Narrative:

We departed ttn with marginal WX. Deer and wildlife were in the vicinity and low flying ducks were seen flying just below the 100-200 ft overcast. Visibility was variable between 1/4 and 1/2 mi. The captain's pitot cover was not removed. On takeoff, the captain had no airspeed and at liftoff the captain's air data computer was lost. An uneventful divert and landing was made at iad. The problem began during preflight when the PIC did not remove the flagless pitot cover. The sic also missed the cover, but he was not assigned the walkaround preflight. While there were extenuating circumstances, company SOP calls for the PNF to call airspeed alive 3 times and at 80 KTS, call '80 KTS, crosschecked.' the PNF did not see that the captain did not have airspeed until well past 80 KTS. The PIC and PF did not look at his airspeed until after rotation -- and the sic took control of the airplane during climb out. Company SOP allows the PF to rely upon the airspeed callouts by the PNF -- although the dassault training manual states that the 80 KT call is to bring the PF's attention to his own airspeed at this point in the takeoff roll. Multiple departures with pitot/static covers installed have taken place within the past 6 months. Corporate flight management has failed to ever advise pilots that the potential problem exists. While there were a number of items that broke the link in the chain, most troubling was the fact that the captain was not aware of his own airspeed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FALCOM 2000 CREW, DEPARTING TTN, EXPERIENCED SEVERAL AIR DATA RELATED FAILURES. IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THE CAPT'S PITOT COVER HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED PRIOR TO DEP.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED TTN WITH MARGINAL WX. DEER AND WILDLIFE WERE IN THE VICINITY AND LOW FLYING DUCKS WERE SEEN FLYING JUST BELOW THE 100-200 FT OVCST. VISIBILITY WAS VARIABLE BTWN 1/4 AND 1/2 MI. THE CAPT'S PITOT COVER WAS NOT REMOVED. ON TKOF, THE CAPT HAD NO AIRSPD AND AT LIFTOFF THE CAPT'S AIR DATA COMPUTER WAS LOST. AN UNEVENTFUL DIVERT AND LNDG WAS MADE AT IAD. THE PROB BEGAN DURING PREFLT WHEN THE PIC DID NOT REMOVE THE FLAGLESS PITOT COVER. THE SIC ALSO MISSED THE COVER, BUT HE WAS NOT ASSIGNED THE WALKAROUND PREFLT. WHILE THERE WERE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES, COMPANY SOP CALLS FOR THE PNF TO CALL AIRSPD ALIVE 3 TIMES AND AT 80 KTS, CALL '80 KTS, XCHKED.' THE PNF DID NOT SEE THAT THE CAPT DID NOT HAVE AIRSPD UNTIL WELL PAST 80 KTS. THE PIC AND PF DID NOT LOOK AT HIS AIRSPD UNTIL AFTER ROTATION -- AND THE SIC TOOK CTL OF THE AIRPLANE DURING CLBOUT. COMPANY SOP ALLOWS THE PF TO RELY UPON THE AIRSPD CALLOUTS BY THE PNF -- ALTHOUGH THE DASSAULT TRAINING MANUAL STATES THAT THE 80 KT CALL IS TO BRING THE PF'S ATTN TO HIS OWN AIRSPD AT THIS POINT IN THE TKOF ROLL. MULTIPLE DEPS WITH PITOT/STATIC COVERS INSTALLED HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHIN THE PAST 6 MONTHS. CORPORATE FLT MGMNT HAS FAILED TO EVER ADVISE PLTS THAT THE POTENTIAL PROB EXISTS. WHILE THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ITEMS THAT BROKE THE LINK IN THE CHAIN, MOST TROUBLING WAS THE FACT THAT THE CAPT WAS NOT AWARE OF HIS OWN AIRSPD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.