to the tower manager, the controller involved also might have acted differently, which could possibly have corrected my mistake before it became imminent. In this case, the result of the circumstances and the mistakes which were made, was a breakdown in communication, and a general lack of situational awareness. As I have learned in CRM training, this is most often the cause of accidents in aviation. I have learned from this experience, and hope never to repeat it again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA28 PLT STARTS TKOF ROLL ON OCCUPIED RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: I WAS INVOLVED IN A RWY INCURSION AT VERO BEACH MUNICIPAL ARPT AT APPROX XA20 ON MAR/THU/02. I AM A STUDENT PLT AT FLT SCHOOL WITH A PVT PLT CERTIFICATE, CURRENTLY WORKING ON MY COMMERCIAL RATING. THE SIT WAS AS FOLLOWS: AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC FROM GND CTL TO TAXI TO RWY 22 VIA TXWY A, I ENTERED THE RUN-UP AREA, PERFORMED MY RUN-UP CHKLIST, AND SET FLAPS TO 25 DEGS IN PREPARATION FOR A SOFT FIELD TKOF. I THEN PROCEEDED TOWARD THE ENTRANCE TO RWY 22 AND STOPPED BEHIND ANOTHER ACFT WAITING TO ENTER THE RWY. THAT ACFT WAS GIVEN A POS AND HOLD DIRECTIVE, AND DID SO. I THEN TAXIED TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND WAITED WHILE THE CTL TWR CONTINUED WITH CALLS. ONE OF THOSE CALLS WAS A 'POS AND HOLD' COMMAND FOR AN ACFT, WHICH WAS DEPARTING ON RWY 29L. RWY 29L INTERSECTS RWY 4/22 ABOUT 2/3 DOWN THE RWY FROM MY POS, AND TXWY C PARALLELS RWY 29L/11R ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE. THE CTLR THEN ISSUED A CLRNC FOR THE ACFT ON RWY 22 TO TAKE OFF. AS I WATCHED THAT ACFT DEPART, I WAITED A SHORT TIME TO CALL, AS THE TWR WAS QUITE BUSY. THE CTLR MADE THE CALL 'WHOSE NEXT ON RWY 29? -- CORRECTION, RWY 22?' I RESPONDED 'ACFT X #1 FOR DEP ON RWY 22.' TWR GAVE THE INSTRUCTION 'ACFT X RWY 22, POS AND HOLD, TFC DEPARTING RWY 29L.' I RESPONDED 'POS AND HOLD ON RWY 22.' I THEN PROCEEDED ONTO THE RWY. AS THE TFC DEPARTED ON RWY 29L, A CALL WENT OUT TO THE TWR. 'VERO BEACH TWR, ACFT Y ON RWY 22 AT TXWY C HOLDING.' I DID NOT SEE HIM, AS HE WAS POSITIONED ABOUT 3000 FT DOWN, R OF RWY 22 ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF RWY 29L/11R. THE CALL CAME AS I WAS TAXIING AND PERFORMING MY LINE-UP CHK, AND I DID NOT NOTICE THE SIMILARITY OF THIS TAIL NUMBER TO MY OWN. I DID NOT ATTAIN A CLR PICTURE OF WHERE THAT ACFT WAS. