Narrative:

I am a so, line qualified on an A300-B4. I was receiving IOE on a test flight with an engineering crew in order to check out aircraft when they are out of heavy maintenance. I preflted our airplane. We did numerous flight tests for approximately 2 hours. We started an autoplt go around and the pilots were not satisfied with the results. So we attempted a second automatic go around. The automatic go around was started at approximately 50 ft AGL, VFR on the #2 autoplt and the copilot was doing the maneuver. He pulled the toga triggers and I watched the throttles advance, noted the flight path indicator N1 and go around. I monitored engine spool up, watched the flaps retract from 25 degrees to 15 degrees and monitored gear up. I had visual and aural indication of trim aircraft nose up. After gear retraction, a pitch trim light illuminated on the mode warning panel and I announced it. As aircraft climbed, I monitored pressurization momentarily and then looked for traffic. I recall airspeed approximately 140 KTS and high angle of attack above 2000 ft. There was no mention from any pilot of a problem. I think the copilot was having problems leveling off at 3000 ft preselected altitude. We were still climbing and this was the first indication he gave, 'I have no control of the aircraft' as he looked into my eyes. He also banged the control column full forward to the stops with no aircraft response. I never heard the autoplt disconnect nor did I hear anyone announce they tried. The copilot started to pull the throttles back. We have a high angle of attack, low airspeed, and supposedly no elevator control. I started advancing throttles forward. Airspeed was around 119 KTS, flaps 15 degrees, slats 15 degrees, at 220000 pounds. We all firewalled the throttles. I started moving the manual trim wheel forward as fast as possible. I felt the nose start down and asked if the copilot had control. He said yes. A little later, I re-engaged the pitch trim switches and he could then trim the aircraft. I think the pilot thought the nose would drop if he pulled the throttles back. Our angle of attack was too high and he had no elevator control. I think during the go around the copilot applied forward pressure on the yoke and the autoplt was trimming against his command. He never called for flight director, heading, or altitude acquire after 500 ft. I think the profile for the go around was done improperly and feel communication was horrible and felt the pilots should have monitored the whole process a lot better. The captain never tried to manipulate his control column. Something may have been wrong with the airplane. We overtemped both engines and declared an emergency and landed the aircraft. I feel the pilots gave me very little warning about how the airplane was performing and when they did give me feedback, I had almost no time to make a decision and react. I feel if nothing was done, we would have stalled on departure and we would all have died. We were slats 16 degrees, flaps 15 degrees, 224000 pounds approximately. Our paperwork shows stall warning would have sounded around 108 KTS. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the so was assigned to receive some of his IOE training on a test flight. The captain and first officer are line pilots that also conduct test flts for this company. The so had an IOE check airman with him. The reporter thinks that the captain did not supervise the first officer or the aircraft properly. He thinks the first officer was trying to control the aircraft's high climb rate by pushing forward on the control yolk without disconnecting the autoplt. He heard and saw the stabilizer trim, trim nose up. Both the captain and first officer have been removed from the flight test crew as a result of the incident. He also stated the captain's autoplt disconnect button was found intermittent. Both engines were overtemped and one required replacement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 CREW LOST ACFT CTL WHILE CONDUCTING AN OVERHAUL TEST FLT, AUTOPLT AUTO GAR. THE COMPANY WAS CONDUCTING SO IOE TRAINING ON THE TEST FLT.

