Narrative:

Our flight plan cleared us to the albany airport via the newark 7 departure to brezy then V39 to mooni then V478 to V130 to alb. We were outbound on V39 which is the 057 degree radial of carmel VOR. We were to continue on V39, which required a turn at soars intersection northbound, which was the 355 radial off the bridgeport VOR. Soars intersection was 20 DME off the 057 degree radial of the carmel VOR and 32 DME of the 355 degree radial of the bridgeport VOR. The PF was the captain who had his radial set on carmel 057 degree radial and the PNF was the first officer who had his radio set to the 355 degree radial off the bridgeport VOR. The radios were set in the customary fashion to intercept the new course at soars intersection and continue on V39. At 18 DME from carmel the course of the PNF was coming in and a turn was initiated to a heading of 355 to track outbound on the 355 degree radial. Once the roll out was completed I tuned my radio to bridgeport 355 degree radial to fly to outbound to the next intersection which was mooni and which was 10 mi north of soars, the fix we just passed. Within 10 seconds of making the rollout to the 355 degree heading, ZBW came on and said we missed the turn at mooni and to turn back. We asked him to please repeat and he said, 'you missed the turn, turn back.' up until this point, we knew where we were and what route we were to follow. The controller told me I missed a turn at a fix that I had not yet come to. He gave the instruction to turn back. Sensing the urgency in his voice I immediately turned back to the previous 057 degree heading and was xchking with the first officer as to our track. During this time the controller gave instructions to 2 other aircraft. The elapsed time was roughly 30 seconds. My first officer and I confirmed we had not made it to mooni and that we were on the correct course on the 355 degree heading we were on. I told the first officer to ask for a heading. Before the first officer could ask, ZBW came back even more urgent. He again stated that we missed the turn at mooni and to turn to a heading of 330 degrees, back the way we were originally going. The controller said that we had missed the turn at soars, not mooni. We were in fact on course and within limits. It was the controller's instruction of turn back after we had just made a turn to cause us to get off the airway corridor and his naming a wrong intersection. These instructions caused confusion as to our awareness on our flight plan track. No separation limits were exceeded and we re-established our course and continued to albany without further incident. Upon arriving in albany I phoned ZBW and discussed with the supervisor what happened. The center and the flight crew agreed on 3 things. 1) the turn at soars should be initiated more aggressively to stay tighter on the airway due to the congestion of that corridor. 2) the controller named an incorrect intersection that was used to describe a fix that the flight crew had not yet reached. The controller should have used correct terminology. 3) the term 'turn back' should not be used. The controller had thought we never turned. In fact we did turn and when he said 'turn back,' we did. This term should not be used due to the confusion that it can cause and did. This confusion was made worse by the fact it was on a busy frequency where the flight crew thought action was needed before further clarification. Other possible choices by the controller could have been a question 'are you now established on the 355 degree radial off bridgeport?' or an instruction to turn to a specific heading.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATR42 CREW WAS TOLD THEY MISSED AN AIRWAY TURN AT AN INTXN THAT WAS STILL AHEAD OF THEM.

