Narrative:

Vny ATCT, airport management and lafd were alerted to any emergency aircraft inbound to the airport. This aircraft arrived vny landing on runway 16R (primary runway). The nature of the emergency produced blowouts to the main landing gear tires. Consequently, debris from the aircraft was left along the ground track from the landing rollout. Runway 16R was closed immediately and rescue crews proceeded to the disabled aircraft at the far end of the runway. There were no injuries. As part of my duties in managing airport and aircraft emergencys, I was instructed by my supervisor to inspect the entire runway for foreign object damage and dispatch airfield maintenance crews for clean up. While carrying out this instruction I was advised by company radio of a separate issue that needed attention on the east side of the airfield at an FBO. I acknowledged the transmission. During my response to this separate incident, at intersection 10F, I crossed the hold bar for runway 16R and without clearance crossed the hold bar for runway 16L (adjacent parallel runway). I did not cross the edge-line for runway 16L. Realizing the error that was made, I stopped, turned around and proceeded back to the holding side of runway 16L. A landing cessna 172 was landing on runway 16L when the incident occurred. As far as I know, the cessna did not alter its path due to my encroachment. After a few moments, I radioed vny ground control for the clearance to cross the left runway. Clearance was given and I proceeded to my destination. In my opinion, the contributing factor most affecting this occurrence would be distraction. This was created by frequent outside radio xmissions (VHF and UHF), the expeditious nature of emergency response and the intensity of handling a pivotal situation. This distraction lead to my belief that my location on runway 16R was south of where I actually was. (Runway 16L ends midfield and my crossing to the east at a more southern point would negate my crossing of this runway.) I have responded to numerous aircraft alerts, incidents and accidents prior to this and have always been diligent in the responsibility of operating a vehicle on an aircraft movement area. I do not feel that I was overwhelmed in this situation more so than others. I've handled worse. In this case it is simple -- I was not paying close enough attention to operating my vehicle (situational awareness).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION BY AN ARPT SECURITY MAINT VEHICLE AT VNY, CA.

Narrative: VNY ATCT, ARPT MGMNT AND LAFD WERE ALERTED TO ANY EMER ACFT INBOUND TO THE ARPT. THIS ACFT ARRIVED VNY LNDG ON RWY 16R (PRIMARY RWY). THE NATURE OF THE EMER PRODUCED BLOWOUTS TO THE MAIN LNDG GEAR TIRES. CONSEQUENTLY, DEBRIS FROM THE ACFT WAS LEFT ALONG THE GND TRACK FROM THE LNDG ROLLOUT. RWY 16R WAS CLOSED IMMEDIATELY AND RESCUE CREWS PROCEEDED TO THE DISABLED ACFT AT THE FAR END OF THE RWY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. AS PART OF MY DUTIES IN MANAGING ARPT AND ACFT EMERS, I WAS INSTRUCTED BY MY SUPVR TO INSPECT THE ENTIRE RWY FOR FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE AND DISPATCH AIRFIELD MAINT CREWS FOR CLEAN UP. WHILE CARRYING OUT THIS INSTRUCTION I WAS ADVISED BY COMPANY RADIO OF A SEPARATE ISSUE THAT NEEDED ATTN ON THE E SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD AT AN FBO. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE XMISSION. DURING MY RESPONSE TO THIS SEPARATE INCIDENT, AT INTXN 10F, I CROSSED THE HOLD BAR FOR RWY 16R AND WITHOUT CLRNC CROSSED THE HOLD BAR FOR RWY 16L (ADJACENT PARALLEL RWY). I DID NOT CROSS THE EDGE-LINE FOR RWY 16L. REALIZING THE ERROR THAT WAS MADE, I STOPPED, TURNED AROUND AND PROCEEDED BACK TO THE HOLDING SIDE OF RWY 16L. A LNDG CESSNA 172 WAS LNDG ON RWY 16L WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. AS FAR AS I KNOW, THE CESSNA DID NOT ALTER ITS PATH DUE TO MY ENCROACHMENT. AFTER A FEW MOMENTS, I RADIOED VNY GND CTL FOR THE CLRNC TO CROSS THE L RWY. CLRNC WAS GIVEN AND I PROCEEDED TO MY DEST. IN MY OPINION, THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MOST AFFECTING THIS OCCURRENCE WOULD BE DISTR. THIS WAS CREATED BY FREQUENT OUTSIDE RADIO XMISSIONS (VHF AND UHF), THE EXPEDITIOUS NATURE OF EMER RESPONSE AND THE INTENSITY OF HANDLING A PIVOTAL SIT. THIS DISTR LEAD TO MY BELIEF THAT MY LOCATION ON RWY 16R WAS S OF WHERE I ACTUALLY WAS. (RWY 16L ENDS MIDFIELD AND MY XING TO THE E AT A MORE SOUTHERN POINT WOULD NEGATE MY XING OF THIS RWY.) I HAVE RESPONDED TO NUMEROUS ACFT ALERTS, INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS PRIOR TO THIS AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN DILIGENT IN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OPERATING A VEHICLE ON AN ACFT MOVEMENT AREA. I DO NOT FEEL THAT I WAS OVERWHELMED IN THIS SIT MORE SO THAN OTHERS. I'VE HANDLED WORSE. IN THIS CASE IT IS SIMPLE -- I WAS NOT PAYING CLOSE ENOUGH ATTN TO OPERATING MY VEHICLE (SITUATIONAL AWARENESS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.