Narrative:

I (PIC) was called into work about XB15 for a medevac from anchorage, ak, to dillingham, ak. After pre-flting a learjet 35, I filled out and filed the appropriate paperwork. I headed out to the aircraft to strap in and got the ATIS and clearance while waiting for the rest of the crew to load up. Just as I finished copying the ATIS and clearance, the sic climbed in, I handed him both. Sic proceeded to tune the transponder, set altimeter, etc...while I initiated the start. We proceeded with the after start, taxi and first half of the before takeoff checklists. We were cleared for takeoff as soon as we arrived at the hold short line. I taxied into position on runway 6L and we completed the before takeoff checklist. I pwred up and proceeded to take off. Sic called 'positive rate of climb' and I called for the gear up and the yaw damper on. The 2 main gear door lights stayed red. I reduced power not to exceed the 200 KIAS limit on the gear and brought the nose up to slow down and allow the gear doors to completely close. While passing through approximately 1000 ft, tower told us to switch departure. Sic switched up 118.6 and checked in only to find he had dialed up the wrong departure frequency. ATC told him to switch to 123.8. At approximately 1500 ft, while sic was switching frequencys, I said something to the effect of 'ok, right turn to 190 degree heading at 2000 ft.' sic said 'no, left turn to 330 degrees.' I questioned that and sic looked at the SID which delayed his call to ATC. He again said 'left turn to 330 degrees.' I thought I must have been mistaken and I began a turn to 330 degrees. I started this turn at approximately 2300 ft. Sic checked in with correct departure and we were told to make an immediate right turn to 190 degrees. I started the right turn immediately, we were again told to turn to 190 degrees (I completed 20-30 degrees of heading change to the left before departure told us to make the immediate right turn). I do not remember the exact verbiage but the controller told us we exceeded the 9 DME departure limit, we were over campbell airstrip and were getting too close to the mountains. We continued our climb, heading 190 degrees. We were handed off to center. Supplemental information from acn 556742: when we took off and I raised the gear, the main gear doors would not come up, a common problem in this particular airplane. The captain did what he usually did and reduced the power on the thrust levers to slow the speed from the 200 KTS we had almost reached (and, incidentally, this is vlo for this aircraft) to approximately 160 KTS, at which time the gear doors came up. At about 2400 ft, I had found the anchorage three SID in the book but without realizing I had looked down to the next page, which is the knik six, and read my captain the wrong procedure. I said, 'no, left to 330 degrees.' he said, surprised, 'really? Ok...' and turned the heading bug that he already had on the correct heading all the way around to the erroneous heading I gave him by reading the wrong SID. He began a left turn and had turned about 30 degrees to the left when I switched the transmitter selector to the new departure frequency and finally called them. When the controller responded he said, '...turn right now, heading 190 degrees. Begin your turn now.' the captain immediately reversed his turn to the right. ATC continued, '...terrain alert, continue your right turn, heading 190 degrees.' the captain increased our bank of angle from 30 degrees to 60 degrees in pursuit of the new heading. ATC said again, '...terrain alert, you're over campbell airstrip (a landmark close to the mountains) you're 4 mi from terrain 4400 ft (I think that's the number he gave us) high, you're currently at 3800 ft.' within a few seconds we were at the heading we should have been at, 190 degrees. The captain rolled out of the turn and we continued our climb. ATC was polite, but made a few more comments to the effect of 'remember your turn is supposed to be made by 9 (mi) DME,' and 'check your SID.' I believe the primary contributing factor in this event was the lack of crew takeoff briefing, which I shorted us out of by simply reading the item on the checklist and responding 'no questions.' I did not know until 500 ft before our turn was tobe made that I had no idea which SID we were doing. I'm sure the captain assumed I had read the clearance and understood what was going on. Also, to this day, I do not know why I switched the departure frequency to 118.6 on climb out. Habit, I guess. I believe I remember, however, that the frequency that I switched from was a frequency I knew was not departure, maybe it was clearance or ATIS. Had I read the clearance that the captain wrote down, however, I would have seen that the frequency they gave us in clearance, and the one he wrote down, was 126.4, the correct frequency for departure for the anchorage three SID using the runway from which we took off. We should have had that ready to go in standby mode before we took off. The gear doors hanging up and the subsequent power back to slow the aircraft hurt our climb performance. We were IMC and had no other data dialed in to check our geographical position on the climb out. We obviously passed the 9 DME limit before reaching 2000 ft, or, at least by the time we started our turn in the wrong direction (at 2500 ft). By the time ATC had given us the new departure frequency (123.8, even though it wasn't the one originally assigned, 126.4) I contacted them after a further delay. While looking up the SID, we had flown dangerously close to the mountains. The intersection departure, I am sure, did not help, but I believe this to be much further down the list of contributing factors, way behind the lack of preparedness, primarily on my part.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LEAR 35 FLC FAILED TO TURN AT THE ALT OR REQUIRED DME SID LIMIT. IN ADDITION, THEY TURNED IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WHEN THEY DID TURN, CAUSING AN ATC MSA ALERT DUE TO GETTING CLOSE TO MOUNTAINOUS HIGH RISING TERRAIN. ALSO TUNING IN THE WRONG DEP FREQ.

