B737 captain complaint that company procedure for checking armed passenger identification's does not...

Attributes
ACN	542625
Time
Date	200203
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : parked
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	542625
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted none taken : unable
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company Passenger Human Performance
Primary Problem	Company

Narrative:

Why is it that no where do company security files require the in-flight security coordinator/captain to check the identification's and/or official seals/letters of his armed passenger. The answer cannot be the 'covert nature' or 'blown cover' rationale because the federal air marshal (fam) is required to have his identification checked by the captain. So there is a method to accomplish this, albeit time consuming. The captain could have an armed passenger on his plane relying solely on an identification check by the ticket agent and the ground security coordinator. No law enforcement officer or captain is required to do an additional identification check on the armed passenger. This is woefully inadequate and lacks at least one layer of protection. The captain must be involved in this identification process at least until it becomes an exact science and we are not there yet. We are not to notify armed passenger of fam's on the aircraft. This would seem to contradict other company procedures.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT COMPLAINT THAT COMPANY PROC FOR CHKING ARMED PAX ID'S DOES NOT INCLUDE THE FLC. HE BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE A LAST CHK TO ASSURE THAT THOSE ABOARD WERE PROPERLY IDENTIFIED BY THE CAPT.

Narrative: WHY IS IT THAT NO WHERE DO COMPANY SECURITY FILES REQUIRE THE INFLT SECURITY COORDINATOR/CAPT TO CHK THE ID'S AND/OR OFFICIAL SEALS/LETTERS OF HIS ARMED PAX. THE ANSWER CANNOT BE THE 'COVERT NATURE' OR 'BLOWN COVER' RATIONALE BECAUSE THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL (FAM) IS REQUIRED TO HAVE HIS ID CHKED BY THE CAPT. SO THERE IS A METHOD TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, ALBEIT TIME CONSUMING. THE CAPT COULD HAVE AN ARMED PAX ON HIS PLANE RELYING SOLELY ON AN ID CHK BY THE TICKET AGENT AND THE GND SECURITY COORDINATOR. NO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR CAPT IS REQUIRED TO DO AN ADDITIONAL ID CHK ON THE ARMED PAX. THIS IS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE AND LACKS AT LEAST ONE LAYER OF PROTECTION. THE CAPT MUST BE INVOLVED IN THIS ID PROCESS AT LEAST UNTIL IT BECOMES AN EXACT SCIENCE AND WE ARE NOT THERE YET. WE ARE NOT TO NOTIFY ARMED PAX OF FAM'S ON THE ACFT. THIS WOULD SEEM TO CONTRADICT OTHER COMPANY PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

B737 captain complaint that company procedure for checking armed passenger identification's does not include the flight crew. He believes that it would be a last check to assure that those aboard were properly identified by the captain.