Narrative:

Dfw hazardous WX. Flight dispatched with national WX service (NWS) severe WX watch for dfw for period of arrival. Contacted dispatch prior to descent for brief. Dfw ATIS in effect, winds 160 degrees at 8 KTS, 5 SM visibility, rain. Circumnaved convective activity in vicinity cqy visually and went IMC inbound from cqy. Detected area of heavy rainfall (red) on WX radar at various up-tilt settings north of dietz on start routing and parallel to final. Requested/cleared to deviate west with contingency instructions to turn northwest as soon as possible. First officer pulled dfw ATIS, now with winds 180 degrees at 13 KTS gusting to 19 KTS, 2 south, visibility, rain, indicative of worsening conditions and approaching storm. I instructed first officer to advise approach that we would not attempt the approach. Controller replied tersely and directly to the effect that we will be landing on runway 17C. I then transmitted that he was not telling where to fly the aircraft. Controller replied 'don't stress on me' and was apparently relieved from position. We broke into a clear area and the first officer called the tower on VHF #2 and was advised rain was subsiding. Turning base and final, we observed heavy precipitation returns all along the east side of final and the published missed approach course was covered by heavy precipitation. Approach and landing uneventful. This event closely parallels the environmental and operational circumstances associated with the air carrier accidents, both hull losses. Tower and wsr-88D radar displays were available to air carrier dispatch and TRACON, but neither chose to disseminate this critical information. Further, our aircraft WX radar failed on us, as in flight XXXX. The flight crew's elected to abandon the approach and were effectively encouraged if not overridden by TRACON -- intent on scoring the arrival. It is extremely difficult if not impossible for a flight crew to comply with decision making and WX avoidance policies and regulatory duty without the information that is available to all but the flight crew. It is even more challenging when ATC is encouraging the risk. With these considerations, I request the circumstances of this event be briefed to the air carrier dispatchers and dfw air traffic management with the intent of formulating procedures to reduce risk in hazardous WX operations in the dfw terminal area. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain indicated his air carrier has had numerous occasions where the ATC system has tried to intimidate crews into flying into areas of thunderstorm activity and windshear. The pilot has rejected his air carrier reply to his report that in essence wants to drop the issue. The captain now has a meeting with his air carrier safety department scheduled to make his presentation. He will request the air carrier to present the problem to the FAA at the appropriate level in washington.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CAPT HAD THE D10 APCH CTLR APPEAR TO BE OVERSTRESSED BY SEVERE CONVECTIVE WX IN THE DFW TERMINAL AREA. THE CTLR HAD TO BE REPLACED.

Narrative: DFW HAZARDOUS WX. FLT DISPATCHED WITH NATL WX SVC (NWS) SEVERE WX WATCH FOR DFW FOR PERIOD OF ARR. CONTACTED DISPATCH PRIOR TO DSCNT FOR BRIEF. DFW ATIS IN EFFECT, WINDS 160 DEGS AT 8 KTS, 5 SM VISIBILITY, RAIN. CIRCUMNAVED CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY IN VICINITY CQY VISUALLY AND WENT IMC INBOUND FROM CQY. DETECTED AREA OF HVY RAINFALL (RED) ON WX RADAR AT VARIOUS UP-TILT SETTINGS N OF DIETZ ON START ROUTING AND PARALLEL TO FINAL. REQUESTED/CLRED TO DEVIATE W WITH CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN NW ASAP. FO PULLED DFW ATIS, NOW WITH WINDS 180 DEGS AT 13 KTS GUSTING TO 19 KTS, 2 S, VISIBILITY, RAIN, INDICATIVE OF WORSENING CONDITIONS AND APCHING STORM. I INSTRUCTED FO TO ADVISE APCH THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT THE APCH. CTLR REPLIED TERSELY AND DIRECTLY TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WILL BE LNDG ON RWY 17C. I THEN XMITTED THAT HE WAS NOT TELLING WHERE TO FLY THE ACFT. CTLR REPLIED 'DON'T STRESS ON ME' AND WAS APPARENTLY RELIEVED FROM POS. WE BROKE INTO A CLR AREA AND THE FO CALLED THE TWR ON VHF #2 AND WAS ADVISED RAIN WAS SUBSIDING. TURNING BASE AND FINAL, WE OBSERVED HVY PRECIP RETURNS ALL ALONG THE E SIDE OF FINAL AND THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH COURSE WAS COVERED BY HVY PRECIP. APCH AND LNDG UNEVENTFUL. THIS EVENT CLOSELY PARALLELS THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACR ACCIDENTS, BOTH HULL LOSSES. TWR AND WSR-88D RADAR DISPLAYS WERE AVAILABLE TO ACR DISPATCH AND TRACON, BUT NEITHER CHOSE TO DISSEMINATE THIS CRITICAL INFO. FURTHER, OUR ACFT WX RADAR FAILED ON US, AS IN FLT XXXX. THE FLC'S ELECTED TO ABANDON THE APCH AND WERE EFFECTIVELY ENCOURAGED IF NOT OVERRIDDEN BY TRACON -- INTENT ON SCORING THE ARR. IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A FLC TO COMPLY WITH DECISION MAKING AND WX AVOIDANCE POLICIES AND REGULATORY DUTY WITHOUT THE INFO THAT IS AVAILABLE TO ALL BUT THE FLC. IT IS EVEN MORE CHALLENGING WHEN ATC IS ENCOURAGING THE RISK. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS, I REQUEST THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS EVENT BE BRIEFED TO THE ACR DISPATCHERS AND DFW AIR TFC MGMNT WITH THE INTENT OF FORMULATING PROCS TO REDUCE RISK IN HAZARDOUS WX OPS IN THE DFW TERMINAL AREA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT INDICATED HIS ACR HAS HAD NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WHERE THE ATC SYS HAS TRIED TO INTIMIDATE CREWS INTO FLYING INTO AREAS OF TSTM ACTIVITY AND WINDSHEAR. THE PLT HAS REJECTED HIS ACR REPLY TO HIS RPT THAT IN ESSENCE WANTS TO DROP THE ISSUE. THE CAPT NOW HAS A MEETING WITH HIS ACR SAFETY DEPT SCHEDULED TO MAKE HIS PRESENTATION. HE WILL REQUEST THE ACR TO PRESENT THE PROB TO THE FAA AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN WASHINGTON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.