Narrative:

I had just completed a practice CAT III approach in visual conditions. We had briefed and were expecting to taxi straight off on either high-speed taxiway K or H. As we cleared the runway on taxiway H, seattle tower cleared us to: 'turn right and right again, hold short of 34R'. My first officer read it back as: 'two right turns, hold short of 34R'. I don't believe the controller used taxiway names in his clearance, but I understood that I was to make the quick turn onto the intersecting reverse high-speed J, a greater than 90 degree right turn. After completing the turn, I was surprised to see white edge lights rapidly approaching. I looked to the right, down what I now recognized as runway 34R and saw the headlights of an aircraft that had just been cleared for takeoff. I asked my first officer if we were cleared to cross, immediately realized that we were not and applied the brakes to stop the aircraft. Our aircraft's nose ended up about 6 ft past the runway edge lights. I asked my first officer to call the tower and advise them to stop the takeoff of the other aircraft, which he did. The other aircraft aborted his takeoff at what appeared to be a relatively low speed and taxied clear, well south of us on either taxiway north or M. We were then cleared to cross runway 34R and taxied to parking where I called the tower and gave them a brief account of the incident. Human factors considerations: 1. Distraction: I flew a practice CAT III approach for the purpose of logging it for self-certification, concentrating on flying a precise approach and landing using the HUD. During the flare, we got an 'approach warn', which would have required a go around had it been IMC. Since we were in VMC, I continued the landing visually, although the HUD still appeared usable. I was still reviewing the approach and landing in my mind as we cleared the runway. In addition, my first officer became preoccupied with methodically completing the after landing checklist as soon as we had cleared the landing runway (34L). 2. Fatigue: we had been flying in the eastern time zone for 3 days and had arrived late the night before. Although this was not an extremely long duty period 9 hours and 35 mins, the incident occurred at the end of a long day. 3. Expectation: I had briefed and was expecting to taxi straight off the runway and had not anticipated a clearance for a hard right turn onto the intersecting reverse high-speed taxiway. Thus the clearance caught me by surprise, and after the turn, the actual visual picture was different from what I had expected to see. 4. Communications: the non-standard clearance without specific taxiway names was a bit confusing, and it took me a moment to interpret what I was being told to do. I believe I became preoccupied with the first part of the clearance (turn right and right again), while the second part (hold short) didn't completely register in my mind. It's now clear to me that I became momentarily overloaded and vulnerable to making an error. I need to better manage my workload, especially when I'm fatigued, and will do the following: 1. I will no longer plan practice apches at the end of a duty day. 2. I will specifically include in my approach briefing the location and proximity of any active runways to be crossed en route to parking. Additionally, I will brief my co-pilots to not run the 'after landing checklist' until we're clear of all active runways and in contact with ground control. 3. When possible, I will decline shortcut clrncs and request to stay with the simpler routing previously briefed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC INCORRECTLY ASSUME TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AFTER LNDG SEA RWY 34L AND INCUR INTO RWY 34R CAUSING A TKOF ABORT.