Narrative: I (PIC) WAS CALLED INTO WORK ABOUT XB15 FOR A MEDEVAC FROM ANCHORAGE, AK, TO DILLINGHAM, AK. AFTER PRE-FLTING A LEARJET 35, I FILLED OUT AND FILED THE APPROPRIATE PAPERWORK. I HEADED OUT TO THE ACFT TO STRAP IN AND GOT THE ATIS AND CLRNC WHILE WAITING FOR THE REST OF THE CREW TO LOAD UP. JUST AS I FINISHED COPYING THE ATIS AND CLRNC, THE SIC CLBED IN, I HANDED HIM BOTH. SIC PROCEEDED TO TUNE THE XPONDER, SET ALTIMETER, ETC...WHILE I INITIATED THE START. WE PROCEEDED WITH THE AFTER START, TAXI AND FIRST HALF OF THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AS SOON AS WE ARRIVED AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I TAXIED INTO POS ON RWY 6L AND WE COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. I PWRED UP AND PROCEEDED TO TAKE OFF. SIC CALLED 'POSITIVE RATE OF CLB' AND I CALLED FOR THE GEAR UP AND THE YAW DAMPER ON. THE 2 MAIN GEAR DOOR LIGHTS STAYED RED. I REDUCED PWR NOT TO EXCEED THE 200 KIAS LIMIT ON THE GEAR AND BROUGHT THE NOSE UP TO SLOW DOWN AND ALLOW THE GEAR DOORS TO COMPLETELY CLOSE. WHILE PASSING THROUGH APPROX 1000 FT, TWR TOLD US TO SWITCH DEP. SIC SWITCHED UP 118.6 AND CHKED IN ONLY TO FIND HE HAD DIALED UP THE WRONG DEP FREQ. ATC TOLD HIM TO SWITCH TO 123.8. AT APPROX 1500 FT, WHILE SIC WAS SWITCHING FREQS, I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'OK, R TURN TO 190 DEG HDG AT 2000 FT.' SIC SAID 'NO, L TURN TO 330 DEGS.' I QUESTIONED THAT AND SIC LOOKED AT THE SID WHICH DELAYED HIS CALL TO ATC. HE AGAIN SAID 'L TURN TO 330 DEGS.' I THOUGHT I MUST HAVE BEEN MISTAKEN AND I BEGAN A TURN TO 330 DEGS. I STARTED THIS TURN AT APPROX 2300 FT. SIC CHKED IN WITH CORRECT DEP AND WE WERE TOLD TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO 190 DEGS. I STARTED THE R TURN IMMEDIATELY, WE WERE AGAIN TOLD TO TURN TO 190 DEGS (I COMPLETED 20-30 DEGS OF HEADING CHANGE TO THE L BEFORE DEP TOLD US TO MAKE THE IMMEDIATE R TURN). I DO NOT REMEMBER THE EXACT VERBIAGE BUT THE CTLR TOLD US WE EXCEEDED THE 9 DME DEP LIMIT, WE WERE OVER CAMPBELL AIRSTRIP AND WERE GETTING TOO CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS. WE CONTINUED OUR CLB, HEADING 190 DEGS. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO CTR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 556742: WHEN WE TOOK OFF AND I RAISED THE GEAR, THE MAIN GEAR DOORS WOULD NOT COME UP, A COMMON PROB IN THIS PARTICULAR AIRPLANE. THE CAPT DID WHAT HE USUALLY DID AND REDUCED THE PWR ON THE THRUST LEVERS TO SLOW THE SPD FROM THE 200 KTS WE HAD ALMOST REACHED (AND, INCIDENTALLY, THIS IS VLO FOR THIS ACFT) TO APPROX 160 KTS, AT WHICH TIME THE GEAR DOORS CAME UP. AT ABOUT 2400 FT, I HAD FOUND THE ANCHORAGE THREE SID IN THE BOOK BUT WITHOUT REALIZING I HAD LOOKED DOWN TO THE NEXT PAGE, WHICH IS THE KNIK SIX, AND READ MY CAPT THE WRONG PROC. I SAID, 'NO, L TO 330 DEGS.' HE SAID, SURPRISED, 'REALLY? OK...' AND TURNED THE HEADING BUG THAT HE ALREADY HAD ON THE CORRECT HEADING ALL THE WAY AROUND TO THE