Narrative:

Conditions: OAT 32, TOGW 212000 reference: cle 10-9 taxi chart. ATC gave us clearance to cross 24L, position hold 24R. At this point our aircraft is facing west on runway 28 and unable to see traffic on final for 24L. We crossed 24L hold short line, aircraft was moving very slowly due to high OAT and settling into asphalt at the higher gross weight power was set to maximum breakaway thrust 35 percent. Once we made the 45 degree turn to cross 24L the 24L final came into view for the first officer he indicated to me that traffic on final was close and did not believe that we could safely make it across in time. This conflict was not visible to me in the left seat, but I decided to stop the aircraft. We were past hold line but short of edge of runway 24L. ATC told us to expedite across but I did not want to continue and possibly place aircraft in danger of a closer conflict. ATC directed runway 24L traffic to go around. ATC then instructed us again to taxi to runway 24R, setting maximum breakaway thrust, aircraft was slow to respond and move. Another aircraft was on final for runway 24L, I saw his position and again we were unable to clear even though we were past the H/south line and had less distance to travel to runway 24R. This caused a second go around. ATC asked us to call tower at destination. During phone call controller seemed to be unaware of impact of high temperatures, heavy aircraft and asphalt have on rate of aircraft movement. He also indicated that once given a clearance onto a runway that we had to do it no matter what we see out of our windows, that we had 2 miles separation to get into position according to their radar and that is sufficient. He was unaware that we always check ATC clearances in this check and balance world and make sure that we can comply with that clearance. In this instance, and what makes cle unique, hold short point does not allow visual confirmation of final until past the 24L hold short point and committed to a possible incursion or conflict. The 2 mile separation stated above may work for rj's and B737 traffic primarily worked at cle, but the distance from the hold short pt. To cross on runway and onto the other combined with the physics of inertia did not work with the breakaway thrust caution in our flight manual even with the second clearance. Tower controllers need to request greater spacings on final from app control when large aircraft are departing. The controllers at cle need to be aware of the effect of high temperatures on heavier aircraft with settling onto asphalt and also there are thrust limits to push the heavy aircraft on the ground contributing to slower movements. ATC should also be required to notify taxiing aircraft of the distance out on final for the crossing runway in addition to the departing runway as currently required. Supplemental information from acn 556272: we were holding short of runway 24L on runway 28, tower told us to cross 24L and position and hold runway 24R. The captain applied thrust of approximately 35 percent N1 and we slowly began to move. (Hot day, heavy aircraft, hot asphalt runway) as we started to make the turn on taxiway Z, I had a better view of final and took notice of an aircraft on about a 1 mi final for runway 24L, based on our acceleration, it seemed likely there would be a conflict, so I told the captain to stop the aircraft. We had already crossed the hold short line by a couple of ft, so the tower sent the other aircraft around and told us to continue to runway 24R. Again the acceleration was slow the tower asked us to hurry across runway 24L, traffic was on a mi final. We did not clear runway 24L in time and another aircraft was sent around. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The situation of aircraft was placed in compromised safety in that we were expected to accelerate and cross the runway 24L like a small, light aircraft in the best of conditions, which we were in neither. The situation was compounded by the tightly spaced arrival aircraft in which we were being inserted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 CREW AT CLE HAD DIFFICULTY TAXIING AND XING RWYS DUE TO THE HOT ASPHALT TAXIWAYS AND TAXI RTE ANGLE TO FINAL.

