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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 541552 |
Time | |
Date | 200203 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DC-9 40 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : maintenance |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DC-9 40 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : maintenance |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
Qualification | technician : powerplant technician : airframe |
Experience | maintenance technician : 14 |
ASRS Report | 541552 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : inspector |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : egt indicators other other : person 1 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : engineering procedure performance deficiency : testing |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Environmental Factor Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
I am a line maintenance representative for an air carrier in ZZZ. My company, on mar/fri/02 and mar/FRI2/02, issued a work order to be complied with which states that a maximum takeoff power run be accomplished and record parameters. This run was requested for only 1 of the engines on each of the aircraft. I was in the left seat operating the controls and mr a, a company designated engine run and taxi trainer, was in the right seat on each of the runs recording the parameters. It was apparent to myself, as well as mr a, in everything written, that engineering was requesting parameters to be taken at maximum takeoff power as stated and not charted EPR for the day. On mar/thu/02, power plant engineering found that due to the excessive temperatures from the assessment runs the engines in question should be further addressed and it was at this time that I was advised that it was indeed not power plant engineering's intention to have had us run the engines as stated. Aircraft X was the aircraft that was run on 03/fri/02. This run appeared to go smoothly and although I have been told by my company that mr a written parameters show that this engine reached 640 degrees C to my recollection never went past a red line of 620 degrees C. Mr a and I would certainly recall such an occurrence. This engine in question received a boroscope inspection which found no faults. Aircraft Y was run on mar/FRI2/02. In addition to the egt assessment, I was receiving engine run and taxi recurrent training. Aircraft Y was run in the same manner as the previous aircraft. The #1 engine throttle was brought up to the stop at which time the egt went to 640 degrees C. The egt, EPR, and outside air temperature were recorded and the throttle was reduced in order to remain below red line. The operating limitation for this engine is 595 degrees C for 5 mins. This engine is being removed at this time for precautionary measures. The engineering written request states that the engine should be run for 3 mins for stabilization. The engine on aircraft Y as previously stated, may be run at 595 degrees for 5 mins. It is not unrealistic that one may conclude that power plant engineering may allow a slightly higher temperature increase for 3 mins (more temperature but less time) in order to document a particular regime that could be worsening. If power plant engineering had referenced that this assignment should be conducted in accordance with the applicable maintenance manual reference their intentions would most certainly have been productive. The paperwork from engineering instructs the technician to mail a copy of the completed forms. If procedures called for a more timely reception of conclusions this would have insured any faults being found immediately, rather than 2 weeks after completion. I have enclosed a copy of the paperwork described.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: 2 DC9-40 AIRPLANES EACH HAD 1 ENG EXCEED OPERATING LIMITATIONS DUE TO INCORRECT PWR PLANT ENGINEERING DIRECTIVES AND TECHNICIANS FAILURE TO PERFORM ENG RUNS PER THE MAINT MANUAL.
Narrative: I AM A LINE MAINT REPRESENTATIVE FOR AN ACR IN ZZZ. MY COMPANY, ON MAR/FRI/02 AND MAR/FRI2/02, ISSUED A WORK ORDER TO BE COMPLIED WITH WHICH STATES THAT A MAX TKOF PWR RUN BE ACCOMPLISHED AND RECORD PARAMETERS. THIS RUN WAS REQUESTED FOR ONLY 1 OF THE ENGS ON EACH OF THE ACFT. I WAS IN THE L SEAT OPERATING THE CTLS AND MR A, A COMPANY DESIGNATED ENG RUN AND TAXI TRAINER, WAS IN THE R SEAT ON EACH OF THE RUNS RECORDING THE PARAMETERS. IT WAS APPARENT TO MYSELF, AS WELL AS MR A, IN EVERYTHING WRITTEN, THAT ENGINEERING WAS REQUESTING PARAMETERS TO BE TAKEN AT MAX TKOF PWR AS STATED AND NOT CHARTED EPR FOR THE DAY. ON MAR/THU/02, PWR PLANT ENGINEERING FOUND THAT DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE TEMPS FROM THE ASSESSMENT RUNS THE ENGS IN QUESTION SHOULD BE FURTHER ADDRESSED AND IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I WAS ADVISED THAT IT WAS INDEED NOT PWR PLANT ENGINEERING'S INTENTION TO HAVE HAD US RUN THE ENGS AS STATED. ACFT X WAS THE ACFT THAT WAS RUN ON 03/FRI/02. THIS RUN APPEARED TO GO SMOOTHLY AND ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN TOLD BY MY COMPANY THAT MR A WRITTEN PARAMETERS SHOW THAT THIS ENG REACHED 640 DEGS C TO MY RECOLLECTION NEVER WENT PAST A RED LINE OF 620 DEGS C. MR A AND I WOULD CERTAINLY RECALL SUCH AN OCCURRENCE. THIS ENG IN QUESTION RECEIVED A BOROSCOPE INSPECTION WHICH FOUND NO FAULTS. ACFT Y WAS RUN ON MAR/FRI2/02. IN ADDITION TO THE EGT ASSESSMENT, I WAS RECEIVING ENG RUN AND TAXI RECURRENT TRAINING. ACFT Y WAS RUN IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE PREVIOUS ACFT. THE #1 ENG THROTTLE WAS BROUGHT UP TO THE STOP AT WHICH TIME THE EGT WENT TO 640 DEGS C. THE EGT, EPR, AND OUTSIDE AIR TEMP WERE RECORDED AND THE THROTTLE WAS REDUCED IN ORDER TO REMAIN BELOW RED LINE. THE OPERATING LIMITATION FOR THIS ENG IS 595 DEGS C FOR 5 MINS. THIS ENG IS BEING REMOVED AT THIS TIME FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. THE ENGINEERING WRITTEN REQUEST STATES THAT THE ENG SHOULD BE RUN FOR 3 MINS FOR STABILIZATION. THE ENG ON ACFT Y AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, MAY BE RUN AT 595 DEGS FOR 5 MINS. IT IS NOT UNREALISTIC THAT ONE MAY CONCLUDE THAT PWR PLANT ENGINEERING MAY ALLOW A SLIGHTLY HIGHER TEMP INCREASE FOR 3 MINS (MORE TEMP BUT LESS TIME) IN ORDER TO DOCUMENT A PARTICULAR REGIME THAT COULD BE WORSENING. IF PWR PLANT ENGINEERING HAD REFED THAT THIS ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE MAINT MANUAL REF THEIR INTENTIONS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN PRODUCTIVE. THE PAPERWORK FROM ENGINEERING INSTRUCTS THE TECHNICIAN TO MAIL A COPY OF THE COMPLETED FORMS. IF PROCS CALLED FOR A MORE TIMELY RECEPTION OF CONCLUSIONS THIS WOULD HAVE INSURED ANY FAULTS BEING FOUND IMMEDIATELY, RATHER THAN 2 WKS AFTER COMPLETION. I HAVE ENCLOSED A COPY OF THE PAPERWORK DESCRIBED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.