Narrative:

We were on a flight from cvg to fll. The flight was conducted as an far part 121 passenger flight. This was an IOE flight with a new captain. We were on the first leg of the flight and his first flight in the new position. The departure, climb, and initial cruise flight were normal and uneventful. Over the florida/georgia border, thunderstorms were beginning to build. These storms extended through northern, central, and southern florida and forced us to remain on the gulf coast until south of the WX. This deviation put us just south of mia with a turn back to the north toward fll. Indications on our radar showed a thunderstorm just west of fll and on the runway 9L localizer. At this time we were in contact with fll approach and at 11000 ft 20 mi from the airport. Approach asked us to keep our speed up and we complied with 320 KTS. The controller gave us vectors that would take us east of the airport and a 270 degree descending turn to the left for a close-in visual approach to runway 9L. The clouds over the approach end of the runway were approximately 1500 ft broken. We broke out on the left base leg approximately 3 mi from the runway with the thunderstorm 4 mi on the right side of us. We were then issued a visual approach to runway 9L. The aircraft was configured for the approach, checklists were run and landing was uneventful. After clearing the runway, I looked down at the radio for ground frequency and noticed that the approach control frequency was still tuned and active. We had landed without a landing clearance! As the PIC and IOE check airman, I take responsibility for this situation. However, I do feel there are some contributing factors to this situation. 1) higher than normal workload situation. 2) severe WX near the airport. 3) 2 frequencys listed on the approach plate without specific runway designations. 4) the controller's failure to switch us over to tower after visual approach clearance. After recapping the situation in my head numerous times, I remember looking at the tower frequencys on downwind leg and not knowing which one to put in as a standby frequency. I thought approach control would issue the frequency when we were handed over. Our pilots at my airline have developed routines which help to remind us if something has not been done. In this case, the taxi/recognition light switch should have been on if a landing clearance had been given. I remember after landing and realizing our mistake we both looked up to see the switch in the 'off' position. I feel [the reason why] we didn't look at this switch is because of the workload. This routine has been a great help in the past and I will still use the technique in the future.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 CREW LANDED AT FLL WITHOUT GETTING LNDG CLRNC FROM THE TWR.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A FLT FROM CVG TO FLL. THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED AS AN FAR PART 121 PAX FLT. THIS WAS AN IOE FLT WITH A NEW CAPT. WE WERE ON THE FIRST LEG OF THE FLT AND HIS FIRST FLT IN THE NEW POS. THE DEP, CLB, AND INITIAL CRUISE FLT WERE NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. OVER THE FLORIDA/GEORGIA BORDER, TSTMS WERE BEGINNING TO BUILD. THESE STORMS EXTENDED THROUGH NORTHERN, CENTRAL, AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA AND FORCED US TO REMAIN ON THE GULF COAST UNTIL S OF THE WX. THIS DEV PUT US JUST S OF MIA WITH A TURN BACK TO THE N TOWARD FLL. INDICATIONS ON OUR RADAR SHOWED A TSTM JUST W OF FLL AND ON THE RWY 9L LOC. AT THIS TIME WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH FLL APCH AND AT 11000 FT 20 MI FROM THE ARPT. APCH ASKED US TO KEEP OUR SPD UP AND WE COMPLIED WITH 320 KTS. THE CTLR GAVE US VECTORS THAT WOULD TAKE US E OF THE ARPT AND A 270 DEG DSNDING TURN TO THE L FOR A CLOSE-IN VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9L. THE CLOUDS OVER THE APCH END OF THE RWY WERE APPROX 1500 FT BROKEN. WE BROKE OUT ON THE L BASE LEG APPROX 3 MI FROM THE RWY WITH THE TSTM 4 MI ON THE R SIDE OF US. WE WERE THEN ISSUED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9L. THE ACFT WAS CONFIGURED FOR THE APCH, CHKLISTS WERE RUN AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I LOOKED DOWN AT THE RADIO FOR GND FREQ AND NOTICED THAT THE APCH CTL FREQ WAS STILL TUNED AND ACTIVE. WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC! AS THE PIC AND IOE CHK AIRMAN, I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SIT. HOWEVER, I DO FEEL THERE ARE SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS SIT. 1) HIGHER THAN NORMAL WORKLOAD SIT. 2) SEVERE WX NEAR THE ARPT. 3) 2 FREQS LISTED ON THE APCH PLATE WITHOUT SPECIFIC RWY DESIGNATIONS. 4) THE CTLR'S FAILURE TO SWITCH US OVER TO TWR AFTER VISUAL APCH CLRNC. AFTER RECAPPING THE SIT IN MY HEAD NUMEROUS TIMES, I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE TWR FREQS ON DOWNWIND LEG AND NOT KNOWING WHICH ONE TO PUT IN AS A STANDBY FREQ. I THOUGHT APCH CTL WOULD ISSUE THE FREQ WHEN WE WERE HANDED OVER. OUR PLTS AT MY AIRLINE HAVE DEVELOPED ROUTINES WHICH HELP TO REMIND US IF SOMETHING HAS NOT BEEN DONE. IN THIS CASE, THE TAXI/RECOGNITION LIGHT SWITCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON IF A LNDG CLRNC HAD BEEN GIVEN. I REMEMBER AFTER LNDG AND REALIZING OUR MISTAKE WE BOTH LOOKED UP TO SEE THE SWITCH IN THE 'OFF' POS. I FEEL [THE REASON WHY] WE DIDN'T LOOK AT THIS SWITCH IS BECAUSE OF THE WORKLOAD. THIS ROUTINE HAS BEEN A GREAT HELP IN THE PAST AND I WILL STILL USE THE TECHNIQUE IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.