Narrative: I AM A SO, LINE QUALIFIED ON AN A300-B4. I WAS RECEIVING IOE ON A TEST FLT WITH AN ENGINEERING CREW IN ORDER TO CHK OUT ACFT WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF HVY MAINT. I PREFLTED OUR AIRPLANE. WE DID NUMEROUS FLT TESTS FOR APPROX 2 HRS. WE STARTED AN AUTOPLT GAR AND THE PLTS WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS. SO WE ATTEMPTED A SECOND AUTO GAR. THE AUTO GAR WAS STARTED AT APPROX 50 FT AGL, VFR ON THE #2 AUTOPLT AND THE COPLT WAS DOING THE MANEUVER. HE PULLED THE TOGA TRIGGERS AND I WATCHED THE THROTTLES ADVANCE, NOTED THE FLT PATH INDICATOR N1 AND GAR. I MONITORED ENG SPOOL UP, WATCHED THE FLAPS RETRACT FROM 25 DEGS TO 15 DEGS AND MONITORED GEAR UP. I HAD VISUAL AND AURAL INDICATION OF TRIM ACFT NOSE UP. AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, A PITCH TRIM LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE MODE WARNING PANEL AND I ANNOUNCED IT. AS ACFT CLBED, I MONITORED PRESSURIZATION MOMENTARILY AND THEN LOOKED FOR TFC. I RECALL AIRSPD APPROX 140 KTS AND HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK ABOVE 2000 FT. THERE WAS NO MENTION FROM ANY PLT OF A PROB. I THINK THE COPLT WAS HAVING PROBS LEVELING OFF AT 3000 FT PRESELECTED ALT. WE WERE STILL CLBING AND THIS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION HE GAVE, 'I HAVE NO CTL OF THE ACFT' AS HE LOOKED INTO MY EYES. HE ALSO BANGED THE CTL COLUMN FULL FORWARD TO THE STOPS WITH NO ACFT RESPONSE. I NEVER HEARD THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT NOR DID I HEAR ANYONE ANNOUNCE THEY TRIED. THE COPLT STARTED TO PULL THE THROTTLES BACK. WE HAVE A HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK, LOW AIRSPD, AND SUPPOSEDLY NO ELEVATOR CTL. I STARTED ADVANCING THROTTLES FORWARD. AIRSPD WAS AROUND 119 KTS, FLAPS 15 DEGS, SLATS 15 DEGS, AT 220000 LBS. WE ALL FIREWALLED THE THROTTLES. I STARTED MOVING THE MANUAL TRIM WHEEL FORWARD AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. I FELT THE NOSE START DOWN AND ASKED IF THE COPLT HAD CTL. HE SAID YES. A LITTLE LATER, I RE-ENGAGED THE PITCH TRIM SWITCHES AND HE COULD THEN TRIM THE ACFT. I THINK THE PLT THOUGHT THE NOSE WOULD DROP IF HE PULLED THE THROTTLES BACK. OUR ANGLE OF ATTACK WAS TOO HIGH AND HE HAD NO ELEVATOR CTL. I THINK DURING THE GAR THE COPLT APPLIED FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE AND THE AUTOPLT WAS TRIMMING AGAINST HIS COMMAND. HE NEVER CALLED FOR FLT DIRECTOR, HDG, OR ALT ACQUIRE AFTER 500 FT. I THINK THE PROFILE FOR THE GAR WAS DONE IMPROPERLY AND FEEL COM WAS HORRIBLE AND FELT THE PLTS SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE WHOLE PROCESS A LOT BETTER. THE CAPT NEVER TRIED TO MANIPULATE HIS CTL COLUMN. SOMETHING MAY HAVE BEEN WRONG WITH THE AIRPLANE. WE OVERTEMPED BOTH ENGS AND DECLARED AN EMER AND LANDED THE ACFT. I FEEL THE PLTS GAVE ME VERY LITTLE WARNING ABOUT HOW THE AIRPLANE WAS PERFORMING AND WHEN THEY DID GIVE ME FEEDBACK, I HAD ALMOST NO TIME TO MAKE A DECISION AND REACT. I FEEL IF NOTHING WAS DONE, WE WOULD HAVE STALLED ON DEP AND WE WOULD ALL HAVE DIED. WE WERE SLATS 16 DEGS, FLAPS 15 DEGS, 224000 LBS APPROX. OUR PAPERWORK SHOWS STALL WARNING WOULD HAVE SOUNDED AROUND 108 KTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE SO WAS ASSIGNED TO RECEIVE SOME OF HIS IOE TRAINING ON A TEST FLT. THE CAPT AND FO ARE LINE PLTS THAT ALSO CONDUCT TEST FLTS FOR THIS COMPANY. THE SO HAD AN IOE CHK AIRMAN WITH HIM. THE RPTR THINKS THAT THE CAPT DID NOT SUPERVISE THE FO OR THE ACFT PROPERLY. HE THINKS THE FO WAS TRYING TO CTL THE ACFT'S HIGH CLB RATE BY PUSHING FORWARD ON THE CTL YOLK WITHOUT DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT. HE HEARD AND SAW THE STABILIZER TRIM, TRIM NOSE UP. BOTH THE CAPT AND FO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE FLT TEST CREW AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT. HE ALSO STATED THE CAPT'S AUTOPLT DISCONNECT BUTTON WAS FOUND INTERMITTENT. BOTH ENGS WERE OVERTEMPED AND ONE REQUIRED REPLACEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.