Narrative:

The following incident resulted in a TCASII RA to monitor vertical speed. As we were being vectored around for a visual approach, it became obvious the controller was either new or distraction because he had us at 8000 ft only a couple of mi from the marker. At the last min, he changed our runway to runway 16R. The problem was, he never cleared us for a visual or gave us a final vector. This would not be too unusual if we were going to the left side. Suddenly, the controller told us to turn hard right to avoid the approach area of runway 16L. Of course, we overshot and at that point received the RA. We never heard a supervisor's voice and the controller still at this point said nothing, therefore, we initiated a go around. Throughout the go around and approach, the controller expressed a lack of situational awareness, and we barely got in and avoided a second go around because too many planes were at minimum lateral separation on the final approach. Landing was uneventful. Both the captain and I maintained a close listening watch on the frequency and there were no distrs in the cockpit during this time of sterile cockpit. The confusion and distraction seemed to be solely on the part of the controller. No reference was made of the incident during the approach, landing, and taxi in by any of slc's ATC controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW, ON A VISUAL APCH TO SLC, EXECUTED A GAR UPON RECEIVING AN RA FROM TCASII.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT RESULTED IN A TCASII RA TO MONITOR VERT SPD. AS WE WERE BEING VECTORED AROUND FOR A VISUAL APCH, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THE CTLR WAS EITHER NEW OR DISTR BECAUSE HE HAD US AT 8000 FT ONLY A COUPLE OF MI FROM THE MARKER. AT THE LAST MIN, HE CHANGED OUR RWY TO RWY 16R. THE PROB WAS, HE NEVER CLRED US FOR A VISUAL OR GAVE US A FINAL VECTOR. THIS WOULD NOT BE TOO UNUSUAL IF WE WERE GOING TO THE L SIDE. SUDDENLY, THE CTLR TOLD US TO TURN HARD R TO AVOID THE APCH AREA OF RWY 16L. OF COURSE, WE OVERSHOT AND AT THAT POINT RECEIVED THE RA. WE NEVER HEARD A SUPVR'S VOICE AND THE CTLR STILL AT THIS POINT SAID NOTHING, THEREFORE, WE INITIATED A GAR. THROUGHOUT THE GAR AND APCH, THE CTLR EXPRESSED A LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AND WE BARELY GOT IN AND AVOIDED A SECOND GAR BECAUSE TOO MANY PLANES WERE AT MINIMUM LATERAL SEPARATION ON THE FINAL APCH. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. BOTH THE CAPT AND I MAINTAINED A CLOSE LISTENING WATCH ON THE FREQ AND THERE WERE NO DISTRS IN THE COCKPIT DURING THIS TIME OF STERILE COCKPIT. THE CONFUSION AND DISTR SEEMED TO BE SOLELY ON THE PART OF THE CTLR. NO REF WAS MADE OF THE INCIDENT DURING THE APCH, LNDG, AND TAXI IN BY ANY OF SLC'S ATC CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.