Narrative: CONDITIONS: OAT 32, TOGW 212000 REF: CLE 10-9 TAXI CHART. ATC GAVE US CLRNC TO CROSS 24L, POS HOLD 24R. AT THIS POINT OUR ACFT IS FACING W ON RWY 28 AND UNABLE TO SEE TFC ON FINAL FOR 24L. WE CROSSED 24L HOLD SHORT LINE, ACFT WAS MOVING VERY SLOWLY DUE TO HIGH OAT AND SETTLING INTO ASPHALT AT THE HIGHER GROSS WT POWER WAS SET TO MAX BREAKAWAY THRUST 35 PERCENT. ONCE WE MADE THE 45 DEG TURN TO CROSS 24L THE 24L FINAL CAME INTO VIEW FOR THE FO HE INDICATED TO ME THAT TFC ON FINAL WAS CLOSE AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE COULD SAFELY MAKE IT ACROSS IN TIME. THIS CONFLICT WAS NOT VISIBLE TO ME IN THE LEFT SEAT, BUT I DECIDED TO STOP THE ACFT. WE WERE PAST HOLD LINE BUT SHORT OF EDGE OF RWY 24L. ATC TOLD US TO EXPEDITE ACROSS BUT I DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE AND POSSIBLY PLACE ACFT IN DANGER OF A CLOSER CONFLICT. ATC DIRECTED RWY 24L TFC TO GO AROUND. ATC THEN INSTRUCTED US AGAIN TO TAXI TO RWY 24R, SETTING MAX BREAKAWAY THRUST, ACFT WAS SLOW TO RESPOND AND MOVE. ANOTHER ACFT WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 24L, I SAW HIS POS AND AGAIN WE WERE UNABLE TO CLR EVEN THOUGH WE WERE PAST THE H/S LINE AND HAD LESS DISTANCE TO TRAVEL TO RWY 24R. THIS CAUSED A SECOND GAR. ATC ASKED US TO CALL TWR AT DESTINATION. DURING PHONE CALL CTLR SEEMED TO BE UNAWARE OF IMPACT OF HIGH TEMPS, HEAVY ACFT AND ASPHALT HAVE ON RATE OF ACFT MOVEMENT. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT ONCE GIVEN A CLRNC ONTO A RWY THAT WE HAD TO DO IT NO MATTER WHAT WE SEE OUT OF OUR WINDOWS, THAT WE HAD 2 MILES SEPARATION TO GET INTO POS ACCORDING TO THEIR RADAR AND THAT IS SUFFICIENT. HE WAS UNAWARE THAT WE ALWAYS CHK ATC CLEARANCES IN THIS CHK AND BALANCE WORLD AND MAKE SURE THAT WE CAN COMPLY WITH THAT CLRNC. IN THIS INSTANCE, AND WHAT MAKES CLE UNIQUE, HOLD SHORT POINT DOES NOT ALLOW VISUAL CONFIRMATION OF FINAL UNTIL PAST THE 24L HOLD SHORT POINT AND COMMITTED TO A POSSIBLE INCURSION OR CONFLICT. THE 2 MILE SEPARATION STATED ABOVE MAY WORK FOR RJ'S AND B737 TFC PRIMARILY WORKED AT CLE, BUT THE DISTANCE FROM THE HOLD SHORT PT. TO CROSS ON RWY AND ONTO THE OTHER COMBINED WITH THE PHYSICS OF INERTIA DID NOT WORK WITH THE BREAKAWAY THRUST CAUTION IN OUR FLT MANUAL EVEN WITH THE SECOND CLRNC. TWR CTLRS NEED TO REQUEST GREATER SPACINGS ON FINAL FROM APP CTL WHEN LARGE ACFT ARE DEPARTING. THE CTLRS AT CLE NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE EFFECT OF HIGH TEMPS ON HEAVIER ACFT WITH SETTLING ONTO ASPHALT AND ALSO THERE ARE THRUST LIMITS TO PUSH THE HEAVY ACFT ON THE GND CONTRIBUTING TO SLOWER MOVEMENTS. ATC SHOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED TO NOTIFY TAXIING ACFT OF THE DISTANCE OUT ON FINAL FOR THE XING RWY IN ADDITION TO THE DEPARTING RWY AS CURRENTLY REQUIRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556272: WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 24L ON RWY 28, TWR TOLD US TO CROSS 24L AND POS AND HOLD RWY 24R. THE CAPT APPLIED THRUST OF APPROX 35 PERCENT N1 AND WE SLOWLY BEGAN TO MOVE. (HOT DAY, HEAVY ACFT, HOT ASPHALT RWY) AS WE STARTED TO MAKE THE TURN ON TXWY Z, I HAD A BETTER VIEW OF FINAL AND TOOK NOTICE OF AN ACFT ON ABOUT A 1 MI FINAL FOR RWY 24L, BASED ON OUR ACCELERATION, IT SEEMED LIKELY THERE WOULD BE A CONFLICT, SO I TOLD THE CAPT TO STOP THE ACFT. WE HAD ALREADY CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE BY A COUPLE OF FT, SO THE TWR SENT THE OTHER ACFT AROUND AND TOLD US TO CONTINUE TO RWY 24R. AGAIN THE ACCELERATION WAS SLOW THE TWR ASKED US TO HURRY ACROSS RWY 24L, TFC WAS ON A MI FINAL. WE DID NOT CLR RWY 24L IN TIME AND ANOTHER ACFT WAS SENT AROUND. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE SIT OF ACFT WAS PLACED IN COMPROMISED SAFETY IN THAT WE WERE EXPECTED TO ACCELERATE AND CROSS THE RWY 24L LIKE A SMALL, LIGHT ACFT IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS, WHICH WE WERE IN NEITHER. THE SIT WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE TIGHTLY SPACED ARRIVAL ACFT IN WHICH WE WERE BEING INSERTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.