Narrative:

My commercial multi-engine student with approximately 9 hours of training by me in the beechcraft D95A travel air was executing a short field landing. He had previously demonstrated proficiency with this maneuver in prior flts. We touched down on the desired point (1000 ft runway marker) and during the rollout the student retracted the landing gear instead of the flaps. I was unable to stop his actions as it happened so quickly. This occurred approximately 500 ft into the landing roll at a speed below vso. The aircraft skidded to a stop where we secured all electrical and fuel and evacuate/evacuationed the aircraft. During our securing/evacuate/evacuation of the aircraft, the student asked me what happened and I informed him that he retracted the landing gear instead of the flaps. He did not believe me until I pointed out to him the retracted gear switch. Factors contributing to this event were: 1) unconventional location of the landing gear switch. This make/model of aircraft has the throttles, propellers, flaps and gear switches/controls located unconventionally as compared to a cessna. Most of this student's experience is in a cessna. 2) failure to identify and verify the proper switch. The student retracted the gear switch out of habit thinking it was the flaps. 3) CFI physically not guarding the gear switch. However, I was guarding the power quadrant and yoke as well as dividing my attention inside and outside the cockpit. 4) student's limited experience with complex aircraft. 5) landing gear 'squat' switch -- did it function properly? Possible corrective actions: 1) consider physically guarding the gear switch from retraction at the risk of a student making an incorrect power or yoke application. Due to the physical location of the gear switch in this aircraft, one might not be able to react quickly enough from the gear switch to the power quadrant or to the yoke if one's hand is committed to guarding the gear switch. 2) break old and form new student habits through ground and flight training. Personally, I believe I am very thorough in this area. Specifically, when training for and in this aircraft, I constantly remind students to identify/verify all switches, levers, and controls before engaging due to their unconventional location. However, this event proves how strong the law of primacy is and that one can never be absolutely sure of a student's action/reaction. 3) modify the poh's landing procedure. It states 'on any landing, retract the wing flaps near the end of the landing roll. Set elevator trim to '0' reading and open the cowl flaps.' these actions create a busy cockpit and could be deferred to the after landing checklist being performed after the aircraft has come to a complete stop, clear of the active runway. Supplemental information from acn 559198: my instructor asked me to do a short field landing. The airport was a little busy so we held north and west for a while. After receiving clearance we started inbound. My instructor briefed me on where he wanted me to touch down and short field procedures. I touched down on the 1000 ft mark at full stall (approximately 70 mph) held the nose off until it dropped and applied brakes. I then went to raise the flaps. Instead I inadvertently raised the gear lever. I notified the tower that we had a problem. My instructor said we should exit the aircraft now and he got out. I shut down the magnetos, main power and closed the fuel selectors before exiting the aircraft. The emergency crews showed up moments later. They checked us for injuries and talked to us briefly.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE95 INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT. STUDENT RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR INSTEAD OF THE FLAPS DURING LNDG ROLLOUT.