ERRONEOUS HEADING I GAVE HIM BY READING THE WRONG SID. HE BEGAN A L TURN AND HAD TURNED ABOUT 30 DEGS TO THE L WHEN I SWITCHED THE XMITTER SELECTOR TO THE NEW DEP FREQ AND FINALLY CALLED THEM. WHEN THE CTLR RESPONDED HE SAID, '...TURN R NOW, HEADING 190 DEGS. BEGIN YOUR TURN NOW.' THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY REVERSED HIS TURN TO THE R. ATC CONTINUED, '...TERRAIN ALERT, CONTINUE YOUR R TURN, HEADING 190 DEGS.' THE CAPT INCREASED OUR BANK OF ANGLE FROM 30 DEGS TO 60 DEGS IN PURSUIT OF THE NEW HEADING. ATC SAID AGAIN, '...TERRAIN ALERT, YOU'RE OVER CAMPBELL AIRSTRIP (A LANDMARK CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS) YOU'RE 4 MI FROM TERRAIN 4400 FT (I THINK THAT'S THE NUMBER HE GAVE US) HIGH, YOU'RE CURRENTLY AT 3800 FT.' WITHIN A FEW SECONDS WE WERE AT THE HEADING WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT, 190 DEGS. THE CAPT ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN AND WE CONTINUED OUR CLB. ATC WAS POLITE, BUT MADE A FEW MORE COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT OF 'REMEMBER YOUR TURN IS SUPPOSED TO BE MADE BY 9 (MI) DME,' AND 'CHK YOUR SID.' I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS EVENT WAS THE LACK OF CREW TKOF BRIEFING, WHICH I SHORTED US OUT OF BY SIMPLY READING THE ITEM ON THE CHKLIST AND RESPONDING 'NO QUESTIONS.' I DID NOT KNOW UNTIL 500 FT BEFORE OUR TURN WAS TOBE MADE THAT I HAD NO IDEA WHICH SID WE WERE DOING. I'M SURE THE CAPT ASSUMED I HAD READ THE CLRNC AND UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS GOING ON. ALSO, TO THIS DAY, I DO NOT KNOW WHY I SWITCHED THE DEP FREQ TO 118.6 ON CLBOUT. HABIT, I GUESS. I BELIEVE I REMEMBER, HOWEVER, THAT THE FREQ THAT I SWITCHED FROM WAS A FREQ I KNEW WAS NOT DEP, MAYBE IT WAS CLRNC OR ATIS. HAD I READ THE CLRNC THAT THE CAPT WROTE DOWN, HOWEVER, I WOULD HAVE SEEN THAT THE FREQ THEY GAVE US IN CLRNC, AND THE ONE HE WROTE DOWN, WAS 126.4, THE CORRECT FREQ FOR DEP FOR THE ANCHORAGE THREE SID USING THE RWY FROM WHICH WE TOOK OFF. WE SHOULD HAVE HAD THAT READY TO GO IN STANDBY MODE BEFORE WE TOOK OFF. THE GEAR DOORS HANGING UP AND THE SUBSEQUENT PWR BACK TO SLOW THE ACFT HURT OUR CLB PERFORMANCE. WE WERE IMC AND HAD NO OTHER DATA DIALED IN TO CHK OUR GEOGRAPHICAL POS ON THE CLBOUT. WE OBVIOUSLY PASSED THE 9 DME LIMIT BEFORE REACHING 2000 FT, OR, AT LEAST BY THE TIME WE STARTED OUR TURN IN THE WRONG DIRECTION (AT 2500 FT). BY THE TIME ATC HAD GIVEN US THE NEW DEP FREQ (123.8, EVEN THOUGH IT WASN'T THE ONE ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED, 126.4) I CONTACTED THEM AFTER A FURTHER DELAY. WHILE LOOKING UP THE SID, WE HAD FLOWN DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO THE MOUNTAINS. THE INTXN DEP, I AM SURE, DID NOT HELP, BUT I BELIEVE THIS TO BE MUCH FURTHER DOWN THE LIST OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, WAY BEHIND THE LACK OF PREPAREDNESS, PRIMARILY ON MY PART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.