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF 'TUNING OUT' THE CALL SINCE IT WAS NOT DIRECTED TO ME. THE TWR RESPONDED 'ACFT Y, RWY 22, INTXN C, CLR FOR TKOF.' I FAILED TO NOTICE THE WORD 'INTXN,' AND MISTOOK THE CLRNC FOR 'ACFT X.' I RESPONDED 'ACFT X CLR FOR TKOF ON RWY 22.' HOWEVER, THE OTHER ACFT ENTERING RWY 22 HAD ALSO RESPONDED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE CTLR HEARD 'TALK-OVER.' AT THIS POINT, I HAD NOT YET ARRIVED AT THE RWY CTRLINE, AND PROCEEDED TO PULL FULL AFT ON THE YOKE, ADDED FULL THROTTLE AND ALIGNED THE ACFT FOR A SOFT FIELD TKOF. THE CTLR DID NOT REPEAT THE CLRNC CALL, AND RESPONDED TO A CALL FROM AN ACFT ALREADY IN THE PATTERN. ONCE CTRED AND ROLLING, I CHKED MY AIRSPD INDICATOR AS WELL AS MY ENG INSTS. AFTER THIS BRIEF SCAN, I LOOKED UP AS THE ACFT ENTERED A 'NOSE HIGH' ATTITUDE. FROM MY VANTAGE, I COULD SEE ONLY THE GND ON EITHER SIDE, THE NOSE OF THE ACFT, AND THE SKY ABOVE. THERE WAS NO WAY FOR ME TO SEE THE TFC AT THE OTHER END OF THE RWY. MY ACFT LEFT THE GND AND I RELEASED PRESSURE TO REMAIN IN GND EFFECT. AS I STARTED TO BUILD SPD, AND PUSHED FORWARD ON THE YOKE, THE CTLR CALLED ABRUPTLY, 'ACFT X CANCEL TKOF CLRNC AND HOLD POS!' THIS IS WHEN I FIRST SAW THE TFC, WHICH WAS CTRED ON THE RWY A FEW THOUSAND FT AWAY -- I COULD NOT DETERMINE IF IT WAS MOVING OR STATIONARY. I IMMEDIATELY PULLED MY THROTTLE TO IDLE AND PITCHED DOWN AS I CALLED BACK 'CANCELING TKOF AND HOLDING.' I LANDED ON THE RWY AND USED MAX BRAKING. I WAS DOWN TO TAXI SPD BY THE TIME I WAS XING RWY 29L AND WOULD HAVE STOPPED COMPLETELY, HAD IT BEEN NECESSARY. BY THIS TIME THE OTHER ACFT WAS STARTING TO LIFT OFF. THE TWR CALLED 'ACFT X CLR AT TXWY C AND CONTACT GND.' IT IS MY BELIEF, AND I THINK THOSE INVOLVED AGREE, THAT THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THIS SIT PLAYED OUT IN AN ALMOST 'SCRIPTED' MANNER AS IF ONE WERE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A SCENARIO TO TEST BOTH PLT AND CTL OFFICER, IE, THE SIMILAR TAIL NUMBERS. THE ABBREVIATION OF THOSE NUMBERS, THE COMMON TERM 'CHARLIE' USED, THE AMOUNT OF DEPARTING TFC, THE UNUSUAL ENTRY OF TFC ON THE RWY, THE 'TALK-OVER' ON THE RADIO, THE VISUAL LIMITATIONS OF A SOFT FIELD TKOF, THE SEPARATION ON THE RWY ETC. I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY AS PIC FOR MY MISS IN FAILING TO LISTEN MORE CAREFULLY TO RESPONSIBILITY AS PIC FOR MY MISTAKES IN FAILING TO LISTEN MORE CAREFULLY TO THE CALLS GIVEN DURING THIS EVENT. I NOW HAVE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT I DID WRONG, AND HOW I CAN ACT DIFFERENTLY IN THE FUTURE TO AVOID A RECURRENCE OF THIS TYPE OF INCURSION. ACCORDING TO THE TWR MGR, THE CTLR INVOLVED ALSO MIGHT HAVE ACTED DIFFERENTLY, WHICH COULD POSSIBLY HAVE CORRECTED MY MISTAKE BEFORE IT BECAME IMMINENT. IN THIS CASE, THE RESULT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE MISTAKES WHICH WERE MADE, WAS A BREAKDOWN IN COM, AND A GENERAL LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. AS I HAVE LEARNED IN CRM TRAINING, THIS IS MOST OFTEN THE CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS IN AVIATION. I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE, AND HOPE NEVER TO REPEAT IT AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.