Narrative: OUR FLT PLAN CLRED US TO THE ALBANY ARPT VIA THE NEWARK 7 DEP TO BREZY THEN V39 TO MOONI THEN V478 TO V130 TO ALB. WE WERE OUTBOUND ON V39 WHICH IS THE 057 DEG RADIAL OF CARMEL VOR. WE WERE TO CONTINUE ON V39, WHICH REQUIRED A TURN AT SOARS INTXN NBOUND, WHICH WAS THE 355 RADIAL OFF THE BRIDGEPORT VOR. SOARS INTXN WAS 20 DME OFF THE 057 DEG RADIAL OF THE CARMEL VOR AND 32 DME OF THE 355 DEG RADIAL OF THE BRIDGEPORT VOR. THE PF WAS THE CAPT WHO HAD HIS RADIAL SET ON CARMEL 057 DEG RADIAL AND THE PNF WAS THE FO WHO HAD HIS RADIO SET TO THE 355 DEG RADIAL OFF THE BRIDGEPORT VOR. THE RADIOS WERE SET IN THE CUSTOMARY FASHION TO INTERCEPT THE NEW COURSE AT SOARS INTXN AND CONTINUE ON V39. AT 18 DME FROM CARMEL THE COURSE OF THE PNF WAS COMING IN AND A TURN WAS INITIATED TO A HDG OF 355 TO TRACK OUTBOUND ON THE 355 DEG RADIAL. ONCE THE ROLL OUT WAS COMPLETED I TUNED MY RADIO TO BRIDGEPORT 355 DEG RADIAL TO FLY TO OUTBOUND TO THE NEXT INTXN WHICH WAS MOONI AND WHICH WAS 10 MI N OF SOARS, THE FIX WE JUST PASSED. WITHIN 10 SECONDS OF MAKING THE ROLLOUT TO THE 355 DEG HDG, ZBW CAME ON AND SAID WE MISSED THE TURN AT MOONI AND TO TURN BACK. WE ASKED HIM TO PLEASE REPEAT AND HE SAID, 'YOU MISSED THE TURN, TURN BACK.' UP UNTIL THIS POINT, WE KNEW WHERE WE WERE AND WHAT RTE WE WERE TO FOLLOW. THE CTLR TOLD ME I MISSED A TURN AT A FIX THAT I HAD NOT YET COME TO. HE GAVE THE INSTRUCTION TO TURN BACK. SENSING THE URGENCY IN HIS VOICE I IMMEDIATELY TURNED BACK TO THE PREVIOUS 057 DEG HDG AND WAS XCHKING WITH THE FO AS TO OUR TRACK. DURING THIS TIME THE CTLR GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO 2 OTHER ACFT. THE ELAPSED TIME WAS ROUGHLY 30 SECONDS. MY FO AND I CONFIRMED WE HAD NOT MADE IT TO MOONI AND THAT WE WERE ON THE CORRECT COURSE ON THE 355 DEG HDG WE WERE ON. I TOLD THE FO TO ASK FOR A HEADING. BEFORE THE FO COULD ASK, ZBW CAME BACK EVEN MORE URGENT. HE AGAIN STATED THAT WE MISSED THE TURN AT MOONI AND TO TURN TO A HDG OF 330 DEGS, BACK THE WAY WE WERE ORIGINALLY GOING. THE CTLR SAID THAT WE HAD MISSED THE TURN AT SOARS, NOT MOONI. WE WERE IN FACT ON COURSE AND WITHIN LIMITS. IT WAS THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTION OF TURN BACK AFTER WE HAD JUST MADE A TURN TO CAUSE US TO GET OFF THE AIRWAY CORRIDOR AND HIS NAMING A WRONG INTXN. THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAUSED CONFUSION AS TO OUR AWARENESS ON OUR FLT PLAN TRACK. NO SEPARATION LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED AND WE RE-ESTABLISHED OUR COURSE AND CONTINUED TO ALBANY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON ARRIVING IN ALBANY I PHONED ZBW AND DISCUSSED WITH THE SUPVR WHAT HAPPENED. THE CTR AND THE FLC AGREED ON 3 THINGS. 1) THE TURN AT SOARS SHOULD BE INITIATED MORE AGGRESSIVELY TO STAY TIGHTER ON THE AIRWAY DUE TO THE CONGESTION OF THAT CORRIDOR. 2) THE CTLR NAMED AN INCORRECT INTXN THAT WAS USED TO DESCRIBE A FIX THAT THE FLC HAD NOT YET REACHED. THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE USED CORRECT TERMINOLOGY. 3) THE TERM 'TURN BACK' SHOULD NOT BE USED. THE CTLR HAD THOUGHT WE NEVER TURNED. IN FACT WE DID TURN AND WHEN HE SAID 'TURN BACK,' WE DID. THIS TERM SHOULD NOT BE USED DUE TO THE CONFUSION THAT IT CAN CAUSE AND DID. THIS CONFUSION WAS MADE WORSE BY THE FACT IT WAS ON A BUSY FREQ WHERE THE FLC THOUGHT ACTION WAS NEEDED BEFORE FURTHER CLARIFICATION. OTHER POSSIBLE CHOICES BY THE CTLR COULD HAVE BEEN A QUESTION 'ARE YOU NOW ESTABLISHED ON THE 355 DEG RADIAL OFF BRIDGEPORT?' OR AN INSTRUCTION TO TURN TO A SPECIFIC HEADING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.