Narrative:

At cid airport, we were cleared to taxi via taxiway C to runway 27. A review of the airport diagram showed a simple taxi from the passenger terminal to runway 27. As the first officer, my head was inside the cockpit recording takeoff numbers and inputting the data into the FMS and EFIS system. While looking up to determine our progress to the runway, I noted the hold short line passing by the cockpit. I alerted the captain about the hold short line, which we were now across and he responded quickly and confidently we were crossing runway 31. Assured and relieved, we continued to roll, across the approach end of runway 27 at which point the tower asked if we were proceeding to runway 31. The incursion had occurred and we taxied across the active runway without a clearance. Thankfully no aircraft were approaching the runway and there was no conflict with other aircraft. We turned around on the other side of runway 27 and prepared for takeoff with the tower's assistance. Factors contributing to this incursion: 1) a crew that did not place the highest priority on situational awareness over cockpit housekeeping duties. 2) increase workload in the cockpit during taxi, performing FMS, and EFIS system preparation duties before departure. Duties also include ACARS company communication, about loads, times, passenger needs. 3) breakdown in crew communication. A) a captain that did not doublechk his actions when alerted by a crew member of a potential problem. B) a first officer that did not interject his concern forcefully enough and allowed a captain's authority/authorized and confidence to convince him he was incorrect. Note: as a first officer for a part 121 airline, I have been concerned and now justified about the amount of time my eyes are in the cockpit managing the automated system. This applies to both ground and air operations. As our aircraft become more sophisticated 'to allow the pilots to focus on flying.' it is requiring more attention to manage the interface between computers, navigation, company communication and the aircraft. Often I will look up during taxi and not know how we arrived at a position on the field, because my head was down typing and running checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARJ CREW TAXIING FOR TKOF AT CID, TAXIED ACROSS THEIR ASSIGNED RWY WITHOUT A CLRNC.

Narrative: AT CID ARPT, WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI VIA TXWY C TO RWY 27. A REVIEW OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM SHOWED A SIMPLE TAXI FROM THE PAX TERMINAL TO RWY 27. AS THE FO, MY HEAD WAS INSIDE THE COCKPIT RECORDING TKOF NUMBERS AND INPUTTING THE DATA INTO THE FMS AND EFIS SYS. WHILE LOOKING UP TO DETERMINE OUR PROGRESS TO THE RWY, I NOTED THE HOLD SHORT LINE PASSING BY THE COCKPIT. I ALERTED THE CAPT ABOUT THE HOLD SHORT LINE, WHICH WE WERE NOW ACROSS AND HE RESPONDED QUICKLY AND CONFIDENTLY WE WERE XING RWY 31. ASSURED AND RELIEVED, WE CONTINUED TO ROLL, ACROSS THE APCH END OF RWY 27 AT WHICH POINT THE TWR ASKED IF WE WERE PROCEEDING TO RWY 31. THE INCURSION HAD OCCURRED AND WE TAXIED ACROSS THE ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT A CLRNC. THANKFULLY NO ACFT WERE APCHING THE RWY AND THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT. WE TURNED AROUND ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RWY 27 AND PREPARED FOR TKOF WITH THE TWR'S ASSISTANCE. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCURSION: 1) A CREW THAT DID NOT PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OVER COCKPIT HOUSEKEEPING DUTIES. 2) INCREASE WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT DURING TAXI, PERFORMING FMS, AND EFIS SYS PREPARATION DUTIES BEFORE DEP. DUTIES ALSO INCLUDE ACARS COMPANY COM, ABOUT LOADS, TIMES, PAX NEEDS. 3) BREAKDOWN IN CREW COM. A) A CAPT THAT DID NOT DOUBLECHK HIS ACTIONS WHEN ALERTED BY A CREW MEMBER OF A POTENTIAL PROB. B) A FO THAT DID NOT INTERJECT HIS CONCERN FORCEFULLY ENOUGH AND ALLOWED A CAPT'S AUTH AND CONFIDENCE TO CONVINCE HIM HE WAS INCORRECT. NOTE: AS A FO FOR A PART 121 AIRLINE, I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AND NOW JUSTIFIED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF TIME MY EYES ARE IN THE COCKPIT MANAGING THE AUTOMATED SYS. THIS APPLIES TO BOTH GND AND AIR OPS. AS OUR ACFT BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED 'TO ALLOW THE PLTS TO FOCUS ON FLYING.' IT IS REQUIRING MORE ATTN TO MANAGE THE INTERFACE BTWN COMPUTERS, NAV, COMPANY COM AND THE ACFT. OFTEN I WILL LOOK UP DURING TAXI AND NOT KNOW HOW WE ARRIVED AT A POS ON THE FIELD, BECAUSE MY HEAD WAS DOWN TYPING AND RUNNING CHKLIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.