B767 crew member activated the rudder trim to full nose left with a foot on the pedestal.

Attributes
ACN	552484
Time
Date	200207
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : zdv.artcc
State Reference	CO
Altitude	msl single value : 39000
Environment
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	cruise : level
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	552484
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	552488
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies other anomaly other other spatial deviation
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : rudder trim indicator other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	flight crew : regained aircraft control none taken : detected after the fact other
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

Inadvertent rudder trim. While cruising at FL390 and passing a waypoint, we noticed the aircraft turing toward the next waypoint. The aircraft continued the turn past the intended course at which time I thought that the waypoints may have somehow gotten out of sequence. I reached up and selected heading hold, but there was no response. As the bank angle continued past 15 degrees, I knew that something was not right. I disconnected the autoplt, rolled the wings level and realized that the aircraft was out of trim in the yaw axes. We looked down and noticed that the rudder trim was showing 15 units of left trim, at which time we trimmed the aircraft, re-engaged the autoplt, and continued to our destination. After the event, we discussed how 15 units of trim could have been put in inadvertently. We realized that just prior, the first officer was standing between the seats with his foot on the back of the center pedestal, he must have inadvertently touched the trim knob. I realize that all boeing center pedestals as well as rudder trim knobs were modified to prevent this exact scenario after a B737 accident in lga in 1989. During this event, we did not deviate off altitude and our xtrack error was less than 1 mi.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 CREW MEMBER ACTIVATED THE RUDDER TRIM TO FULL NOSE L WITH A FOOT ON THE PEDESTAL.

Narrative: INADVERTENT RUDDER TRIM. WHILE CRUISING AT FL390 AND PASSING A WAYPOINT, WE NOTICED THE ACFT TURING TOWARD THE NEXT WAYPOINT. THE ACFT CONTINUED THE TURN PAST THE INTENDED COURSE AT WHICH TIME I THOUGHT THAT THE WAYPOINTS MAY HAVE SOMEHOW GOTTEN OUT OF SEQUENCE. I REACHED UP AND SELECTED HDG HOLD, BUT THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. AS THE BANK ANGLE CONTINUED PAST 15 DEGS, I KNEW THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, ROLLED THE WINGS LEVEL AND REALIZED THAT THE ACFT WAS OUT OF TRIM IN THE YAW AXES. WE LOOKED DOWN AND NOTICED THAT THE RUDDER TRIM WAS SHOWING 15 UNITS OF L TRIM, AT WHICH TIME WE TRIMMED THE ACFT, RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, AND CONTINUED TO OUR DEST. AFTER THE EVENT, WE DISCUSSED HOW 15 UNITS OF TRIM COULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN INADVERTENTLY. WE REALIZED THAT JUST PRIOR, THE FO WAS STANDING BTWN THE SEATS WITH HIS FOOT ON THE BACK OF THE CTR PEDESTAL, HE MUST HAVE INADVERTENTLY TOUCHED THE TRIM KNOB. I REALIZE THAT ALL BOEING CENTER PEDESTALS AS WELL AS RUDDER TRIM KNOBS WERE MODIFIED TO PREVENT THIS EXACT SCENARIO AFTER A B737 ACCIDENT IN LGA IN 1989. DURING THIS EVENT, WE DID NOT DEVIATE OFF ALT AND OUR XTRACK ERROR WAS LESS THAN 1 MI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.