Narrative:

PA60 was crossing the northern end of my airspace at 9000 ft and subsequently entered the next sector without coordination (handoff) having been completed. There is no doubt that it was solely my responsibility to ensure that the handoff was complete in a timely fashion. As usual, we have enough people for a 'normal' operation, but it is unusual for us to have adequate staffing to handle the extra coordination required by aircraft deviating for WX. When the aircraft was still 2 or 3 mins away from the sector boundary, I considered calling the next sector to initiate a manual handoff (since they had not yet accepted the automated handoff which had been flashing to them for several mins). I elected to postpone the call since I had another aircraft which would also enter their airspace soon and I knew that I would have to call the sector again very soon with pertinent information about the second aircraft -- but I did not yet have all the information I needed for this second piece of coordination. This second aircraft was landing at a small airport 15-20 mi inside the adjacent airspace and had turned 60 degrees or 70 degrees right of course to avoid WX. Unfortunately, this caused the aircraft to approach the atlanta terminal area, which is generally off limits to aircraft which are not landing inside their airspace. I called the adjacent sector to coordination this information. During all this time the aircraft data block had been flashing (ie, a handoff had been initiated) to the adjacent sector. I reinitiated a handoff to the sector which was then controling that airspace, and called them to verbally initiate a handoff. They accepted the automated handoff just as I had completed identing myself (in the phone call). I reported this incident to my supervisor, who reported it to the operations manager, because I thought that this was clearly an airspace violation. However, I was told some time later that there had not been a deviation. Like most errors, there are a chain of circumstances and events which might have prevented this error: 1) increased staffing would have allowed me to concentrate on control and separation. 2) if I had been advised of the change in sector confign, I might have remembered the 2 aircraft flashing at sector 18 and reinitiated a handoff to sector 17. 3) if our computer software were smarter, it would automatically rerte handoffs which are flashing at a 'now closed' sector. (It already automatically rertes new handoffs which are sent to a closed sector, but nothing happens with handoffs which are already in progress.)

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZTL ARTCC RADAR CTLR BELIEVED AN OPDEV HAD OCCURRED AT HIS SECTOR, HOWEVER, HE WAS ADVISED BY THE SUPVR THERE WAS NO DEV.

Narrative: PA60 WAS XING THE NORTHERN END OF MY AIRSPACE AT 9000 FT AND SUBSEQUENTLY ENTERED THE NEXT SECTOR WITHOUT COORD (HDOF) HAVING BEEN COMPLETED. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS SOLELY MY RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE HDOF WAS COMPLETE IN A TIMELY FASHION. AS USUAL, WE HAVE ENOUGH PEOPLE FOR A 'NORMAL' OP, BUT IT IS UNUSUAL FOR US TO HAVE ADEQUATE STAFFING TO HANDLE THE EXTRA COORD REQUIRED BY ACFT DEVIATING FOR WX. WHEN THE ACFT WAS STILL 2 OR 3 MINS AWAY FROM THE SECTOR BOUNDARY, I CONSIDERED CALLING THE NEXT SECTOR TO INITIATE A MANUAL HDOF (SINCE THEY HAD NOT YET ACCEPTED THE AUTOMATED HDOF WHICH HAD BEEN FLASHING TO THEM FOR SEVERAL MINS). I ELECTED TO POSTPONE THE CALL SINCE I HAD ANOTHER ACFT WHICH WOULD ALSO ENTER THEIR AIRSPACE SOON AND I KNEW THAT I WOULD HAVE TO CALL THE SECTOR AGAIN VERY SOON WITH PERTINENT INFO ABOUT THE SECOND ACFT -- BUT I DID NOT YET HAVE ALL THE INFO I NEEDED FOR THIS SECOND PIECE OF COORD. THIS SECOND ACFT WAS LNDG AT A SMALL ARPT 15-20 MI INSIDE THE ADJACENT AIRSPACE AND HAD TURNED 60 DEGS OR 70 DEGS R OF COURSE TO AVOID WX. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS CAUSED THE ACFT TO APCH THE ATLANTA TERMINAL AREA, WHICH IS GENERALLY OFF LIMITS TO ACFT WHICH ARE NOT LNDG INSIDE THEIR AIRSPACE. I CALLED THE ADJACENT SECTOR TO COORD THIS INFO. DURING ALL THIS TIME THE ACFT DATA BLOCK HAD BEEN FLASHING (IE, A HDOF HAD BEEN INITIATED) TO THE ADJACENT SECTOR. I REINITIATED A HDOF TO THE SECTOR WHICH WAS THEN CTLING THAT AIRSPACE, AND CALLED THEM TO VERBALLY INITIATE A HDOF. THEY ACCEPTED THE AUTOMATED HDOF JUST AS I HAD COMPLETED IDENTING MYSELF (IN THE PHONE CALL). I RPTED THIS INCIDENT TO MY SUPVR, WHO RPTED IT TO THE OPS MGR, BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS CLRLY AN AIRSPACE VIOLATION. HOWEVER, I WAS TOLD SOME TIME LATER THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A DEV. LIKE MOST ERRORS, THERE ARE A CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THIS ERROR: 1) INCREASED STAFFING WOULD HAVE ALLOWED ME TO CONCENTRATE ON CTL AND SEPARATION. 2) IF I HAD BEEN ADVISED OF THE CHANGE IN SECTOR CONFIGN, I MIGHT HAVE REMEMBERED THE 2 ACFT FLASHING AT SECTOR 18 AND REINITIATED A HDOF TO SECTOR 17. 3) IF OUR COMPUTER SOFTWARE WERE SMARTER, IT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RERTE HDOFS WHICH ARE FLASHING AT A 'NOW CLOSED' SECTOR. (IT ALREADY AUTOMATICALLY RERTES NEW HDOFS WHICH ARE SENT TO A CLOSED SECTOR, BUT NOTHING HAPPENS WITH HDOFS WHICH ARE ALREADY IN PROGRESS.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.