Narrative: I HAD JUST COMPLETED A PRACTICE CAT III APCH IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. WE HAD BRIEFED AND WERE EXPECTING TO TAXI STRAIGHT OFF ON EITHER HIGH-SPEED TXWY K OR H. AS WE CLRED THE RWY ON TXWY H, SEATTLE TWR CLRED US TO: 'TURN R AND R AGAIN, HOLD SHORT OF 34R'. MY FO READ IT BACK AS: 'TWO RIGHT TURNS, HOLD SHORT OF 34R'. I DON'T BELIEVE THE CTLR USED TXWY NAMES IN HIS CLRNC, BUT I UNDERSTOOD THAT I WAS TO MAKE THE QUICK TURN ONTO THE INTERSECTING REVERSE HIGH-SPEED J, A GREATER THAN 90 DEG R TURN. AFTER COMPLETING THE TURN, I WAS SURPRISED TO SEE WHITE EDGE LIGHTS RAPIDLY APCHING. I LOOKED TO THE R, DOWN WHAT I NOW RECOGNIZED AS RWY 34R AND SAW THE HEADLIGHTS OF AN ACFT THAT HAD JUST BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I ASKED MY FO IF WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS, IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT AND APPLIED THE BRAKES TO STOP THE ACFT. OUR ACFT'S NOSE ENDED UP ABOUT 6 FT PAST THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. I ASKED MY FO TO CALL THE TWR AND ADVISE THEM TO STOP THE TKOF OF THE OTHER ACFT, WHICH HE DID. THE OTHER ACFT ABORTED HIS TKOF AT WHAT APPEARED TO BE A RELATIVELY LOW SPEED AND TAXIED CLR, WELL S OF US ON EITHER TXWY N OR M. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO CROSS RWY 34R AND TAXIED TO PARKING WHERE I CALLED THE TWR AND GAVE THEM A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT. HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS: 1. DISTRACTION: I FLEW A PRACTICE CAT III APCH FOR THE PURPOSE OF LOGGING IT FOR SELF-CERTIFICATION, CONCENTRATING ON FLYING A PRECISE APCH AND LNDG USING THE HUD. DURING THE FLARE, WE GOT AN 'APCH WARN', WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A GAR HAD IT BEEN IMC. SINCE WE WERE IN VMC, I CONTINUED THE LNDG VISUALLY, ALTHOUGH THE HUD STILL APPEARED USABLE. I WAS STILL REVIEWING THE APCH AND LNDG IN MY MIND AS WE CLRED THE RWY. IN ADDITION, MY FO BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH METHODICALLY COMPLETING THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST AS SOON AS WE HAD CLRED THE LNDG RWY (34L). 2. FATIGUE: WE HAD BEEN FLYING IN THE EASTERN TIME ZONE FOR 3 DAYS AND HAD ARRIVED LATE THE NIGHT BEFORE. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT AN EXTREMELY LONG DUTY PERIOD 9 HRS AND 35 MINS, THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AT THE END OF A LONG DAY. 3. EXPECTATION: I HAD BRIEFED AND WAS EXPECTING TO TAXI STRAIGHT OFF THE RWY AND HAD NOT ANTICIPATED A CLRNC FOR A HARD R TURN ONTO THE INTERSECTING REVERSE HIGH-SPEED TXWY. THUS THE CLRNC CAUGHT ME BY SURPRISE, AND AFTER THE TURN, THE ACTUAL VISUAL PICTURE WAS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT I HAD EXPECTED TO SEE. 4. COMMUNICATIONS: THE NON-STANDARD CLRNC WITHOUT SPECIFIC TXWY NAMES WAS A BIT CONFUSING, AND IT TOOK ME A MOMENT TO INTERPRET WHAT I WAS BEING TOLD TO DO. I BELIEVE I BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH THE FIRST PART OF THE CLRNC (TURN R AND R AGAIN), WHILE THE SECOND PART (HOLD SHORT) DIDN'T COMPLETELY REGISTER IN MY MIND. IT'S NOW CLEAR TO ME THAT I BECAME MOMENTARILY OVERLOADED AND VULNERABLE TO MAKING AN ERROR. I NEED TO BETTER MANAGE MY WORKLOAD, ESPECIALLY WHEN I'M FATIGUED, AND WILL DO THE FOLLOWING: 1. I WILL NO LONGER PLAN PRACTICE APCHES AT THE END OF A DUTY DAY. 2. I WILL SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE IN MY APCH BRIEFING THE LOCATION AND PROXIMITY OF ANY ACTIVE RWYS TO BE CROSSED ENRTE TO PARKING. ADDITIONALLY, I WILL BRIEF MY CO-PLTS TO NOT RUN THE 'AFTER LNDG CHKLIST' UNTIL WE'RE CLR OF ALL ACTIVE RWYS AND IN CONTACT WITH GND CTL. 3. WHEN POSSIBLE, I WILL DECLINE SHORTCUT CLRNCS AND REQUEST TO STAY WITH THE SIMPLER ROUTING PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.