Narrative: MY COMMERCIAL MULTI-ENG STUDENT WITH APPROX 9 HRS OF TRAINING BY ME IN THE BEECHCRAFT D95A TRAVEL AIR WAS EXECUTING A SHORT FIELD LNDG. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED PROFICIENCY WITH THIS MANEUVER IN PRIOR FLTS. WE TOUCHED DOWN ON THE DESIRED POINT (1000 FT RWY MARKER) AND DURING THE ROLLOUT THE STUDENT RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR INSTEAD OF THE FLAPS. I WAS UNABLE TO STOP HIS ACTIONS AS IT HAPPENED SO QUICKLY. THIS OCCURRED APPROX 500 FT INTO THE LNDG ROLL AT A SPD BELOW VSO. THE ACFT SKIDDED TO A STOP WHERE WE SECURED ALL ELECTRICAL AND FUEL AND EVACED THE ACFT. DURING OUR SECURING/EVAC OF THE ACFT, THE STUDENT ASKED ME WHAT HAPPENED AND I INFORMED HIM THAT HE RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR INSTEAD OF THE FLAPS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE ME UNTIL I POINTED OUT TO HIM THE RETRACTED GEAR SWITCH. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS EVENT WERE: 1) UNCONVENTIONAL LOCATION OF THE LNDG GEAR SWITCH. THIS MAKE/MODEL OF ACFT HAS THE THROTTLES, PROPS, FLAPS AND GEAR SWITCHES/CTLS LOCATED UNCONVENTIONALLY AS COMPARED TO A CESSNA. MOST OF THIS STUDENT'S EXPERIENCE IS IN A CESSNA. 2) FAILURE TO IDENT AND VERIFY THE PROPER SWITCH. THE STUDENT RETRACTED THE GEAR SWITCH OUT OF HABIT THINKING IT WAS THE FLAPS. 3) CFI PHYSICALLY NOT GUARDING THE GEAR SWITCH. HOWEVER, I WAS GUARDING THE PWR QUADRANT AND YOKE AS WELL AS DIVIDING MY ATTN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT. 4) STUDENT'S LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH COMPLEX ACFT. 5) LNDG GEAR 'SQUAT' SWITCH -- DID IT FUNCTION PROPERLY? POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) CONSIDER PHYSICALLY GUARDING THE GEAR SWITCH FROM RETRACTION AT THE RISK OF A STUDENT MAKING AN INCORRECT PWR OR YOKE APPLICATION. DUE TO THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE GEAR SWITCH IN THIS ACFT, ONE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO REACT QUICKLY ENOUGH FROM THE GEAR SWITCH TO THE PWR QUADRANT OR TO THE YOKE IF ONE'S HAND IS COMMITTED TO GUARDING THE GEAR SWITCH. 2) BREAK OLD AND FORM NEW STUDENT HABITS THROUGH GND AND FLT TRAINING. PERSONALLY, I BELIEVE I AM VERY THOROUGH IN THIS AREA. SPECIFICALLY, WHEN TRAINING FOR AND IN THIS ACFT, I CONSTANTLY REMIND STUDENTS TO IDENT/VERIFY ALL SWITCHES, LEVERS, AND CTLS BEFORE ENGAGING DUE TO THEIR UNCONVENTIONAL LOCATION. HOWEVER, THIS EVENT PROVES HOW STRONG THE LAW OF PRIMACY IS AND THAT ONE CAN NEVER BE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF A STUDENT'S ACTION/REACTION. 3) MODIFY THE POH'S LNDG PROC. IT STATES 'ON ANY LNDG, RETRACT THE WING FLAPS NEAR THE END OF THE LNDG ROLL. SET ELEVATOR TRIM TO '0' READING AND OPEN THE COWL FLAPS.' THESE ACTIONS CREATE A BUSY COCKPIT AND COULD BE DEFERRED TO THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST BEING PERFORMED AFTER THE ACFT HAS COME TO A COMPLETE STOP, CLR OF THE ACTIVE RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 559198: MY INSTRUCTOR ASKED ME TO DO A SHORT FIELD LNDG. THE ARPT WAS A LITTLE BUSY SO WE HELD N AND W FOR A WHILE. AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC WE STARTED INBOUND. MY INSTRUCTOR BRIEFED ME ON WHERE HE WANTED ME TO TOUCH DOWN AND SHORT FIELD PROCS. I TOUCHED DOWN ON THE 1000 FT MARK AT FULL STALL (APPROX 70 MPH) HELD THE NOSE OFF UNTIL IT DROPPED AND APPLIED BRAKES. I THEN WENT TO RAISE THE FLAPS. INSTEAD I INADVERTENTLY RAISED THE GEAR LEVER. I NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT WE HAD A PROB. MY INSTRUCTOR SAID WE SHOULD EXIT THE ACFT NOW AND HE GOT OUT. I SHUT DOWN THE MAGNETOS, MAIN PWR AND CLOSED THE FUEL SELECTORS BEFORE EXITING THE ACFT. THE EMER CREWS SHOWED UP MOMENTS LATER. THEY CHKED US FOR INJURIES AND TALKED TO US BRIEFLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.